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Preface
The BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) are pleased to present the State of 
Governance report for 2013. The BIGD was established in June 2013 through a merger of the Institute of 
Governance Studies (IGS) and the BRAC Development Institute (BDI) at BRAC University. The BIGD is 
devoted to specialized research on a wide range of governance and development concerns as well as the 
nexus between the two intertwined areas. It also offers specialized postgraduate courses, training 
courses, and plays an advocacy role to voice contemporary issues in the two areas. The IGS had 
published six annual State of Governance Report (SOG) reports from 2006-2013 as one of the 'flagship' 
publications. he reports 
annually, and SOG 2013 is its maiden 'venture.'  
The SOG 2013 investigates the norms and practices of the two dominant political parties of Bangladesh 
and their impact on democratic outcomes. It attempts a deeper understanding of the constraints to the 
development of political institutions in Bangladesh since its inception. In doing so, the report 
particularly focuses on the relationship between political parties and building democracy and its 
institutions in the country. It analyzes issues such as the growing 'monopoly' of the successive ruling 
parties over institutions and resources, systemic weaknesses in the internal governance of parties, 
political violence, the profile of political leaders and its correlation with their performance, severe 
gender under representation, and the financing of political parties.
The findings, based extensively on survey data, key informant interviews (KIIs), case studies, official 
documents and other sources such as public information and newspaper excerpts, portray the nature 
and extent of democratic, accountable and transparent behavior and practices within the political 
parties.  We hope this report will help to enhance the knowledge domain of politicians and the political 
parties, state and non-state actors, and the wider public, i.e., all stakeholders and inform the political 
discourse in the country.
The report is the outcome of a strong effort by BIGD's research team coordinated and led by Minhaj 
Mahmud, Head of Research, BIGD. The contribution of Professor Niaz A Khan, Department of 
Development Studies, University of Dhaka, and Dr Ashikur Rahman, Visiting Fellow, BIGD is gratefully 
acknowledged, as are the reviews by Professor Sohela Nazneen, Department of International Relations, 
University of Dhaka, Dr. Kazi Iqbal, Research Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) 
and Dr. Tofail Ahmed, Lead Specialist, Politics, Democracy and Governance Cluster, BIGD.The solid 
editorial support provided by Ms. Sadaf Siddiqi is deeply appreciated. The BIGD's research associate Mr. 
Kazi Masel Ullah, research assistant Ms. Ramizah Ahmed and the communications team led by Mr. 
Ekram Hossain deserve special mention for ensuring that the report is published in time.
Last but not least, we wish to express our sincere appreciation to the International Development 
Research Center (IDRC) for their generous support and commitment to the institutional strengthening 
of BIGD through the 'Think Tank Initiative.' This has permitted BIGD (formerly IGS) to continue 
publishing its 'flagship' report  the SOG in the past several years. 
Sultan Hafeez Rahman
Executive Director 
BIGD, BRAC University
 Following the merger, BIGD remains committed to continue publishing t
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Executive Summary
The State of Governance 2013 (the report) is devoted to an issue which lies at the centre of the present 
political discourse in the country, i.e., the norms and practices of the two dominant political parties of 
Bangladesh and their impact on the development of political institutions and democracy in the 
country. There is considerable public frustration on the issue and it has lingered for nearly three 
decades. An analysis of this important concern, one which not only involves the present state of the 
country's politics and society but also its future. The report analyzes the factors which have influenced 
political underdevelopment, the degree of democracy within the two parties and the gap between 
'intent' and actual practice within the political parties, political violence, a growing nexus between 
parties and the private sector relating to party financing, and under representation and 'stereotyped' 
roles of women in the parties. Together they point to the risks and threats to democracy in Bangladesh. 
The SOG 2013 is meant as a timely contribution to the public debate on democratic consolidation in 
Bangladesh and is also intended as a contribution to the literature on the political development of 
Bangladesh. The analysis in the report relies both on primary survey data, conducted specifically for the 
report, as well as secondary data including information obtained from key informant interviews, and 
deploys both qualitative and quantitative research methods.   
The introductory chapter sets out the context and the question examined and substance of the 
research. It provides a brief account of the global 'crisis' of democracy and points to the historical 
evidence that the growth of democracy cannot be taken for granted but that its institutions must be 
painstakingly built over a long period. It suggests that while democracies in many countries are 
experiencing serious challenges, there is no room for complacency for the political parties of 
Bangladesh. 
The second chapter is an investigation of the slow political development and democratic consolidation 
in Bangladesh. Deploying a theoretical framework proposed by Fukuyama, it examines the three 
components of political development, i.e., state building, democratic accountability, and the rule of 
law. The findings show that progress in achieving the three key elements are constrained in Bangladesh 
by the overwhelming influence wielded by the two dominant parties who have ruled the country for 
much of its existence, over most state and non-state institutions. On example in the slow development 
of pluralism in the practice of democracy. 
Such near-complete dominance over the various state and non-state institutions by the political 
parties has led to a political system which may be described as 'partyarchy'. The chapter further 
suggests that partyarchy has thwarted the process of political development primarily because of the 
duopolistic nature of party domination over law enforcement agencies and marginalization of non-
partisan citizen's representation at the local level.  The chapter concludes with the recommendation 
that civil society institutions be empowered to play a stronger role in helping to achieve the full 
potential of citizenship in Bangladesh, which can be a major deterrent to the practices associated with 
partyarchy. 
The third chapter assesses the extent to which the two dominant political parties follow democratic 
practices by juxtaposing the principles stated in their respective constitutions with the actual practices 
xv
followed by the respective parties. The chapter attempts to do so on the basis of two broad themes of a 
pluralistic democracy—inclusiveness and decentralization—and five complementary indicators 
associated with the two themes—participation, representation, competition, responsiveness, and 
transparency. Thus, the chapter focuses on intra-party democracy as it deconstructs the differences 
between the 'scruples' and the 'practices'. While the former are determined by analyzing the relevant 
party constitutions at the national level, the latter are determined by the practices of the district level 
party offices. The chapter also builds on the analyses at the two tiers of party organization by 
addressing the five components mentioned above, and argues that often rudimentary democratic 
practices are absent at the district levels of the two main parties in Bangladesh, which further 
diminishes the prospects of  democratic consolidation in the country. 
The fourth chapter sheds light on the nature of 'political violence' in Bangladesh using incidents of 
political violence gleaned from the print media. Within this context, the chapter defines 'political 
violence' as 'party induced violence' i.e.,the violence between and within political parties, between 
political parties and individuals, between political parties and different interest groups, as well as 
between parties and law enforcing agencies. The trends and patterns that emerge from the 
investigation suggest that 'political violence' has increased at a constant rate of four percent compared 
to previous years. Furthermore, the study reveals the ruling party's (regardless of which party is in 
power) endemic propensity to engage in political violence, surpasses that of the opposition parties in 
the period under consideration. The hypothesis is further tested with political and economic variables 
and shows a close association between slow political development and the reported increase in 
political violence. 
The fifth chapter investigates the profiles of individual politicians given that the country's 'democratic 
deficit' is expected to be profoundly influenced by the behavior of party members in its socio-political 
space. Essentially, the chapter analyses profiles of politicians who became political representatives as 
nominees of the dominant political parties. It also examines whether leadership traits matter to 
parliamentary performance. The chapter further points out the significant presence of legislators with 
legal and corruption charges and highlights the weak quality of 'screening' of aspiring parliamentary 
candidates in the country's electoral processes.  The analysis shows evidence of the performance of 
parliament members in terms of attendance and participation in the budget session—suggesting a 
negative association between legislative experience and parliamentary attendance. A further 
indication of under performance of legislators is the identity or influence of the respective political 
party. Overall, further research is needed to explore the systematic relationships between who the 
leaders are and how they behave, which have important implications for democratic consolidation. 
The sixth chapter, following on the findings of the previous chapter, suggests that the presence of 
women in political structures is abysmally low in the dominant political parties, mainly because women 
are relegated to the lower levels in party hierarchies and deputed for community mobilization works. 
Such low participation of women in major political party activities reflects strong gender biases in the 
process of recruitment of members when it comes to formal political power and other arenas of 
political apprenticeship. This in turn, reflects on the overarching ideology in both the major parties, 
which is that women lack the financial resources to become political enforcers. 
xvi
Chapter seven examines the financial resources of the major political parties and the association that 
political parties are believed to have with persons in business. Interestingly, although both the 
dominant parties recognized membership fees as the major source of earnings of district units in 
survey responses, the key informant interview (KII) findings suggest that political parties rely largely on 
large donations from their members or sympathizers in the private sector. The chapter concludes that 
there is significant deviation between what the parties claim as their sources of finance and their actual 
practices. Hardly any contributions flow from the district committees to central party funds.
The report concludes that the norms and practices of the two dominant political parties have severely 
constrained the establishment of a modern, constitutional democracy; and, further that their political 
conduct poses major risks to reversal of the gains achieved through the democratic process so far. The 
report argues that an enlightened social contract or national compact in which narrow party interests 
are subordinated to those of the country's, is an urgent imperative in consolidating democracy and 
fostering its further growth. 
xvii
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Introduction
1.1  Preliminaries
The previous State of Governance (SOG) reports have used the term 'governance' to imply the sum 
total of institutions and processes through which society orders and conducts its collective or common 
affairs' (IGS 2012). To this viewpoint, it may be added that governance also includes the advancement 
of civil liberties and the rule of law by civil society. This view of governance provides a broad 'canvas' to 
address concerns relating to it, and inevitably, to development—economic, political, social and 
cultural. The first three SOG reports constituted an inquiry into the institutions and politics of 
Bangladesh. The SOG 2009 shifted the focus to sector level analysis of specific policy concerns—food 
security, energy, 'digital' development and international labor migration. The next SOG was a double 
thissue and coincided with the 40  birth anniversary of Bangladesh. It moved back to the macro level, 
streaming together the themes of autonomy, independence and the influence of development 
partners in shaping public policy. The SOG 2012 took a different approach from the ones taken in past 
reports, in that the analysis was based on secondary data obtained from the government, instead of 
primary data. And, the analysis pertained to district level service delivery in health and education, thus 
reflecting views from a lower tier of administration. 
Taking into consideration our previous endeavors, this year's SOG  is devoted to a concern that has 
been at the centre of the political discourse in Bangladesh since the advent of multiparty democracy in 
1991, and one that involves the very fabric of the country's society and its future—the political parties 
of Bangladesh. The political party system is the bedrock of modern democracies.  The practices of 
these parties to a large extent determine the 'performance' of democracy as a form of political 
organization of society in a given country. Their behavior profoundly impacts the functioning of 
democratic institutions and hence the 'outcomes' of democracy. The practices of political parties and 
the outcomes achieved by democracy are thus deeply related. More specifically, the present SOG 
1
1
1. The terms 'modern', 'constitutional' and 'liberal' are used interchangeably to qualify democracy in this report. They 
therefore refer to same form of democracy. 
2. The causation may run both ways, i.e., from democracy to political parties depending on the context. In the case of 
Bangladesh, the establishment of democracy was one of the key ideals of the liberation war, and has been practiced for 
over two decades. Hence, it seems reasonable to ask: Is democracy delivering? The implication here being that the 
political parties determine the outcomes achieved by democracy.
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(2013) examines the proposition that democracy in Bangladesh is challenged by the practices of the 
political parties, hence being unable to deliver the expected outcomes.  In investigating the 
proposition, the report considers only the two dominant political parties of the country—the Awami 
League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The focus of the report is not on democracy 
per se but rather on the norms and practices and behaviour of the political parties to the extent they 
impact democratic outcomes.  Section 1.2 on democracy and its predicaments across the world in the 
stearly 21  Century is included only to add depth to the context in which the SOG 2013 is written.  As 
stated in the Preface, the research and analysis of SOG 2013 is based on multiple sources of data; 
primary data including key informant interviews as well as secondary data. Both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses are used.  
The idea of a political organization in which sovereign power rests with, and is exercised by the people 
for their own benefit  based on the principles of civil liberty, equality of opportunity and the rule of law 
is one of history's most transformational ideas.  In the conventional narrative, modern democracy 
traces its roots to ancient Greece and Roman law and evolves through the Magna Carta and the 
subsequent early English representative institutions, the American Constitution and Bill of Rights and 
reaches a new height with the French Revolution and the final overthrow of the absolutist monarchies 
of Europe.  The principles of democracy are thus owed to the works of many political philosophers 
written over centuries—Plato, Socrates and Aristotle, Mill, Hume, Bentham, Hobbes, Locke, Adams, 
Jefferson, Hamilton and later Rousseau, Robespierre, Voltaire, Montesque, Tocqueville, et al., not 
mentioning the modern theorists, who have, no doubt, also contributed to shaping liberal democracy 
as we know and practice it today.  It has been the 'chosen model' of political organization in the 
thindustrialized societies for over 250 years, and has experienced its most spectacular success in the 20  
Century. The last half of the century coincided with unprecedented wealth creation and sustained rise 
in living standards in the industrialised countries.
The same period also witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist 
countries (Huntington and Samuel 1991). In Asia, East and Southeast Asian economic success 'stories,' 
i.e., Japan and the Philippines (after the second world war), and later Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, 
followed by Thailand and Indonesia also emerged as democracies following long periods of colonial, 
autocratic or military rule. It was no longer away doubt that countries would eventually choose 
democracy as the preferred political system as they industrialised and modernised—democracy was a 
historical inevitability. These events, gave democracy a legitimacy it had not enjoyed before. It not only 
put its critics on the 'back foot' but also convinced its champions of its 'invincibility' as a form of political 
organisation. Many scholars argued that only modern or liberal democracy could guarantee civil 
liberties, pluralism and an open society needed to ensure economic prosperity. In other words, 
fundamental freedoms espoused by liberal democracy and 'free' market capitalism were thus 
inseparable. Its success led to Fukuyama's celebrated proclamation: 
2
1.2  Democracy in crisis? 
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“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of 
post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution 
and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” 
(Fakuyama 1992)
In hindsight, such exuberant claims were premature at best and deeply flawed at worst. Even Athenian 
democracy did not grow strong enough roots to be sustained in ancient Greece for long enough; 
neither did it spread to other parts of Europe (Economist 2014). Its rebirth in the industrialised 
countries nearly two millennia later and its spread was never even.  The political history of democracy 
is replete with many examples of reversal—the most recent example being the reversal of Thai 
democracy in recent months and in the past decade, the 'back tracking' of democracy in some East 
European countries. On the eve of World War II, only 11 democracies lived in its heartland—the United 
States and Europe. Scholars such as Amartya Sen have argued that representative institutions have 
existed for much longer than the narrative above would suggest (Sen 2006).  However, these were not 
based on the ideals of modern democracy born during the 'Enlightenment.'  
The global financial and economic crisis and its lingering effects have compelled a serious reflection on 
democracy and its institutions: the role of the legislature, forms of representation, the separation of 
powers, the limits and exercise of executive power (central and local), the role of political parties, the 
relations between state institutions and political parties, relations between political parties, leaders 
and vested interest groups, the role of civil society, etc. The legislative 'paralysis' in the US Congress and 
the polarisation between the two main parties in the US have slowed urgently needed legislation, 
including those relating to economic reforms, and sharply lowered public trust in the US politicians and 
the Congress. In addition, a similar 'trust deficit' with respect to British Parliamentarians, Europe's 
political 'paralysis' resulting in ineffective economic policies in the face of a severe economic downturn, 
the 'regionalisation' of the party system, weakening of secular values and rising corruption in South 
Asian democracies, etc. have weakened public trust in politicians, parties, and with them, challenged 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions. From the West to the East, democracy suddenly seems to be 
on the 'back foot' everywhere. Some view the present state of democracy around the world as a 'crisis.' 
Whether it is or not will yet be debated. However, what can be said is that democracy is not 'delivering' 
3expected outcomes, not the least of which are individual and collective well being  of the general public 
and good governance.
That the problems of democracy are global should, however, give no comfort to political parties in 
Bangladesh. Four decades after independence several of the fundamental guarantees of the 1972 
Constitution remain elusive. Even in the post 1991 period of multiparty democracy, the country has not 
been able to achieve a single peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to the next. 
Democracy in Bangladesh is characterized by declining 'quality' of political representation, political 
exclusion (scant representation of minorities and ethnic peoples), poor gender representation in the 
political parties and in Parliament, deeply flawed inner party processes, entrenched 'majoritarianism,'  4
Introduction
3. Well being' here does not refer to material well being alone but rather a more holistic 'well being' encompassing personal 
security, cultural attainment and spiritual fulfillment, apart from national well being achieved by society as a whole. 
4. A system in which political parties rule with a simple majority of electoral votes, without regard for the opposition party 
or parties which may have won a greater proportion of the total national vote.  
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increasing ruling party 'capture' of institutions and resources, rising violence, and lack of transparency 
in party financing, weak pluralism within and across political parties. In areas where significant gains 
had been made in the past, particularly with regard to the issue area of holding free and fair elections, 
there seems to have been some reversal in the gains that were initially achieved. 
Despite its importance, rigorous research on the political parties and democratic institutions in 
Bangladesh is limited. This made it more difficult for the SOG 2013 team to undertake a more 
exhaustive study of the subject. Moreover, the subject of the report covers a broad area involving many 
different aspects and dimensions. For purposes of brevity and focus, therefore, the investigation in 
SOG 2013 includes a select few aspects of party behavior which contribute to a richer understanding of 
the workings of Bangladesh' political parties and provide interesting insights into the challenge 
democracy faces as a consequence. The report is thus a contribution to the literature on political 
parties and democracy in Bangladesh.  
The beginnings of the Awami League (AL)'s hegemony over the Bangali nationalist movement during 
the pre-independence period may be traced to the historic six point program. The program gave voice 
to the growing sentiments of the Bangali majority against Pakistani rule. In the 'heels' of this, came the 
anti-Ayub movement in 1969, whose 11 points program incorporated AL's 6 points but was more 
radical and went beyond the demand for provincial autonomy for what was then East Pakistan. The AL, 
having emerged as the champion of Bangali nationalism and with its superior organisational capability 
quickly established leadership over the movement. Significantly the '69 Movement ended Ayub's 
authoritarian military-backed rule, which had come to symbolise the concentration of wealth in the 
hands of a few industrialists (which did not include Bangalis), systemic discrimination against the then 
East Pakistan and its people, and freed the 'strongest voice' and leader of the nationalist movement, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Despite vociferously raising the issue of political and democratic rights of the 
Bengali majority of the country as well as being the first to raise the 'specter of separation' from 
Pakistan as a means to establish those rights, the political 'left' at the time failed to put forward a 
unified, alternative view on the most burning issue of the day: the 'right of national self-determination' 
of the Bangalis. The AL thus emerged as the uncontested leader of the movement for Bangali 
nationhood by 1969. 
In its post-1971 incarnation, the AL claimed legitimacy from its leadership of the Bangali nationalist 
movement which led to the birth of Bangladesh. Consequently, it has drawn inspiration from the 
liberation war. It is the oldest political party of Bangladesh with a 60 year history. Nationalism, 
democracy and secularism form the core of their ideals. In the run up to the elections of 1991, the AL 
abjured its support for 'socialism' which was quite pronounced during the pre independence period. It 
reinvented itself by dropping socialism—'statism and nationalisation' of large industries (commanding 
heights of the economy), and emerged as a 'centrist' party embracing deregulation, privatisation and 
the 'market economy.' The AL, however, maintained a strong 'accent' on social justice centered on the 
rights of workers and farmers. In theory, the AL may be described as a 'left of center' party.  
1.3  The political parties
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The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) on the other hand, is a post-independence phenomenon 
formed in the lead up to General Ziaur Rahman's entry into competitive politics in the post-1975 era. It 
was, and to a large extent remains, a coalition of all political forces from the 'right' and the 'left who 
were opposed to the AL. The BNP's nationalist politics was based not so much on a harkening back to 
the spirit of the liberation war, but rather on 'Bangladeshi' nationalism distinguished by a strong 
opposition to secularism and socialism. The 'Muslim identity' of Bangladesh is a seminal pillar of BNP's 
ideology, in sharp contrast with the AL's ideology of a secularism based on the country's Bangali 
identity, which recognizes the religious and cultural heritage of all Bangladeshis, i.e., it embraces its 
pre-Islamic past.  This in our view, represents a deep 'fault line' in Bangladeshi politics (to which we 
return briefly below). Some political forces within the BNP were also drawn together by a strong 
sensitivity to perceptions of the country's large neighbor and its multi-faceted relations with 
Bangladesh, especially in its early years. It remains a highly centralised party by 'construct' with many 
of its powers vested in the leader of party. At birth it may have reflected in part, the party leader's 
military background and a felt need to hold a vastly diverse political coalition, which was not 
necessarily bound together by political ideals beyond a reaction to secularism, socialism and 
Bangladesh' close relations with its large neighbor. It has thus relied more on the charisma of its leader 
to develop politically. The BNP embraced Bangladeshi nationalism, democracy and the market 
economy as its ideals from its birth. 
Its more progressive leaders argue that the intent of its founders was to create a 'right of center' 
democratic party seeking inspiration not only from the struggle for independence but also from 
moderate Muslim values which, in their view, permeate Bangladeshi society. The party has, however, 
veered closer to the anti-independence, religious political forces such as the Jamaat-E-Islami, some of 
whose leaders are being tried for war crimes committed during the liberation war in 1971. They also 
formed electoral and political alliance with these forces to contest elections and wage anti-
government protests, the worst manifestations of which were seen throughout the last year.   
The behaviour and practices of the two major political parties continue to frustrate the general public. 
Their unyielding confrontational stance played out over two-and-a-half decades with astonishing 
disregard for democratic norms has been a source of persistent political instability and public anxiety.  
Such political conduct is not only incompatible with constitutional democracy in which pluralism 
among other ideals is a prerequisite. The country has been consistently ranked poorly in the global 
governance, corruption and business environment indicators, as well as having its human rights record 
questioned.  It has sharply polarized the country and slowed political development and the growth of 
democratic and state institutions. Importantly, it has slowed the country's march to prosperity.
The underlying motivation for such sharp antagonism among the two main political parties is difficult 
to explain without considering a more complex question which centers around two competing visions 
of Bangladesh, in which national identity is the epicenter. Are we Bangladeshi or Bangali? This deep 
'fault line' alluded to above has existed since the advent of Islam in Bengal seven centuries ago. The 
partition of Bengal in 1905 and its annulment seven years later and the partition of India and creation of 
5
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5. The political turmoil in Egypt for example, is essentially a struggle between similar identities. Arab nationalism under 
secularists has been more inclusive and recognizes its pre-Islamic heritage or embraces some modern political ideals.
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Pakistan and later the independence of Bangladesh, all have been attempts to resolve one or other 
aspect of this fundamental question. The infancy of democracy in Bangladesh, its economic 
underdevelopment and educational levels, and in part its feudal and colonial history and the country's 
failure to conduct a professionally supervised deweaponisation program in the aftermath of the 
liberation war explain parts of the 'puzzle,' but does not provide an overall coherent answer.  A more 
robust explanation must include the failure of the political parties to present a convincing narrative of 
our national identity. This is a profoundly ideological question and not one that merely relates to 
personal or family animosities. The role of national identity in the politics of Bangladesh is a complex 
subject on its own and deserves separate treatment. As such, it is not explored further in this report.
The SOG 2013 investigates six central issues relating to the behaviour of political parties that 
undermine democratic consolidation. The second chapter investigates the increasing 'control' of the 
ruling parties over state institutions and resources, which is likely to slow political development—in 
this case, multiparty democracy and democratic consolidation. The third chapter investigates the 
nature and extent of compliance of the parties with their expressed principles and ideals. Issues of 
inner party democracy, broad based participation of political cadres in internal debates, electoral 
contests at the district level, and the influence of central and prominent members in electoral 
outcomes, as well as representation of minorities are also analysed, and an innovative Party 
Democracy Index (PDI) is constructed to 'measure' the extent of democracy within the two dominant 
political parties.  The fourth chapter investigates trends and sources of political violence relating to the 
two parties and whether the distribution of power between the parties breeds political violence.  The 
fifth chapter is an investigation of the profile of political leaders (MPs) along seven dimensions and its 
correlation with the performance of the politicians. In doing so, the analysis identifies indicators which 
may be taken into account in selecting party leaders, especially those seeking nomination to public or 
party offices. The sixth chapter relates to gender role and representation in the political parties and 
sheds light on gender inclusiveness, or the lack thereof, in intra-party political practices. The seventh 
chapter investigates the financing of political parties. The analysis includes the party rules relating to 
fundraising for the party and the divergences of the actual norms and practices vis a vis the rules. It also 
sheds light on accounting practices and the extent of transparency in submissions made to the Election 
Commission. The eighth chapter comprises the conclusions.   
The intent of this report is to add to the knowledge of the conduct and practices of the two dominant 
political parties and assess their impact on democratic outcomes on a number of dimensions. It is the 
product of research and attempts to address the 'paramount' political debate in the country. As a 
research report, it takes no political position, but rather concerns itself with the problems and 
prospects of political development to promote liberal, constitutional democracy. Clearly, the country 
has made progress in building democratic institutions including a parliament to which elections based 
on adult franchise are held every three years. It is also a fact that despite the political instability 
experienced from time to time, the country has experienced strong social and economic results. 
However, these gains must be protected and advanced within a vibrant democratic order. Thus, the 
point of this SOG 2013 is to draw attention to some persistent and challenging issues relating to 
democratic consolidation in the country. 
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1. The term, partyarchy is in sharp contrast to Robert Dahl's (1989) definition of polyarchy. The term Polyarachy ensures 
that minorities are not excluded from the governance and where de jure and de facto pluralism guarantees effective 
representation to organized social interests. Partyarchy, in this sense, is "the degree to which political parties interferes 
with the fulfillment of the requirement for polyarchy" (Coppedge 1994; p.19).
Partyarchy and Political
Underdevelopment 
2.1  Introduction
Although Bangladesh has made significant strides on the economic front, political development still 
remains elusive. The main question being; what is preventing political development in Bangladesh? 
This study attempts to systematically study the key underlying factors towards political 
underdevelopment. In doing so it uses the theoretical framework offered by political scientist 
Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama (2011) identified three components of political development: a) state 
building (state's impersonality and state's monopoly over legitimate violence), b) democratic 
accountability, and c) rule of law. The three components are intertwined, and the development of 
each facilitates the development of others. 
Political parties largely determine the pace and quality of the evolution of any political culture, being 
the principle actors in this domain. The nature of party functioning also has ramifications on the 
behavior of the state. In Bangladesh, during the last two decades, the two dominant political parties 
successfully infiltrated most state (including constitutional bodies, key economic institutions) and non-
state institutions (civil society, media, and professional groups), thereby preventing their 
institutionalisation, weakening their ability to contribute to the development of a pluralistic 
democracy (Hassan, M. 2013).
This attempt by the political parties to capture state and non-state institutions has been termed as 
partyarchy. It is a political phenomenon whereby “political parties monopolise the formal political 
1process and politicise society along party lines” (Coppedge 1994; p. 24).  In partyarchy, political parties 
tend to monopolise instruments of political participation, subordinate all other forms of political or 
2
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social organisation, and limit the transparency and autonomy of interest groups. The ruling party 
develops a strategic nexus with organized interest groups (labor unions, professional associations, civil 
society groups), on the basis of ideological and organisational control, and distribution of patronage. 
Such partyarchal forms of domination were particularly apparent during the last two decades (Islam 
2010). This study aims to analytically explore the relationship between partyarchy and political 
development in Bangladesh. It provides a systematic body of evidence showing how partyarchy has 
adversely affected state building and undermined the autonomy of civil society. The focus remains on 
the post-1991 period, thus exploring what happened in the democratic phase that came in with a lot of 
hope and anticipation.
Firstly, we provide a brief analytical narrative of the partyarchal influences over major state 
institutions and civil society in Bangladesh, based on a desk review. Secondly, to illustrate how 
partyarchy has deterred state building, we present a case study of police administration. Thirdly, to 
explore partyarhcy's impact on rule of law, we present a case study of the Supreme Court Bar 
Association. Fourthly, we conduct a case study of selected UPs (Union Parishad) to show how 
partyarchal influences in the governance of UP have adversely affected democratic accountability at 
the local level.
Partyarchy has operated in a complex manner across state organisations and social sectors in the 
country after democracy was introduced whereby the dominant political parties, particularly, 
Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have successfully politicised state 
institutions and organisations along party lines. These parties have secured a clientelistic control 
over various organisations, ranging from trade unions, businesses, to professional associations such 
as doctor's and lawyer's associations. The AL and the BNP had an alternating monopoly in 
Bangladeshi politics, which has determined the nature of party-state relations, as well as those 
between state and society. 
Partyarchal governance takes three forms: Monopoly (winner takes it all), Duopoly (ruling party 
shares power and rents with another major party), and in rare instances Pluralist (in which other 
smaller parties have a certain share of the power and rents). The ruling party often relates to state 
institutions, organisations and autonomous constitutional bodies in a monopolistic partyarchal 
form. The ruling party, for instance, tends to have monopolistic partisan control over the civil 
bureaucracy, state-owned electronic media, law enforcement agencies, institutions of horizontal 
accountability (Public Service Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission), the lower judiciary and, 
more recently, also the higher judiciary (Hassan 2001; CGS and BRAC RED 2006; IGS 2008; ICG 2012 ). 
The ruling political party is also able to use the security forces as de facto private enforcers of 
violence. One of the critical strategies to ensure such partisan control is the politicisation of police 
recruitment process. This strategy created a systemic network between the officials loyal to ruling 
party politicians. 
2.2  A brief overview of partyarchal control over the state and civil society2
2. This section heavily borrows from Hassan 2013.
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The domain of party-civil society relations manifests in both duopolistic and pluralist partyarchal forms 
of dominance. The political parties (predominantly AL and BNP but also to a limited extent Jatiya Party 
(JP) and Jamat E Islami (JI), and in rare cases other smaller parties), have directly or indirectly colonised 
3almost all important civil society organisations (CSO).  These CSOs are generally proactive and have a 
large membership base. However, due to the clientelistic dependency of the CSO leadership on 
political parties, these organisations are virtually incapable of demanding accountability from the state 
in their policy and professional domain.  Hence these CSOs often fail to act as effective pressure groups 
to defend collective professional interests. 
Duopolistic partyarchal control (by AL and BNP) is mostly evident in powerful CSOs such as associations 
of lawyers and doctors. In these associations factions loyal to each party interact in a zero-sum fashion. 
The faction belonging to the ruling party monopolises rents and privileges. However, independent 
professionals, including lawyers, do not face such constraints. 
Monopolisation of the positions in the attorney general's office takes place via lawyers loyal to the 
ruling-party faction of the association. For the opposition political elites, the political payoffs from 
controlling such civil society groups can also be very high. The blatant political use of the judiciary by 
the ruling party to harass opposition leaders can be countered and neutralized by the faction in the 
lawyer's association that is loyal to the opposition. The measures taken by the faction loyal to the 
opposition party include modes of protests ranging from legal actions to boycotting 'pro-ruling party' 
judges, as well as violent agitations inside the court rooms to intimidate the judges. In recent years, as 
the autonomy of the higher judiciary has declined, the frequency of such violent incidents within the 
4judicial compound is on the rise.
We employed a case study method for this study. The cases have been selected purposively. A major 
consideration in this regard has been theoretical. Cases have been chosen carefully to test the 
conceptual framework we are using. For example, to see partyarchy's deleterious effects on state 
building we needed to explore how party-capture undermines the impersonal nature of the state 
and compromises state's control over legitimate use of violence; which required the study of a state 
organ where both these components can be observed. The police case study seemed ideally suited 
for this. Similarly, to illustrate the effects of partyarchy on rule of law, looking at the Supreme Court 
Bar Association, seemed appropriate as it is a major civil society organisation that has the 
mandate to uphold the rule of law, and at the same time is subject to intense partisan influences. 
The third case  Union Parishad Direct Democracy is also a deliberate selection. Although a range of 
institutions could have been chosen to illustrate the case of partyarchy's effects on democratic 
accountability mechanisms, the Union Parishad was chosen as it perhaps is the only institution which 
has experienced an uninterrupted form of democratic governance, despite changes in the nature of 
regimes at the national level. Also see Figure 2.1.
2.3  Methodology and data
3. See Hassan and Hossain 1997; Hashemi and Hassan 1999 for further discussion
4. For further discussion on this, see section 2.5 regarding Bar association.
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Figure 2.1: Partyarchy and political development: Selection of cases
The study applied two qualitative methods for information gathering: a literature review as a 
secondary source, and key informant interviews (KII) as a primary source. For the police case study, data 
has been collected through secondary publications, mining of newspaper archives and 14 KIIs among 
retired and serving police officers, politicians, journalists, academics and civil society groups. We also 
studied various Acts and legislations governing the police. For the case study on Bar Association, 15 
KIIs were conducted. These included leading members of the Association and other prominent 
lawyers. From secondary sources, we reviewed the following documents: the constitution and other 
rules of the Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar Association, major laws governing the legal profession 
and bar associations in Bangladesh, and reported and unreported judgments of the high courts. 
Case study on Union Parishad (UP) similarly used both primary and secondary sources. Two types of 
qualitative methods, KII and Focus group discussions (FGD) were used to collect primary data. 
Respondents included the following persons formally associated with UP: chairperson, secretary, 
ex-member of UP standing committees, and members (one each from ruling and opposition 
parties). Other key informants included: local citizens and UP level political leaders (one each from 
ruling and opposition parties). The UP Act of 2009, UP Manual, and other sources of secondary 
literature on UP governance were reviewed. Two UPs (one led by pro-ruling party chairperson and 
the other by pro-opposition party chairperson) from the district of Nilphamari were chosen as field 
sites.   
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2.4  Impersonal institution, monopoly over legitimate use of violence and impact on 
state building: The case of police
An impersonal institution incorporates a system based on impersonal, merit-based bureaucratic 
recruitment, promotion and punishment. Fukuyama (2011) observed that a functioning modern state 
should have two key characteristics: it has to be impersonal and it should have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence. 
The rationale behind studying the police is that the state is the source of legitimate use of violence 
5through the police and the military (Weber 1919).  Studying the Bangladesh Police, we look at the 
pattern and attempt to explain the reasons behind Bangladesh's key political parties' influence and de 
facto control over the state institutions. We also assess the consequences of such control in terms of 
partyarchy's obstructive role in the broader state building process of Bangladesh, i.e., how it deters the 
development of the impersonality of the state in Bangladesh, and also compromises  state's control 
over the legitimate use of violence. In this regard, we looked at how political parties, mainly the ruling 
one, influence the police's internal governance, i.e., recruitment, promotion, posting, rewards, 
impunity, punishment, among others. 
Politicisation leading to bad governance in police administration
The Bangladesh Police is the core law enforcement agency in Bangladesh, administered under the 
Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of Bangladesh. Its main responsibility is to maintain law 
and order of the state, which includes protection of life and property of the people, as well as 
prevention and detection of crime within the state. The colonial era Police Act of 1861 is still the key 
legislation governing the police and it outlines the constitution of the police force, its superintendence, 
appointments, dismissal and other conditions of service (The Police Act 1861 and ICG 2009). Significant 
recent developments in police governance include the drafting of Bangladesh Police Ordinance (2007); 
one of the major reform initiatives of the Caretaker Government (2006-2008). This draft was designed 
to replace the existing colonial era police act but is yet to be implemented. Thus, the colonial mode of 
police governance continues to exert its influence in Bangladesh (ICG 2009).
The institutional performance of the police is far from satisfactory. Statistics taken from the 
Bangladesh Police shows that crime figures in the country have increased over the years, even taking 
population growth into consideration (Figure 2.2). According to the Police Internal Oversight (PIO) 
website, “bribery, dishonesty, inefficiency…and politicization” tend to characterise the governance 
of the police. A leading human rights organisation observed that 'in Bangladesh people pay more to 
the police than to their government' (AHRC 2012). Public opinion polls tend to show that police is 
one of the most corrupt institutions in Bangladesh (TI 2010 and TI 2013). A United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP 2007) opinion survey shows that the majority of the respondents 
6expressed dissatisfaction with the current behavior of the police.
5. However, this does not mean that only public force can be used: private force (as in private security) can be used too, as 
long as it has legitimacy derived from the state.
6. More worryingly, the survey reports that the services of police in Bangladesh are biased against people from different 
social stata: a poor adult or adolescent, girl or boy, has almost equal probability (64-84%) of becoming a victim, while the 
probability of someone from the middle class becoming a victim is reduces to about a quarter, and if the person is rich the 
probability of becoming a crime victim becomes negligible (5%).
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Figure 2.2: Comparative Crime Statistics: 2002-2012
Politicisation of the police is largely blamed for such bad governance and low quality services. One 
recent study observed “the authority of police leadership in Bangladesh has eroded over time due to 
political interference leading to a loss of discipline in the force and there is increasing tendency within 
police to seek for political patronage to secure service benefits and also to garner political support to 
protect oneself against disciplinary measures” (Biswas 2012). In a recent survey, police personnel 
acknowledged that they are subject to interference and undue pressure, particularly from local 
political leaders, national politicians and local elites. Most respondents also agreed that politicians 
have too much say in how the police should perform their duties (Police Reform Program, 2011).
2.4.1 Failure of the state to be impersonal
Pre-1990: Militarization of the police and the creation of special forces 
Whilst the police force played a significant role in the war of independence in 1971, and subsequently 
underwent some reforms, it has yet to become an impersonal institution. During the early period of the 
post-independence era, the government's focus turned towards the development of parallel security 
institutions (para-military forces), and the militarisation of the police force. The Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) 
played a dominant role in maintaining internal security during 1972-75. The successive regime (1978-81) 
initiated some reforms including the formation of a special police force of 12,500 men, but its role strongly 
resembled the JRB. During the earlier part of the Ershad regime (1981-90), the military was directly in 
charge of internal security. The district-level police administration was highly militarised, and at one point 
Superintendents of Police in 53 districts (out of 64) were army officers (Hakim 1998). 
Politicisation of the police in the post-1990s
Politicisation of the police administration essentially began during the post-authoritarian period (post 
1990). Experts observed that the first terms of BNP (1991-95) and AL (1996-2000) saw less 
Source: Bangladesh Police website
http://www.police.gov.bd/Crime-Statistics-comparative.php?id=208 [Accessed on 30 May 2014].
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politicisation of police than the second terms of both regimes (i.e., 2001-06 for BNP and 2009-2013 for 
AL). Politicization of the internal governance of the police is manifested in various ways. Recruitment in 
the police service, to a considerable extent, is based on party loyalty as observed by the experts in our 
KIIs. The prevalence of numerous 'quotas' in the police service tends to undermine meritocratic 
principles, and creates opportunities for abusing the recruitment process through various means 
(kinship and regional preferences, among others). Similarly, party loyalty and regionalism (coming 
from a particular geographic region) tend to influence promotion and other privileges, including 
7securing the 'prized' posting.  The police personnel who are not considered loyal to the ruling party, or 
who are assumed to have different ideologies than the ruling party, are made OSD (officer on special 
duty), or in many instances, are given forced retirement. Below we discuss some evidence as well as 
implication of the politicisation of police during both the AL and BNP regimes. 
During the tenure of the second BNP government (2001-06), the politicisation of police took the form 
of forced retirement, or outright sacking, of a huge number of police personnel. This included officials 
of various ranks, who were deemed loyal to the opposition parties, mainly AL. At the same time, 
contractual appointments, promotions and postings at prized positions were given to party loyalists 
(Ahsan 2006). The government recruited about 850 Sub-Inspectors, ninety percent of whom had been 
members of the student fronts of both BNP and JI. Moreover, violating the Police Regulation of Bengal 
1943, the training period for the recruits was reduced from three years (one year in police academy and 
8 two years in the district) to one year (six months in police academy and six months in the district).  This 
was to ensure that the jobs of 'loyal' police personnel could be confirmed before the next election 
(ibid). 
Politicisation also includes extra-legal measures. For instance, in an unprecedented move, three retired 
police officers were brought to service and appointed to the top positions of the force, based on 
political considerations (ibid). According to experts, police personnel were also discriminated on the 
basis of their religion and region. There are allegations that the policemen with a minority religious 
background and those who came from AL controlled political constituencies, experienced various 
forms of discriminations during this period (Ahsan 2006, Ahsan 2007).
When AL came back to power in 2009, one of their priorities was to politically 'compensate' people 
from regions who were deprived during the BNP rule. A total of 1520 Sub Inspectors (SI) were recruited 
during the last AL rule (2009-2013), in which a disproportionate number of candidates were recruited 
from the constituency of the top political leaders. In general, the recruitment process violates many 
standard rules of the Public Service Commission (Hassan, S. 2013). Experts also highlighted the fact that 
there was greater involvement and influence of powerful local politicians (often the local MP) over the 
governance of local police. For instance, the posting of key police officials is now often being decided 
based on the consent of local MP (or his aides). It is also becoming increasingly difficult to file cases at 
the police station, and lodge the First Information Report (FIR), in cases that involve political actors, 
without the consent of local politicians. Even if the FIR is accepted, the issuing of charge sheet largely 
depends on the determination of local influential politicians.
7. Posting in a 'lucrative' region where possibilities of engaging in corrupt practices as well as rate of corruption are much 
higher than other places.
8. For details see Ahsan (2006).
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Incentives for performance in service have also been politicised. The Bangladesh Police Medal 
(BPM) and the President Police Medal (PPM) are awarded to police personnel for their contribution 
to the service. However, in recent years, the selection process for the BPM and the PPM has been 
subject to criticism, as in many cases awards were given based on party loyalty. Some officials have 
even received awards for their proactive involvement in suppressing the opposition (Talukdar and 
Haider 2013). 
2.4.2 Compromise of state's monopoly on legitimate violence
The police, as the state's law enforcing agency, have a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. 
However, such a role has been significantly compromised due to informal deployment of a parallel 
authority (mainly different front organisations of the ruling party) to maintain law and order. Below we 
discuss a few examples of how this has happened. 
Student organisations (both partisan and non-partisan) have historically played a significant role in 
demanding democratic governance in the country. However, their role particularly in the post-1990s 
era has changed markedly. The party's student front tends to control most university and college 
campuses as soon as the party in question comes to power. This is often done with the tacit support of 
the police, and invariably leads to violence and deaths in college and university campuses. There are 
many examples of the student fronts of political parties using deadly weapons like AK-47 and M-16 rifle 
in their attempts to gain control of university campuses, with the police generally protecting the ruling 
party front members. Pro-BNP JCD activists, with the help of the police, for instance, controlled Dhaka 
University and other key university campuses when the party was in power. Similarly, AL's student 
wing, BCL and its adherents, bar the JCD, among others, from entering the Dhaka University and other 
campuses during AL regimes. Moreover, intra-party factions of the ruling party compete to dominate 
university campuses, and this 'change of power' takes place in the presence of the police.  
(Bdnews24.com 2011).
The Police's monopoly over legitimate use of coercive force gets seriously compromised when, in order 
to disrupt and prevent processions, rallies, and hartals of the opposition, the government allows the 
ruling party's student and other front organisations to act as parallel authority in enforcing order. This 
trend has increased over the decades (Khasru 2012). Below three well-known cases illustrate the 
salient role of such parallel authorities in political governance:
Box 2.1: Cases showing how parallel authority functions
The Killings of Biswajit
A man named Bishwajit Das was killed in December 2012 in an attack by a group of BCL activists 
suspecting him of being a pro-hartal (anti-government) supporter. The brutal killings of Bishwajit 
drew criticism from the media, civil society, human rights organisations and various political parties 
primarily for two reasons. He was killed by the ruling party activists and goons with lethal weapons, 
who were encouraged by the top echelons of AL to foil the opposition movement. Secondly, the 
police officials that were present at the incident did not protect Bishwajit from being the victim of 
the government backed party men. This is a classic case of the state's (police) compromise of the 
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monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. As observed by the Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), a 
legal aid and human rights organisation, 'police role in the Biswajit murder was a clear case of 
complete failure of the police to comply with the rules set for them in the police code. Police force is 
legally bound to take action when a situation arises that may lead to irreparable losses, damage of 
property, and loss of life. It is also evident from the role the police took that day that they are devoid 
of any moral strength to take action against the supporters of the ruling party'. (ASK  2013)
The 'Trump Card' of 30 April 2004 and the 'March for Democracy' on 29 December 2013
In 2004, the then opposition party AL's General Secretary Abdul Jalil prophesied the fall of 
government by April 30 of the same year. According to political observers, the April 30 deadline was 
primarily targeted at the grassroots level party activists who were suffering from low morale due to 
party's failure to organize any anti-government movement (Daily Star 2004). To thwart any 
probable movement, the BNP government undertook extraordinary security measures whereby 
party activists (different front organisations) took the main responsibility, alongside the police, of 
taking control of the major entry points of the capital city. Similarly, BNP's March for Democracy of 
28 December 2013 was foiled by the AL's student and other fronts, with the help of thousands of 
police and other para-military forces. Ruling party leaders and activists were seen 'guarding' the 
city streets equipped with sticks and other lethal weapons, ready to resist the opposition activists 
from joining their program.
2.4.3 Police reforms: Is there any way out?
It is not in the remit of this study to assess whether the police could become a de-politicised state 
institution in the near future. However, a brief discussion on the progress of the ongoing police reforms 
could offer some insights about the political party's commitments to the reforms.
Given the limitations of the 1861 Police Act, there have been national and international demands to 
reform the police and replace this Act with a new one that suits the needs of a modern democratic 
society. The law enforcement agency underwent significant reforms during the caretaker regime 
(2007-08). However, the pace of reform, particularly the implementation of key recommendations, 
under AL government (since 2009), has been far from satisfactory. The Act (1861) is still in force without 
any major amendment. However, the ongoing reform process has brought about some changes. The 
infrastructure and other facilities of the police have improved. Following the Metropolitan Police Acts, 
the police administration of six metropolitan areas have improved and expanded their services. 
Unfortunately, political and bureaucratic control over the institution has also increased over the years. 
For instance, the past AL government passed the Code of Criminal Procedure Act of 2009, which has 
effectively reinstated bureaucratic control, the hallmark of the colonial-era 1861 system, over the 
various metropolitan police forces (ICG 2009).
Recommendations that do not go against the interest of the ruling party seem to be easily 
implemented (such as those regarding infrastructure of police). However, reforms that go against 
partyarchy are often ignored. For instance, it is recommended in the Bangladesh Police Ordinance 2007 
that any outside interference in the recruitment process of police should be considered as criminal 
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offense.  Despite this, the practice of politicizing recruitment process has continued unabated. One 
former ruling party lawmaker and deputy home minister (of AL government) reportedly resigned for 
10failing to implement governance reform policies as suggested in the police reform.  His resignation is 
due to the weak commitment that the top echelons of the ruling party have towards implementing 
11police reform.
The existing literature, perception surveys and experts' observations all suggest that the politicisation 
of police has contributed to the decline in efficiency over the years. This has fuelled pervasive 
corruption in the police administration, and as a result, professionalism and corporate coherence of 
the police administration have declined (Hassan and Huda 2009). The police also have largely failed to 
provide security, particularly to the poor and underprivileged, which has led to the loss of its public 
trust, as reflected in the perception surveys. 
The discussion above suggests that there is a fundamental institutional constraint to develop the police 
as an impersonal institution, embedded in the Police Act of 1861, constituted during the British period 
that still governs the police administration. That said, during the period of post-1971, impersonality of 
the police was affected by both militarisation (1975-1990) and politicisation (post-1990s). The 
politicisation of its internal governance undermines the meritocratic principle. Thus, partyarchy 
impeded the development of an efficient and impersonal bureaucracy, critical to the development of a 
modern democratic state.
Moreover, the monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force, has been significantly compromised 
due to the informal deployment of a parallel authority (mainly different front organisations of the 
ruling party) to maintain law and order. As a result, they have failed to comply with the rules set for 
them in the police code. The politicisation of law enforcement agencies also has  
institutionalised the privatisation of violence. This privatisation of violence allows the ruling party's 
political fronts and local cadres to be deployed to terrorise opposition activists. Thus, the experience of 
the police as an institution suggests that state-building process in Bangladesh is severely constrained 
by partyarchy. The ongoing reforms also offer little hope to de-politicise the police as they are not in the 
interest of the ruling party.
Here we attempt to understand the influence of the party on a major civil society organisation, and its 
impact on the civil society's resolve to be the champion of the rule of law. According to Fukuyama (2011), 
9
de facto
2.5  Partyarchal influence over civil society, and the rule of law
9. Section 10(2) of the ordinance states: “Direct or indirect influence or interference into police investigation, law 
enforcement operation, recruitment, promotion, transfer, posting or any other police function in an unlawful manner 
shall be a criminal offence”. Draft Police Ordinance 2007, Section 10 (2) is also cited in ICG 2009.
10. The home minister observed, “[W]e pledged to make the country corruption-free and reform the police. Police force is 
the main weapon to build a corruption-free country. We made commitment to reform police and make it a professional 
force free from corruption. But I could not do that and it pains me” (Khan 2012).
11. Analysis of reform also shows that other influential actors, such as the administrative cadre of the civil bureaucracy, also 
strongly oppose any governance reform, particularly in relation to corporate autonomy of the police administration 
(Hassan and Huda 2009). The progress to date indicates that reforms may not have a significant effect in making the 
police an autonomous, de-politicised or impersonal entity, given the politicians' deep-seated interest in maintaining the 
system of a partyarchal form of governance.
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the second condition of political development is the rule of law. Lawyers are seen a major stakeholder 
in protecting and upholding the rule of law, both individually and collectively. The Supreme Court Bar 
Association, as a major civil society organisation, and a platform for lawyers, shares much of the 
responsibility to promote, protect and uphold rule of law in a country. Hence the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court Bar Association (BSCBA) is expected to play this role.  Earlier evidence indicates that BSCBA does 
not protect the collective interest of the people (Hassan, M. 2013). One reason for this might be that 
the legal community is hugely faction-ridden based on its clientelistic loyalty to various political parties. 
This has limited a lawyers' ability to rise above factional interests, and to stand united to fight for the 
rule of law.  Although several parties influence the bar, it is the influence of the two major parties, AL 
and BNP, that really matters. Partyarchy, therefore, operates in the Bar in a duopolistic fashion, rather 
than in a pluralistic way and one may argue that partyarchy has weakened this institution, so it is unable 
to perform its core mandate. Here we particularly explore the nature, process and the degree of 
partyarchal influence in BSCBA, and how this limits its capacity and commitment to uphold and defend 
the rule of law.
BSCBA and its mandate
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh (SCB) has the jurisdiction to review laws enacted by the legislature 
and declare any law that appears inconsistent with the constitution as invalid. Hence, the SCB both 
interprets the Constitution, and also ensures that 'the rule of law' is guaranteed. It discharges this 
responsibility not only through the benches alone, but also with the help of the lawyers represented by 
BSCBA. As an association of over five thousand members, BSCBA brings matters to the notice of the 
12benches, and assists the bench in a speedy and fair disposal of cases.  A bench needs critical support 
from the Bar in protecting and preserving the rule of law. Without the presence of a strong Bar, the 
bench may be weak, if not ineffective.  
Although BSCBA in its constitution does not explicitly mention 'rule of law' as its obligation, like Bar 
Associations in other countries, its website clearly states the term rule of law in referring its mandate. 
Besides, every lawyer has to swear during their oath-taking, to build a society with rule of law, 
13fundamental human rights, freedom, equality and justice.  The management of the BSCBA is 
conducted through an Executive Committee consisting of 14 members, all elected by the members of 
the Association for one year. The Executive Committee comprises of one President, two Vice-
14Presidents, one Secretary, one Treasurer, two Assistant Secretaries and seven Members.  In addition 
to the Executive Committee, the BSCBA has several sub-committees that perform different functions of 
the organisation.
BSCBA has earned a high reputation for fighting for democracy during 1980s. It campaigned side-by-
side with other political and social actors to establishing democracy in 1991. The association also 
played a critical role in successfully defending the rule of law during authoritarian regimes, particularly 
during 1980s. However, after the return of democracy, the partisan division among the members of the 
BSCBA began to erode its capacity, resolve and credibility to defend the rule of law.  
12. See BSCBA 2014 for details
13. See BSCBA n.d. for details
14. See BSCBA 1993 for details
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Early history of party influences over BSCBA
According to experts, partisan politics in the Bar started soon after the independence of Bangladesh. It 
was initiated by the lawyers themselves as they sought party blessings to become Member of 
Parliaments (MP), secure positions in the Attorney General's office and obtain other privileges. As in 
many other political and social organisations at that time, BSCBA was also overwhelmingly controlled 
by the then major political party i.e., AL. However, a regrouping along staunch party lines was more of a 
phenomenon of the late 1980s. By that time BNP had emerged as another powerful political force, and 
both BNP and AL started mobilizing lawyers into distinctive factions based on party loyalty. JP tried to 
develop factions within the various lawyers associations but could not rally much support. Senior 
lawyers refer to the days before this happened as the 'golden era of BSCBA', a time when most of the 
15lawyers were united and fought together for democracy and rule of law.  During the post-
authoritarian phase, the nature of lawyers' associational politics changed qualitatively. Due to 
extensive party infiltration, the lawyers could not forge any effective bi-partisan alliance to push the 
cause of rule of law.
Actors in BSCB politics
There are a number of organisations active in Supreme Court bar politics. All these organisations have 
formal or informal affiliation with the major political parties. Some of the organisations openly 
acknowledge their political affiliation, while others do not. These include Pro-AL, Pro-BNP, pro-JI, pro-
JP, pro-CPB, pro-JSD lawyers' organisations. The electoral politics of the Supreme Court Bar Association 
largely reflects national level electoral politics. There are many players, but they are mainly organized 
under two coalitions. Blue Panel comprised of mainly pro-BNP and pro-JI lawyers forums and White 
Panel comprising pro-AL lawyer's forum.  In addition to these, occasionally a few 'rebel' lawyers form a 
panel and contest in the election. However, formations of such panels have drastically decreased over 
time, indicating the consolidation duopolistic partyarchy in the politics of the bar.
2.5.1 The process of partyarchal capture
Experts observed that the parties attempt to influence and control the BSCBA in multifarious ways. 
Here we briefly discuss a few of the strategies deployed. 
a) Manipulation of career of lawyers:  Although the Enrollment Committee, a statutory body of 
Bar Council, is responsible for granting permission to lawyers to practice in the High Court, 
senior lawyers allege that the members of the Committee are chosen on a partisan basis to 
control the admission process. The aim of this manipulation is to influence the voting pattern 
in the BSCBA. 
b) Appointments in the Office of the Attorney General:  Appointments in the Office of the 
Attorney General are largely politically determined. Officials change with the change in 
government.  This works as an instrument to reward party loyalty. There is strong incentive 
among lawyers belonging to the opposition parties to pro-actively participate in agitations 
inside the court to signal loyalty with an aim to get posting in the office of the Attorney General 
in the future.  
c) Patronage distribution: Another instrument for patronage distribution is the enlistment of 
lawyers as panel lawyers in government run institutions. Instead of merit and professional 
15. Advocate Shamsul Haque Chowdhury, a non-partisan lawyer, who was elected as president of the Bar Association for six 
consecutive term (from 1983-84 to 1988-89) led the association during that period of unity.
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excellence, political loyalty tends to be the criterion to make one eligible as panel lawyer. The 
Supreme Court bar leaders are occasionally accommodated into national politics; Lawyers can 
be brought under the party fold by offering nomination in an election or an offer of a cabinet post.
2.5.2  Implication of partyarchal control of BSCBA on the rule of law
The President of American Bar Association (1958-59) Ross L. Malone, wrote in his article The American 
Lawyer's Role in Promoting the Rule of Law (Malone 1959), that lawyers can support the rule of law in 
three distinct ways: a) By providing support for the effective administration of justice by the court; b) By 
individual lawyers protecting the rights of individual clients against infringement by the government 
and individuals in both criminal and civil cases; and c) By organizing collective action of the legal 
profession, through the bar association.  
The reasons given below demonstrate that the partyarchal influence of Bangladesh Supreme Court Bar 
Association has undermined the lawyers' ability to perform above functions.
a) Effective administration of justice
Lawyers capacity to create effective administration of justice has been weakened due to the following 
reasons:
Politicisation of the bar leads to corruption and malpractices:  Corrupt transactions, are often carried 
out to win political privileges and positions in the bar and the party, which result in the moral 
degeneration of the bar members, and their loss of commitment to preserve integrity of the judiciary 
and uphold rule of law. A large section of the senior BSCBA leaders use their power and status to 
influence court officials in fixing dates for hearing of cases and the upgrading of cases in the cause list. 
These activities could diminish the integrity of the judicial system.
Bar members' disrespect for the rule of law:  There are incidents of BSCBA members vandalising the 
High Court premise in response to unfavorable Supreme Court order(s) on political issues. 
Furthermore, disregarding the Supreme Court's directive not to hold any political programs on the 
court premises (23 May 2005 suomoto ex Parte HC order), BSCBA leaders continued to use the 
Supreme Court premises for partisan political activities creating an atmosphere of political violence.
Compromising the professional competence and neutrality of the highest court: In 2013 alone 
approximately 800 lawyers were given permission to practice in the High Court. This is an abnormal rise 
from the normal average number of yearly intakes (about 100-150 lawyers per year). Experts say 
association politics and the bar election were major reasons for this hike in enrollment. The 
recruitment process largely based on party political considerations approved lawyers with 
questionable credential due to political influence.  
b) Protection of the rights of individuals
Lawyers, individually and collectively, have a responsibility in facilitating easy access of ordinary 
citizens to judicial remedy. Lawyers could play this role in two ways: firstly, they could lobby for a less 
complex legal system for citizens, and put pressure on Benches for a speedy disposal of cases. Secondly, 
they can promote legal aid and public interest litigation to benefit citizens who are victims of human 
rights abuses or other forms of injustice. Here, we discuss how the pressure of partisan politics has de 
facto deterred lawyers to pursue such strategies, both individually and collectively through BSCBA. 
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Facilitating easy access of ordinary citizens remains elusive: The BSCBA as an institution could have a 
pivotal role in facilitating citizens' access to judicial remedy. However, there is little evidence that 
BSCBA plays any substantial role in facilitating such a process. Instead, BSCBA members, loyal either 
major political stream remains busy pursuing partisan politics, and are pre-dominantly occupied with 
issues relevant to those political parties. 
Legal Aid: BSCBA does not have a legal aid cell. Though it created a legal aid fund for assisting poor 
citizens, this remains largely unused. The audit report of the Legal Aid fund for 2013-14 of BSCBA shows 
that the legal aid under this fund was completely unutilised.
Public Interest Litigation: Public Interest Litigation (PIL) is an important instrument to provide 
protection to ordinary citizens who are deprived of justice. However, there is no evidence that BSCBA, 
as an entity, promoted any PIL on issues of private or public importance, nor supported or promoted 
any of its members to move a PIL. Most of the PILs tend to be initiated by right based non-government 
organisations (NGOs), or enthusiastic lawyers on an individual basis.  
c) Collective action of the lawyers
Due to partisan influences among Bar leaders, the Association has failed to take any united stand in 
relation to critical constitutional debates. While democracy has been struggling for the last two and a 
half decades, major issues of contention are not resolved by institutions, like Parliament, but instead by 
violence on the streets. In the post- 1991 democratic transition, BSCBA played no significant role in 
three critical constitutional debates pertaining to democratic transition.  Firstly, BSCBA failed to take a 
unified stance on the issue of caretaker government in 1996.  Secondly, in 2006, during the debates on 
the constitutional principles in the formation of the Caretaker Government, on the issue of whether 
the President followed due procedures in its formation, BSCBA members took a partisan view on the 
issue. Thirdly, when the Supreme Court declared the provision of Caretaker System ultra vires (in 2011) 
the BSCBA again failed to use this platform to push for national reconciliation on such a critical issue. 
Interestingly the evidence from the 1980s, when BSCBA was not mired in partisan bickering and 
lawyers were more united, indicates it was possible for the association members to forge a common 
alliance to fight for the greater cause like democracy and rule of law.  
2.6.1 Deliberative space created by the UP Act of 2009
The recent enactment of the UP Act (2009), which mandate UPs to hold Ward Shobha's, undertake 
participatory planning, budget meetings and their review, form standing committees and other project 
specific Committees related to delegated functions, has enabled local citizens to have a say in UP 
affairs. This has helped create a formal basis for institutionalising a direct form of democratic 
accountability within UP governance. For UP-wide larger participation of citizens there are two forums: 
Ward Shobha and Open Budget. A limited number of citizens, who are selected based on formal 
procedures, can participate in the Standing Committees and Project Committees for Development 
(including Project Implementation Committees). As part of a large project (Local Government Support 
Project or LGSP) there are two forums where citizens of a particular Ward can participate. These are 
Ward Committee and Supervision Committee.
2.6 Partyarchy and democratic accountability at the local level
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2.6.2  Partyarchal capture of UP committee system
These forums are influenced by political parties in various ways. Standing Committees have some 
functions in relation to sectoral development planning. They gather sector specific information and 
provide inputs to sectoral planning. They also have a role in supervising UP activities in specific areas of 
specialization. Politicians have little interest in these Committees since there is no monetary 
dispensation and they are largely dysfunctional. It is the Committee related to development project 
that is vulnerable to party influence, as this is a major source for patronage distributions by the 
politicians. Important development functions of UP, such as the selection of projects and more 
importantly selections of beneficiaries are done here. These also facilitate general political control of 
the ruling party over UPs. The main way of controlling the Committees is by manipulation of the 
process through which citizens are formally selected. According to the rules, citizens participate in the 
Committees as representatives of different categories from the local community i.e Imam, teacher, 
social worker, freedom fighter and woman. Altogether four to five members are incorporated in the 
Committees. The politically determined de facto process of selection is the following; the local MP 
provides a list of local party leaders to the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO). Based on this list, the UNO 
nominates the persons to be incorporated in the Committees. These nominated names are then 
passed on formally to the UP Chairpersons. UNOs usually play the de facto role of coordinating the 
entire process of politicisation of the Committees. This also indicates the extent of partyarchal control 
16over the local government bureaucracy.
It is, de facto, mandatory that President and the General Secretary of the local party will be selected as 
members of such committee. If party members are not available in sufficient numbers, then local elites 
with proven loyalty to ruling party are incorporated in the Committees. The Committee composition 
does not usually change during the tenure of an MP. The partyarchy that operates here is 
predominantly monopolistic in nature. Chairpersons of UP who belong to opposition party are 
compelled to form committees based on the wishes of the local MP. A key informant made the 
following observation about the MP's, the UNO's role and its consequences:
The members in the various committees who are not ex officio or from the citizen's 
committee are selected by the MP. The MP advises the UNO on this. He [the MP] even 
writes down the names on his letterhead…mostly the seniors within the party at the local 
are selected as members. When it comes to selecting women members of the committee, 
the wives of these senior members are nominated…And the composition of the committee 
is unchangeable as long as the MP is in power… The consequence is that when we are 
preparing lists of beneficiaries for social safety schemes such as VGF [vulnerable group 
feeding] they rap their fists on the table and make demands about who should be on the 
list. Our voices are muted. We do not know whether they distribute the rice [for VGF 
scheme] to the beneficiaries or sell it…
16. As one Upazila official remarked, “If I do not cooperate with the MP in coordinating the process of nominating and 
selecting party members in the Committees then I will be identified as inefficient officer and transferred to other place.”
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Ward based Committees related to LGSP (Local Government Support Project) are also systematically 
controlled by the political parties. These are major sources of rent generation and distributions (Hassan 
and Hossain 2007). In many cases leaders of the Committees have been found plundering resources 
allocated for projects. Typically lower level political leaders are accommodated in these Committees. 
Unlike in project Committees discussed earlier, MPs or other senior leaders do not take interest in the 
formation of these Committees. UP members who belong to opposition parties are also able to 
influence the process of selection. In this sense the process of member selection tends to be largely 
governed by duopolistic partyarchy. Under such condition UP members of the opposition parties are 
allowed to incorporate their own party leaders/activists but within a limit, a tactical consideration that 
allows peaceful co-habitation of politically opposing elites to grab rents at least at the lowest level of 
local government. UP members, who do not belong to ruling party, have been found practicing a 
17balanced strategy of selecting members from both their own party as well as from the ruling party.
However political influence is minimal in the Ward Shabha and Open Budget forums, as they find little 
incentive to do so for various reasons. Firstly, these two committees do not play a meaningful role in the 
UP governance or any decision making processes. Out of two UPs examined in this study, it was found 
that in one UP these forums are not functioning at all, and in the other UP these are run by NGOs, and 
UP leaders only have token involvement. Such de facto politically marginal status of these forums in the 
UP governance process makes it unattractive to the local party leadership. Secondly, no concrete 
decisions on financial allocations are done in these forums. Thirdly, these forums do not engage in any 
kind of beneficiary selection process therefore these are not useful an instrument for patronage 
distributions by politicians.
Therefore, in the case of UPs, non-partisan citizens, who could have ensured some degree of 
accountability and transparency in the formulation, design and implementation processes of a project, 
are being systematically excluded from Committees. Due to partyarchal influence on the local 
government institutions, the possibility of the development of a robust form of direct democratic 
accountability or a deliberative form of democracy at the local level is considerably diminished.
Following Fukuyama's theoretical construct one can argue that political development of Bangladesh 
has been constrained, particularly in the post-1990s. This is due to dominant political parties' influence 
and control of major state institutions and civil society organisations, a phenomenon we referred to as 
partyarchy. This, in effect, deterred the process of state building, establishment of rule of law and 
institutionalisation of democratic accountability. The processes have been illustrated through the 
empirical observations of three domains of state and society- Bangladesh Police, Supreme Court Bar 
Associations and Union Parishad.  
2.7  Concluding observations
17. For example one of the UP members from the opposition party made the following observations to our researchers: “The 
chair makes it clear who would be included in the committee. He says—'you have to keep two of my people in the 
committee.'And these two close to the ruling party exercises power. UP member who belong to the opposition—their 
work is closely monitored. But if you belong to the ruling party you get away scot free. We have difficulties in securing our 
payment for the various programs such as Food For Work etc..but those with the ruling party get theirs before they even 
finish work! Whenever I get a project—the chair places his people on that project—so they get benefit out of it too…”
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The case on the police force showed how partyarchy prevents the development of merit based and 
rational-legal forms of authority. The police case also helped us to understand how the state's 
monopoly over the use of legitimate coercive power for law enforcement is compromised when other 
political forces begin de facto enforcement of coercive power to enforce the government's dictate. The 
politicisation of law enforcement agencies and the deployment of parallel authorities is also de facto 
institutionalising the privatisation of violence. This constrains the opposition political parties to 
exercise their democratic rights, undermining basic democratic norms. 
The difficulty of building an impersonal state is not surprising. The global experience in the past few 
decades in this regard has also been mixed. As Fukuyama observed, impersonal modern states are 
difficult institutions to establish and maintain, since patrimonialism recruitment based on kinship or 
personal reciprocity is the natural form of social relationship to which human beings will revert in the 
absence of other norms and incentives (Fukuyama 2011). 
This study also shows how partyarchal influences significantly weaken the capacity and resolve of a 
formidable civil society organisation like BSCBA to uphold and nurture rule of law. Intriguingly 
partyarchal influence has been further intensified with the onset of post-1991 democratic transition. 
With the democratic transition one would have expected that power would be more pluralistic and civil 
society organisations, particularly the elite-led ones, would be able to maintain their autonomy vis-à-
vis the party and the state. More research will be needed to understand why powerful civil society 
organisations predominantly failed to preserve such autonomy for themselves. In the case of 
Bangladesh civil society leadership tends to seek patronage of the political parties, contributing to the 
robust growth of partyarchy. 
Partyarchal influences also deter the nurturing of an incipient form of state's direct accountability to 
the state at the local level. The new provision of citizens' direct engagement with elected 
representatives has the potential to engage citizens from rural areas, who are also poor. Such 
development of citizenry could have created a countervailing social power in the future, thereby 
undercutting the resilience of partyarchy in Bangladesh.  
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3.1 Introduction
Political parties are said to play a pivotal role in leading democracy movements and anchoring the 
space for public contestations. However, the parties themselves are paradoxically responsible for 
promoting weak organizational structures that are not democratic in nature. Recent literature 
supports this observation. For example, Jalal (1995) observes 'democratic authoritarianism' in the 
working of political parties in many parts of South Asia, including Bangladesh. Khan (2005) emphasises 
the persistence of patron-client mode of political operation, which goes against 'democratic 
deliverables' of the Bangladeshi democracy. This mode of organisation, he claims, reinforces 
institutionalized corruption, which, in turn, is detrimental for state legitimacy and democracy. 
Amundsen (2013a) mentions the dynastic phenomenon that has pervaded party politics since the 
independence of Bangladesh. He observes that the degree of internal democracy is very limited in 
Bangladeshi political parties, and that leadership selection is largely “informal and handled by a 
restricted number of party elites” (ibid: 2). This chapter investigates the nature and extent of 
democratic practices and representativeness within the two major political parties, namely the 
Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Although there is a general 
perception about limited democratic practices within the political parties in Bangladesh, systematic 
1evidence hardly exists.  This study uses and analytical approach using structured surveys, and 
constructs Party Democracy Index (PDI) to draw conclusions on the internal democratic practices of 
the country's main political parties. Intra-party democracy within these parties is explored both by 
closely examining the principles and intentions (the 'scruples') stated in the party constitutions as 
well as studying the actual behaviour and operation in the field (the 'practice'), mainly focusing on 
the functioning of district level committees of these parties. These two levels of analysis are further 
complemented by consultations with selected key stakeholders, notably journalists and relevant 
experts.
Inside Political Parties:
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1. Some documents focus on limited aspects of party operations (e.g. EWG 2013), while others present hypotheses without 
field-based data (e.g. Rahman 2010).
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3. 2  Intra-party democracy
3.3  The scruples: An anatomy of the party constitutions
3.2.1  Conceptual framework for investigation of intra-party democracy
The study of intra-party democracy is a herculean task by any standards. According to Croissant and 
Chambers (2010), who made an extensive review of key literature of the past one and half decades 
(e.g. Pennings and Hazan 2001, Caraway 2004, Norris 2004, Scarrow 2005, Bojinova 2007), intra-
party democracy may be conceptualised as a characteristic of the distribution of decision-making 
power among members and leaders within a political party, along the two principles of inclusiveness 
and decentralisation. Inclusiveness here, as Croissant and Chambers (2010: 196) elaborates, “… 
refers to how wide the circle of decision-makers in a party is and centralisation refers to the extent to 
which decisions are made by a single group or decision body. While the former captures the openness 
of political parties to inputs from both within and outside the body of party members, the latter 
captures the extent to which members of different levels and functional background are included in 
party decision-making”. These two central concepts can be further understood using indicators 
drawn from three recent studies (Croissant and chambers 2010, Berge et al. 2013, IDI 2013) that 
enable us to define the nature and extent of democratic ethos within the parties' principles and 
practices. The indicators are: participation (party members taking part in the selection of its leaders 
and in any ideological matters), representation (ensuring proper representation from wider society, 
both from the perspective of women and minorities), competition (election of leaders through 
competitive mechanism), responsiveness (the broader circle of the party being  included in the key 
decisions of party, like coalition formation), transparency (the availability/accessibility of its by-
laws, rules, procedures and other relevant information for  citizens/voters).
This section, with a view to measuring intra-party democracy, analyses the constitutions of 
Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) based on the above five 
indicators. Based on work done by Berge et al. (2013), the section attempts to numerically analyse 
intra-party democracy as reflected in the two constitutions. This tool has been widely used and 
accepted in many parts of the world. Under the two main criteria of inclusiveness and 
decentralisation, the tool examines intra-party democracy taking into account the five indicators. 
The level of intra-party democracy relevant to particular questions  ranges from -1 (lowest) to +1 
(highest) that  can be calculated for any statute of any political party (see Table 1-1 of Annex 1). The 
following sub-sections infers the most relevant 'scruples' from the party constitutions of AL and BNP.
3.3.1  Participation
Members' rights
In the party constitutions, members' rights can be divided into two areas of interest (Berge et al. 2013): 
a) general members' rights and b) minority (particularly women's) rights. With regards to general 
members' rights, political parties in modern democratic countries tend to ensure the rights of general 
members through party constitutions without considering their position or function in the party. In 
Bangladesh, both the party constitutions of AL and BNP seem to have very limited provisions for 
members' rights. In fact, neither of the constitutions has mentioned the term 'members' rights'. 
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3.3.2  Representation
Minority rights
Ensuring women and minority rights in party decision-making is an important aspect of political 
party constitutions. In many countries where women and minorities lag behind, political party 
constitutions provide special provisions including quota systems (Berge et al. 2013). For example, 
the Australian Labour Party Constitution (ALP-10 A) states not less than 40% of party positions 
should be held by women. Both the constitutions of AL and BNP, include some provisions to a varying 
degree of the 'rights' or 'quota' for women and minorities. The AL constitution mentions that there 
should be minimum 33% women quota in all committees including the Executive Committee and the 
percentage should be gradually increased. BNP, on the other hand, includes quotas for women in its 
Mahanagar Executive Committee, stating that the number of female members will be increased to 
33% by 2020. Regarding other minority rights, both party constitutions framed the issue in different 
ways. According to the constitution of BNP, 10% of the total members would be from labourer, 
freedom fighters, farmers and tribal groups. AL, on the other hand, has no special quota system for 
the minorities, but in the Commitment section it recognizes that minority should enjoy certain 
rights.
3.3.3  Responsiveness
Party congress 
The party congress is a platform constituted by party members, which is considered the highest organ 
of a political party. This platform decides the major decisions of the party, including amendment of the 
party constitution, electing the top leaders for party organs etc. The responsiveness and effectiveness 
of such a party congress depends on the regularity of its sessions. The constitution of a political party 
should typically specify the frequency of holding congresses, procedures for holding extraordinary 
congresses, persons responsible for presiding over congresses, the number and the process of 
selecting delegates from the various party structures and the requirements for quorum and other 
voting procedures (NDI 2011). Both AL and BNP have the provision of holding the party congress in 
their constitutions and they also consider them the highest authority within their parties. The name of 
the AL party congress is Council of the Bangladesh Awami League, and BNP's party congress is named 
as the National Council.  Compared to BNP, AL describes the council in more detail, and explicitly 
mentions that council would be held once in every three years. BNP, on the other hand, does not 
mention the frequency of their Congress, though in the provision of the 'election of party head', it 
states that the party head would be elected for three years by direct vote of the members of the 
national council.
Conflict resolution
In a political party, conflicts may arise among different members or interest groups on various 
issues; the party statutes should have a mechanism to address this. Clear rules and regulations 
acceptable to all members are necessary to address any disputes which may arise within the party. 
The leadership also requires the option of sanctioning members whose actions might be a threat to 
the party. For this purpose, a party constitution should ideally keep an independent, representative 
and neutral organ for dispute resolution. Interestingly, none of the constitutions offer any 
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dedicated, independent or representative dispute resolution body. The statute of the AL under 
article 46, however, mentions that the Executive Committee has the power to take any disciplinary 
action against an aggrieving member. BNP too has no separate provision for this, expcet for the 
national Executive Committee's discretionary right to solve internal conflicts within the party; 
article 11 states that one of the powers of the National Executive concerns “resolving internal 
conflicts among committees on legitimacy”. However, none of the constitutions explicitly mentions 
that the party court's decisions are equally binding for all, including the party executive and party 
president. 
The national executives
The National Executive committee is usually an extended leadership body consisting of 40-100 
members, which is involved in fundamental political debates about party ideology (Berge et al. 
2013). To ensure democracy within the party, the power and function of the body should be 
dispersed in such a way that reduces the possibility of any autocratic behaviour. In the 
constitutions of AL and BNP, such National Executive Committees are officially titled as the 
'National Committee' and 'National Executive Committee' respectively for AL and BNP. In its 
committee, BNP has 351 committee members while AL has 166. A mechanism of accountability 
for the National Executives of AL and BNP is completely absent in their constitutions. None of the 
bodies are de jure accountable to the party members or to the party congress. The constitutions 
of BNP and AL both provide for the formation and operation of executive committees, which 
consists of top leaders including the head and secretary. The name of the executive committee of 
BNP is the 'National Standing Committee' and the AL's is the 'Executive Committee'. The 
Executive Committee of the AL, to some extent has a mechanism for accountability through the 
National Committee, as stated in Article 17d of AL constitution, “the National Committee shall 
have the right to review the decisions and functions of the Bangladesh Awami League Executive 
Committee”. It also notes that “the National Committee shall consider an appeal against punitive 
measures against any member taken by the Executive Committee and take the final decision”, 
which, to some extent ensures the accountability of the Executive Committee. However neither 
of the constitutions stipulates how these bodies should be accountable to the party members or 
party congress.
3.3.4  Competition
Party Head 
Intra-party democracy is often subject to the prerogative power given by the party constitution to its 
party president. To ensure decentralisation and inclusiveness within the party, the rights of the party 
president should be limited, so that s/he cannot wield absolute power of the party. Both the party 
constitutions of BNP and AL allow party heads to enjoy substantial privileges. According to the 25 
(Ka) of the AL constitution, “if any members of the organisation fails to discharge the 
responsibilities, the president shall take necessary steps in the matter and mention it in the next 
meeting of the executive committee.” This provision allows the president to block the execution of 
decisions and other acts of different bodies or members of the party, including the exclusion of a 
party member. 
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The constitution of BNP also allows its president to exercise a wide variety of powers. According to 
Article 8, the party's chief executive (the chairman) will control, supervise and coordinate all the 
activities of the party and, to that end, will wield authority over the national committee; committees 
for various matters and the other committees nominated by the chairman, and will control, supervise 
and coordinate all the activities of these committees. BNP constitution mentions that, “as chairman of 
the national executive committee, the chairmen will determine the responsibilities, authority and 
duties of the officers of these committees. If s/he so feels, the chairman may abolish the national 
executive committee, the national standing committee, the committees on various topics and other 
committees nominated by the chairman.” In addition, BNP gives its president the privilege to act 
against the general provisions of the party constitution in certain cases, mentioned in the article 12. 
The AL constitution, on the contrary, does not mention that the head can solely or single handedly act 
against the general provision of the constitution. 
A party constitution should also contain procedures about the election of the party head including the 
2voting mechanism, which is only vaguely mentioned in both AL and BNP constitutions.  Both the 
constitutions of BNP and AL mention a term limit for their party head, but there is no barrier for re-
election. Regarding the removal of the party head, the BNP constitution reads: “The chairman can be 
removed if the votes of three-fourths members of the national council called by two-third of its 
members are in favour of the chairman's removal.” In the AL constitution, there is no such provision 
that allows the party president to be challenged. 
Candidate nomination
Candidate nomination is the first step of candidate election by party members; neither of the 
constitutions of BNP and AL is clear about the nomination process of different candidates for different 
positions within the parties. In most cases it seems the party heads make such selections. For some of 
the national level committees, the party presidents and secretaries automatically (ex officio) occupy 
leadership positions. In some committees, the party head has the exclusive power to select a certain 
number of members. 
Candidate selection: Leadership
There are different ways of candidate selection by political parties that range from the closed primary 
to direct selection by the party head. A closed primary method is considered the most inclusive, with 
3the selection by party head as the most centralised method.  
2. There should be a clear term limit, such as Australian Labour Party constitution, which mentions that, the State President 
(for party) shall be elected for a 2 year term and shall not be eligible for re-election (Article 7).
3. The Conservative Party of Canada's Constitution, for example, mentions that more than 50 percent of the votes cast 
during the secret ballot must be in favour of selecting a new leader (NDI 2011). 
Inside Political Parties: Scruples and Practices
30
Regarding candidate selection for party leadership, both the party constitutions of BNP and AL mention 
candidate selection for different leadership positions in the national and sub-national levels. Both 
constitutions briefly mention that the national council would select the party head, but the documents 
do not elaborate on the actual process of the election.  However, as certain number of members in both 
the national councils of BNP and AL are drawn from the sub national level, it may be argued that the 
views of the sub-national units are reflected, to a degree in selecting party heads, the general 
secretaries, and other executive members. The constitution of AL, however, through the article 8, 
undermines the rights of members to proclaim any objection to any fault by the council (Article 8 of 
AL constitution).
Candidate selection: Parliament
A democratic way of candidate selection, by the inclusion of all party members, or at least by involving 
all relevant party committees, contributes to intra-party democracy and reduces partiality and 
nepotism. Thus it guarantees the opportunity for party members to prove their ability to be elected as 
leaders. In regards to the candidate selection for parliamentary election of AL and BNP, both the 
constitutions mention the rights of the members to suggest candidates for public offices. AL has a 
separate body called the “Parliamentary Board” for this purpose.  Both the constitutions combine the 
choices of the members of national and sub-national units for the candidate selection in the 
parliamentary election. According to the article 27(a) of the AL constitution, a parliamentary board, 
consisting of eleven members, needs to be formed to nominate candidates on behalf of the party for all 
national elections including the parliamentary polls. The president, general secretary and the leader of 
AL's parliamentary committee are members of the board by virtue of their office. The remaining eight 
members are elected by the council from among the AL council members. The District and Upazila or 
Thana Awami League's working council sends an assessment of the concerned candidate to the 
parliamentary board.
According to article 13 of BNP constitution, there exists a parliamentary board where national standing 
committee members are members of the board. The board includes the relevant Zilla committee 
president and secretaries, which shows that the process is not completely exclusive or centralized. 
However, the national executive of both the parties play a dominant role in matters of candidate 
selection, according to their constitutions, against international best practice.
Formation of the national executive and the executive committee
The central question with regards to the election of members to the national executive is, "who 
determines the composition of the party leadership?" The national executives of BNP and AL both 
appear broadly inclusive in character. According to the constitution of BNP, the president of every 
district executive committee and president of every municipal executive committee are members of 
the national executive committee, and at least one third of the committee is elected by the national 
council for three years. On the other hand, the AL constitution mentions that one member from each 
organizational district of the Bangladesh Awami League is elected by the respective Triennial District 
Councils to the National Committee. 
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Procedures: Voting procedures
Democracy requires a participatory election with a trustworthy voting procedure. For this purpose, 
the secret ballot voting is a widely accepted method. However, neither of the parties includs any 
provision in their constitutions for a secret ballot system for elections of their leaders. Regarding the 
election of party president, BNP prescribes the direct voting procedure, which is the only provision 
incorporated about voting procedure in the entire constitution. None of the constitutions explicitly 
state that voting results need to be presented to all party members within the party in order to 
validate the candidature. To ensure decentralization within the party, it is essential for the sub-
national party units to be free of any interference from the central level to elect sub-national 
leaders. The party constitution therefore should allow sub-national units to elect their public office 
candidates. Both the constitutions mention that the committees are to be elected by forming sub-
national councils. Both the constitutions therefore provide for a degree of autonomy with regard to 
electing their sub-national party positions, although the term 'autonomy' is not explicitly 
mentioned in the documents.
3.3.5  Transparency
Party manifesto
For a political party, the election manifesto is an important document that reflects the party's agenda 
and future plans for the country. An ideal party constitution ensures the right of party members to 
decide upon the party manifesto. Moreover, it also emphasises who is in charge of the manifesto, and 
who has the right to vote on its contents. In the constitution of AL, the parliamentary body is in charge 
of the manifesto. However, it has not kept any room for the general members or sub-national units to 
vote upon the manifesto. BNP's constitution, on the other hand, does not mention anything about the 
party manifesto.
Summary: A comparison of AL's and BNP's scruples
The party constitutions of both AL and BNP contain reasonable elements of democratic ethos. 
The issues of minority rights, including female participation, decentralisation of the sub-
national (operational) units, and requirement of the party congress come out quite 
prominently in the constitutions. However when the constitutions are compared to 
international standards and good practices, they both fall short. The weaknesses that are 
particularly relevant include candidate recruitment for public and party offices, inclusion of 
party members in the decision-making process, lack of specificities of voting procedures and 
ambiguity regarding the scope of power and functions of the party heads. A basic scoring 
exercise, which allow for a comparison of AL's and BNP's constitutions, was conducted under 
this study (see Table 1-1 of Annex 1 for scoring). Based on such scoring, AL does better than 
BNP, specifically in the areas of responsiveness, competition and transparency, while BNP is at 
par with AL when it comes to issues of participation and representation in their constitution 
(Table 3.1).
Inside Political Parties: Scruples and Practices
32
Table 3.1: Measuring intra party democracy in AL's and BNP's constitutions
Interestingly, according to the citizen's survey covering 53 districts, the majority of respondents 
perceive intra-party democracy to be a major problem in Bangladesh. 
Figure 3.1: Drawbacks of the current democratic system in Bangladesh
3.4  The Practice of democracy within the parties: Views from the field
Figure 3.1 shows that a majority 
of citizens (61%) perceived 'lack of democracy within political parties' as the foremost problem 
pertaining to the current democratic system of Bangladesh. 
Indicator Category
AL BNP AL BNP
Participation Members' rights: General members (average of 6 scores) -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 
Representation Members' rights: Minority (average of 6 scores) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Responsiveness National executive (average of 3 scores) -1 -1 -0.36 -0.83
Executive committee (average of 3 scores) -0.33 -1
Relationship Between national and sub-national level 0.25 -0.5
(average of 4 scores)
Competition Party president (average of 6 scores) 0 -0.67 0.22 -0.09
Recruitment for national public office 0.31 -0.05
(average, out of four categories-21 tools)
Recruitment for national party office (average of 10 scores) 0.07 -0.07
Procedure (average of 12 scores) 0.5 0.42
Transparency Programmatic issues (average of six scores) 0.33 -1 0.33 -1
Total Score (Average) -0.003 -0.403
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The five indicators previously discussed (participation, representation, competition, responsiveness 
and transparency) were used for the purpose of our empirical investigation of intra-party democracy. 
This section presents the findings from three independent sources of empirical investigation: a) survey 
of 40 district level party officials, viz district committee secretaries of the two major political parties, b) 
40 Journalists from the respective districts and c) interviews with selected key informants including 
university professors, central political leaders, media professionals and entrepreneurs. Under each of 
4the indicators, the discussion includes perspectives from the above three sources.
3.4.1  Participation
Participation is seen as an indication of 'horizontal-type accountability' while responsiveness (Section 
3.4.4) is considered to be an indication of 'vertical-type accountability.' From the survey of party officials 
most respondents ascertained that the district committee is involved in the MP nomination process, for 
both the parties. The AL has held a greater numbers of meetings in both the years (2012 and 2013), though 
there is a similar trend for both the parties. Also for both parties, evidence shows that there are more 
Executive Meetings held as opposed to General Meetings. The data also indicates that AL is slightly more 
decentralised, allowing for more general member participation. No Executive or General meetings were 
held in over 20% of the districts for BNP, whereas for the AL these figures stand at 10% for both years 
5 observed. Party officials also believe that participatory policymaking by district committee members is 
happening either regularly or occasionally. However, AL is more participatory, as meetings are held more 
“regularly” than BNP. The majority of the journalists interviewed thought that district committees are not 
involved with MP nomination. The district offices on the other hand claimed that the committees are 
moderately involved in MP nomination. However, from the journalists' perspective BNP is slightly less 
participatory in MP nomination. With regards to the party manifesto, the process is also not participatory 
when it concerns sub-national participation; the perception of journalists interviewed confirms the same.
Despite both the major political parties (BNP and AL) having some constitutional provisions of electing 
their party leaders in the different layers through council by engaging grassroots members, there is a 
huge discrepancy in practice, according to experts and stakeholders. The real power and authority 
regarding all major decisions of the parties appear to remain with the central party leaders, particularly 
the party head. A former parliamentarian pointed out that the members of the party are not 
demanding a democratic platform. There is hardly any debate among the party members, and political 
decisions are not made in an open or public forum. Party members are more inclined to say what the 
party-leader would like to hear, instead of expressing their own opinions. The party system is in practice 
hierarchical and only the lower level party members are accountable vertically to the higher ones. 
However, one prominent journalist gave the example of how after the last election, BNP Chair called 
the local leaders to discuss the next course of action, showing that some dialogue is occurring. 
Nevertheless, these discussions are more related to election-related activities rather than decisions on 
major policymaking at the national level. According to experts, central heads often reject 
6recommendations coming from grassroots leaders during general elections.
4. The detail interview scripts and questionnaire can be available from BIGD upon request.
5. See Box 1-3 of Annex 1 for a list of districts where no meetings have been held.
6. There are instances where local leaders have expressed their dissatisfaction. Prior to the eighth parliamentary election, 
for example, nomination of BNP's Kushtia Sadar Upazila shocked local party leaders and activists, and their appeal to the 
party centre to reconsider the nomination was rejected. Similarly in Rajshahi, the AL nomination for ninth parliamentary 
election also disappointed the local leaders and activists. According to the local leaders, their nominations were refused by 
the central leaders. Moreover as a result, they decided not to participate in the election campaign (see, Rahman 2010).
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3.4.2  Representation
Representation of women is well below the minimum requirement at the district level for both parties. 
On average, about 5 % of the AL members in the district committees are women, compared to 6.74% 
7for BNP.
The Representation of the People Order (RPO) does not have any specified reservation 
requirements for religious minority, and thus from a legal perspective, the main political parties are 
not obliged to encourage minority representation within their organisations (Amundsen 2013a).  
However, the parties themselves do have guidelines with specific references to the inclusion of 
8minority people.  In AL, minorities make up 10% or less of total members, on average acrross 50 
districts. For BNP, minorities make up 5% or less of total members. There are therefore more 
minority members within the AL, with an membership percentage of 8.57 % on average. BNPs 
avergae stands at 3.31 %. The local journalists also confirmed the low numbers of female 
representation in case of both the parties. However, it was also observed that the number of women 
members within the BNP is increasing, which is consistent to a report of increasing popularity of 
women in the BNP camps during the Upazila elections 2014 (Daily Star 2014). 
It is also worth mentioning that experts have observed, “women's participation is increasing in both 
political parties,” whereas in terms of religious minority representation BNP lags behind. 
3.4.3  Competition
The constitutions themselves are not entirely democratic when compared to international norms. 
Guidelines for competition within parties are mostly absent (Rahman 2010, Amundsen 2013a). 
However, there are some indications that both parties, from the district-level leaders' perspective, 
engage in fairly democratic practices. The district committees, for example, appear to be broadly 
democratic with a high percentage of Presidents and General Secretaries being appointed by the local 
councils (over 75% for both parties). However, the status of those at the sub-national level appears to 
be affected both by central party selection, as well as by the collusion of interests between party 
leaders at the centre, and other influential leaders of industry and commerce. As evident from Figure 
3.2, where selection is perceived to be made by party heads, party governance in Bangladesh with 
respect to AL and BNP can be authoritarian. 
7. In five districts, there are relatively high rates (over 15%) of women members for BNP. This compares to only two districts 
for AL.
8. From a 'de jure' perspective, the guidelines for the inclusion of minorities is for the most part absent, and where specified 
in text, it remains vague, especially for the AL.
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Figure 3.2: Role of different actors to select leaders at district committees
With regards to competition for party posts in the past five years, it was observed that on average BNP 
has outperformed AL by a significant margin. In the last 5 years, about 65% of AL district committees 
had no contestation for leadership, whereas about 37.5% of committees were not contested within 
BNP.  About one-third of the respondents (overall for both AL and BNP) have stated that there is no 
possibility of being nominated 'other than the blessing of an influential leader'. Also, the party 
executives stated that most of the decisions regarding key committee positions are made by the party 
head, for BNP; while a significant number of respondents have stated that for the AL the party head 
does not normally take such decisions. 
Figure 3.3: Journalists' perception on the recruitment of Dist. President and General Secretary
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As seen in Figure 3.3, the journalists' observed that the President and General Secretary positions are 
mostly appointed through the local councils. The data shows that over half of the party Presidents or 
General Secretaries are appointed by either the 'party head', 'one of the influential leaders' or 'few 
leaders from the centre'. However, the Awami League does, on the whole, better, with almost half of the 
journalists claiming that either of the two positions is 
appointed through local council voting. The journalists 
also felt that elections at the district level are not very 
competitive. About three-fourth of the journalists 
observed that there is poor internal contestation for 
both the parties. This is contrary to the findings from 
the district level party officials that BNP had fared 
significantly better. Along with low internal 
contestation, the majority of the journalists observed 
that district committee position(s) depended on 
economic status and/or professional status. This 
observation is supported by the fact that the majority 
of the party members are businessmen followed by 
professional groups of lawyers, teachers and journalists. 
Citizen survey also supports such observation as 88% of 
the respondents perceive that MPs are nominated by 
the party leader's discretion or decision as opposed to 
voting by party members (Figure 3.4).
In relation to competition, many key informants express dissatisfaction about the lack of competition 
within the main parties in the leadership selection process. In a typical statement, a prominent left-
wing political leader in the country had the following to say:
“BNP and AL hardly practice democracy within their party. No party, except for 
ornamental reasons, has held any effective party conference with a view to changing 
leaders following democratic procedures and this also prove that no party in essence 
practice democracy within their respective party. AL, for instance, camouflaged its true 
face in the name of democracy by enshrining some democratic principles in their 
constitution. In fact, its party leaders decide everything which can be academically termed 
as 'one man rule'. The same is true for BNP. It holds no election within their party for 
leadership change. After the assassination of Ziaur Rahman, the founder of BNP, his wife 
controls the party”. 
In both the parties BNP and AL, the party heads nominate a “big chunk” of the members in the highest 
policy making body the 'National Standing Committee' of BNP and the 'Executive Committee' of AL. Not 
only have the major two political parties irregularly organized their council meetings, even if councils 
and conventions were held, election of party leaders did not take place.  Both parties depend on the 
party Chairperson for leadership. This is because the party decisions are in the hand of the party chiefs. 
Thus the internal organisational strength has been weakened and reliant upon one person, which 
ultimately undermines competition (cf. Rahman 2010). 
However, in case of both the parties, it is observed that two layers at the local level are practicing 
democracy to some extent. These are the Union and the Ward levels. In these two levels, committees 
are formed through proper way of council. One of the reasons, as mentioned by a prominent journalist, 
12%
88%
Through Voting within the party
Chosen by the party leader
Figure 3.4: Member of Parliament nomination
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is that, in the communities, leaders are more accountable to the party members and citizenry, as they 
face them every day. Therefore, it is not always possible for them to avoid someone who is supported 
by the party members. Others also report that on rare occasions, there may be limited demand for 
healthy competition among the members of the parties in the local level. Such a practice is also 
reported by a national newspaper from the district of Dinajpur, where the district BNP committee was 
formed through the secret ballot method. Initiatives taken by the local party councillors were 
appreciated by the party activists.
3.4.4  Responsiveness
Responsiveness is conceptualised as being a main feature of the higher-order concept of 
accountability. Specifically responsiveness was considered here as the activity of holding council 
meetings on a regular basis, over time. The regularity of such process is a key feature of accountability 
since it offers the opportunity for the elected district members to inquire and question party leaders 
and thus holding them accountable to stated democratic obligations.  In the district level party officials' 
survey, for the indicator, 'last council held', it is considered that holding councils would make the 
'centre' more responsive and accountable to the district committee. This would decentralise power, 
making the party inclusive and participatory. Figure 3.5 shows that the AL is highly uninclusive as the 
council meetings are rarely held regularly. About three-fourths of respondents from AL party offices 
report that council meetings have not been held in the last 10 years. This seems to suggest that power is 
centralised around the top party leaders. BNP appears more responsive as over 70% of the districts 
reportedly held meetings between 3 and 5 years. 
Figure 3.5: Number of council held in AL and BNP during the last 10 years
The practice of discussion 
and sharing of opinions in 
the councils would make 
the party more responsive 
to the district committees. 
A l though  the  counc i l  
meetings held for AL are 
infrequently held, member 
from both the parties state 
t h at  t h e y  a re  h i g h l y  
responsive, with over three-
fourth of the respondents 
claiming that they can 
provide their opinion in the 
Counci l .  According to 
journalists, the councils are 
not held regularly at the 
district level, and so democratic practices are suffering, which support the responses from the district 
offices to a great extent. We see from Figure 3.6 that majority of the councils (66.7%) were held 10 
years back, although the reported percentage is higher (over 70%) by the party leaders. Given that the 
constitution of AL states that any decision taken by the national council cannot be challenged, 
responsiveness with regards to AL is low.
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Figure 3.6: Journalists' perception of councils held in AL
The district level journalists feel that over 
three-fourth of the district leaders can voice 
their opinions in the national council. This 
perception has positive implications if the 
voice of members is being heard at the 
national level, and can make the 'centre' 
more responsive. This is consistent with the 
findings from the district offices survey, 
which suggest that three-fourth of the 
district committee members are able to 
give their opinion at the national council. 
Experts felt that members are expected not to criticise any act of the leaders. Drastic actions (such as 
expelling, depriving of the possibility of nominations for major elections) are taken against members 
9who criticize his/her party leaders or challenge any decision.
3.4.5  Transparency
Transparency was considered a function of six variables, which would show the availability of essential 
information at the district level, as follows: 1) party constitutions, 2) information about the party's 
history, 3) election manifesto, 4) profile of MPs and MP candidates, 5) profile of the party-head, and 6) 
list of party officials. Data from the party offices survey indicate that for both parties the availability of 
party constitutions is relatively high with about 75% of party offices displaying the information to the 
general public. However, both parties score relatively low with regards to publicising a list of profiles of 
MP candidates, with less than 40 % of offices making such information available. BNP scores better 
than AL in the category of listing party officials' names, with information made available in about 75% 
of offices, compared to ALs 58%. 
10 A transparency index was created by standardising  the aggregate of the six 'transparency-availability' 
variables. A greater value indicates a higher availability of resources, making the party documentation 
procedures more transparent. Using the 'transparency-availability index', interestingly a positive 
correlation has been found (see Box 1-2 and Table 1-2 of Annex 1) between the parties. Districts in 
which AL party district committees are more transparent, overlap closely with BNPs reporting in the 
same districts. Journalists support the district level party leaders report of party constitutions being 
available in the majority of the offices. This can have positive implications on governance. For instance, 
party members can raise their voice to increase the representation of women within the party. Also, 
the constitution itself can be challenged by party members.
9. It is relevant here to consider the local level implications of the Article 70 of Bangladesh Constitution, which reads, “if a 
member of parliament, (a) being present in Parliament abstains from voting, or, (b) absents himself from any sitting of 
Parliament, ignoring the direction of the party which nominated him at the election as a candidate not to do so, he shall 
be deemed to have voted against that party.” Interviews with experts reveal that these central restrictions create the 
culture of subservience at the local level.
10. See Box 1-2 of Annex 1 for standardizing formula.
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Another transparency index created using the journalists' responses show a high consistency in 
responses of the district offices and local journalists. A similar correlation (see Box 1-2 and Table 1-3 of 
Annex 1)  shows that the districts in which information is unavailable for AL, the same is true for BNP. 
There seems to be some effect of geography on the district offices, verified by the recurrence of the 
findings. We can also hypothesise that there may also exist a competitive nature among the parties at 
the district level as different respondents (respondents from BNP offices and from AL offices) have 
provided similar results on the availability of information.
According to a prominent academic, the standard of both political parties has gradually deteriorated in 
terms of intra-party democratic practices. The main reason, he feels, is that “there is no trust among 
the party leaders and activists … Leaders do not trust the members and members do not trust the 
leaders”. One political leader suggested that, “supporters and activists do not want their leader to be 
competent”. Another senior media professional had the following observation: “As there is little or no 
transparency within the party, very few members actually know the criterion on which members of the 
different committee in the top level are selected. Leaders of local party units know little about party 
policies” (cf. Rahman 2010).
After a comprehensive analysis of the five indicators (representation, competition, transparency, 
responsiveness and participation), five standardised and equally weighted indices were constructed by 
scaling and quantifying the responses using the indicators from the theoretical framework:                   
1) representation, 2) transparency, 3) participation, 4) competition and 5) responsiveness (or 
accountability). Finally, the average of the five indices was taken to create the Party Democracy Index 
(PDI) for the two parties.
The 'Party Democracy Index' or PDI provides an (index) value where the higher value indicates that a 
party district office is more democratic with regards to intra-party governance. Map 3.1 shows the 
geographical variation and positioning of the top 10 and bottom 10 performing districts according to 
the PDI for both the parties, AL and BNP. When the overall index value is considered, BNP is at par with 
AL where the average score for both the parties is 0.46. When the indicators are considered, BNP 
responsiveness value is at 0.74 and the AL value is at 0.56. AL does better than BNP in representation, 
transparency and participation, when BNP does better in competition (AL competition value of 0.51 
11and BNP value of 0.59). Also, the AL score for participation is considerably greater than that of BNP.  
However, one needs to be careful to make any absolute 'judgment calls' as the values are derived from 
'perceptions' of respondents from district offices. 
3.5  'Party democracy index' (PDI)
3.6  Concluding observations
In relation to the constitutional scruples, the degree and extent of participation (i.e. recruitment of 
party leaders) for both the parties is low.  In practice, the extent to which members partake in the 
formulation, discussion and critique of ideological and broad national issues is minimal and hardly 
visible among the members.  The provisions for minority representation including women, when party 
11. See Table 1-4 and Table 1-5 of Annex 1 for the overall PDI and indicator values.
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scruples are considered, is clearly below the international best practices, which tend to require a 50% 
participation rate for minorities. In actuality, women are severely underrepresented (at about 5%) 
among the two major parties while the situation of ethnic and religious minority representation is 
slightly better. However, it is still below the international best practices. Although the constitutions 
contain reference to mechanisms of leadership recruitment, the relevant provisions lack clarity, are 
open to arbitrary interpretations and therefore remain prone to potential abuse. As per the party 
leader responses, the field practice apparently looks encouraging with a considerable majority 
reporting that the district level leaders are selected through respective party councils. Except for the 
mention of holding 'party congress' the constitutions do not give any systematic prescription regarding 
the manner and means of inclusion of the “broad circle of the party” in key party decisions. Even this 
limited provision of voice in decisions through 'party congress' is rarely practiced; three-quarters of the 
district party leader respondents noted that the AL council was not held in 10 years, and for BNP the 
time-lapse was between 3 and 5 years as reported by 70% of the respondents. The constitutions do not 
exclusively dwell on the parties' responsibility of ensuring transparency in terms of the 
availability/accessibility of its information, by-laws and other relevant party documents. Basic avenues 
of information such as profile of leaders and history of the party are unavailable in most districts. The 
party websites are not regularly updated, far from exhaustive, and poorly maintained.
It could be argued that 'inclusive and decentralized' form of representation should be maintained, 
without which democratic governance risks descending into usurpation and authoritarianism. 
Regrettably, even with such a minimalistic evaluative framework, we cannot but conclude that the 
rudimentary democratic 'scruples and practices' are still not apparent within the two main parties in 
Bangladesh.
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4.1  Introduction
Political violence is a alarmingly growing phenomenon in many parts of the world. The severity of 
violence in Bangladesh's politics is widely discussed at the national level, as well as internationally. The 
international risk analyst Maplecroft, in its latest (2013) Conflict and Political Violence Index (CPVI), 
identifies Bangladesh as being at 'high risk' for political violence. The CPVI ranking included 197 
stnations, among which Bangladesh was ranked 21 . A recent survey by BRAC Institute of Governance 
and Development (BIGD) on public perception identifies political violence among the top five 'law and 
order' problems in Bangladesh. 
Violence has long been part of the political landscape in Bangladesh and is considered to be a central 
problem of politics. While differences in opinion between parties are common in democracies, in 
Bangladesh these often lead to the use of extreme forms of violence, resulting in death, injury and 
extensive damage to property. Some studies illustrate how political violence has been institutionalised 
as a 'political norm' in Bangladesh (Amundsen 2013b, Alamgir 2011, Moniruzzaman 2009a, Sattar 
2008). Moniruzzaman (2009a) states that political violence emerges from a deep-rooted political 
culture of intolerance, antagonism, revenge and arrogance. Alamgir (2011) argues that violence has 
become a core governance problem affecting legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and 
representation. Amundsen (2013b) identifies that political dynasties in Bangladesh have contributed 
to the country's prevailing situation of highly confrontational politics. A new breed of 'politicians' with 
money and armed support are increasingly replacing veteran politicians (Hussain 2002 cited in 
Moniruzzaman 2009a, P. 84). As a consequence of all such factors, political violence remains stuck in a 
'vicious cycle', whereby undemocratic practices reinforce political violence and vice versa. Thus, the 
development of a basic democratic system in Bangladesh is undermined. 
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In spite of being recognised as a core problem, political violence is under researched in the context of 
Bangladesh. Only a few systematic quantitative studies have been taken place in last 44 years 
1(Amudsen 2013b, Ahmed 2012, Alamgir 2011, Sattar 2008, Islam 2006, Datta 2005).
This study describes the patterns of political violence in Bangladesh, with a particular focus on the 
period 2008-13, and looks at the variation between regions. It investigates how political violence is 
associated with different political and economic variables. 
The independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan was achieved through a bloody liberation war, which 
established some fundamental rights, including the transfer of power to the elected representatives of 
the people, thus paving the way to establishing a country with a democratic system of government. But 
few years later the democratic ethos began to erode with the formation of one party system in 1975 
and till date, the nation has had conflict and dissent over the fundamentals of nationhood (Ahmed 
2012, Khan 2010, Jahan 2008). 
The political history of the Indian subcontinent shows that the origin of violence in politics dates 
back to the British Colonial era. The dramatic transformation of East Bengal to East Pakistan and 
finally to Bangladesh, under the British rule and the Pakistani rule respectively, was a narration of 
2violent struggles (Khan 2010).  The legacy of political violence was further perpetuated during the 
Pakistan era, famously exemplified by the demand for Bengali as a national language and for 
equitable representation outlined in the 'Six Point Demand' (Moniruzzaman 2009b). The post-
independence era was also influenced by a worldwide revolutionary leftist movement, violent 
practice by extremist parties (Wallace and Harris 1989), enactment of special internal security force, 
failure of proper de-weaponisation after the liberation war, unemployment among well-armed 
freedom fighters (Talukder 1975) as well as violent conflicts within and outside the dominant party. 
All of this contributed to a rise in violent politics. Thus, the period from 1971 to 1975 was a turbulent 
era, as elites with significant political power, but few economic assets, came to power in the newly 
independent country (Khan 2010), and in this context, violent political behavior created an avenue 
for economic gain. Political violence henceforth became a means of capital accumulation (Ahmed 
2012). The increase of state-induced violence was evident during both civil and military regimes. 
Using the state machinery, both regimes imposed strict control on political activities across the 
country. In the 1990s, Bangladesh entered the process of democratic transition and began to 
practice a multiparty parliamentary political system, however, political violence in Bangladesh 
remains a tool to gain political supremacy.
4.2  Political violence in the context of Bangladesh
1. Firstly, only a few studies used quantitative information to discuss political violence in Bangladesh (Alamgir 2011, Sattar 
2008, Islam 2006). Secondly, most studies were not comprehensive, and lacked a detailed description of violence, its 
types, causes, consequences and  regional distribution. Thirdly, no detailed studies on political violence post 2006 were 
available. Fourthly, a systematic study is not available, correlating different socio-economic issues to incidences of 
political violence in the Bangladeshi context.
2. Basically most of the violence in this period took place in the form of communal violence.
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4.3  Data and method
4.4 Political violence in Bangladesh (2008-13): Trends, patterns, severity and 
regional distribution
stTo assess the trends of political violence, this study uses an original dataset for a period from January 1  
st 32008 to December 31  2013, by collecting newspaper reports on violence (Daily Prothom Alo).
A rather narrow definition of 'party induced violence' has been used to look at political violence for the 
purpose of this study. That is, any sort of violence between and within political parties, between political 
parties and individuals, between political parties and different interest groups, as well as between parties 
and law enforcing agencies, would be considered as political violence. Murders/ attacks on political party 
members when the reported motive is not mentioned as political were excluded from the analysis. For all 
types of violence, detailed information including year, cause(s) of violence, type(s) of violence, casualties, 
tool(s) and place(s) where the violence took place were recorded. The raw data was cross-checked and 
collated. To explain political violence in relation to different economic and political variables, data was 
collected from secondary sources. Simple multiple regressions are used to see the association of political 
violence with different variables. The details of the regression analysis are discussed in section four. 
4.4.1 Trend of violence
Political violence in Bangladesh is recognised as a core problem. The record of incidents of political 
violence over the last six years shows that political violence is a daily occurance. Figure 4.1 depicts the 
reported violence against each year. Roughly 2,723 incidents of political violence were reported for the 
period from 2008 to 2013, over 64 districts of Bangladesh. As seen, the violence in 2013 alone accounts 
for 43 percent of political violence that occurred in the entire period during 2008-13. Thus, in the next 
sections, the  discussion is divided into two different periods of 2008-12 and 2013.
Figure 4.1: Frequency of political violence in 2008-2013
Studies on political violence in the 
context of Bangladesh show that 
politically induced violence peaks in 
the election years (Sattar 2008). 
Excluding election years 2008 and 
2013, data used in this study 
supports this assertion. However, in 
spite of being the election year, 
2008 has very few incidents of 
political violence, partly because 
the election was held under a 
caretaker government while 
enough steps were taken to ensure 
it was free and fair. A similar 
3. A single newspaper was used as a source of information to ensure consistency on data, as well as to avoid 
duplication. The rationale behind selecting The Daily Prothom Alo is that it has reporters in all 64 districts. 
The assumption is that there would be optimum level reporting of event. It would also enable an analysis of 
regional patterns of violence. However, one caveat of using a single source is that it might result in under 
reporting (which, for the purpose of this study would be preferable to over reporting).
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phenomenon is seen in 1991, as both the major parties, Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist 
thParty (BNP) were united against the autocratic regime, and thus the 5  parliamentary election witnessed 
less violence compared to other subsequent elections. When 2008 election is compared to the previous 
ones, it is seen to have been the least violent year among all election years of 1991, 1996 and 2001. 
Comparing violence between regimes
Table 4.1 presents a comparative picture of political violence of this regime (2008-13) to the previous regime 
(2001-06), using Ain o Shalish Kendra (ASK) data on political violence for 2001-2006 period. The reporting 
procedure is similar to this study, except that the data was collected from mulitple sources. When this data is 
4 cross-checked with ASK data, there is little variation in numbers  for the period of 2008-13. 
Table 4.1: Violence in different regimes for non-election years
When the incidents of the study period (2008-13) is compared with the previous six years (2001-2006), it 
appears that, on average, political violence has increased four percent per year. To see how trends of 
violence have changed in non-election years,  2001 and 2013 were excluded from the comparison. 
Incidents of political violence were found to have increased by 16 percent per year in non-election years.  
Political violence by parties
Political parties act as the key agents of political violence in Bangladesh. Many different wings and sub-wings 
of these parties are also engaged in violence. In the following section, we grouped all associated organisations 
under their respective mainstream political parties (AL, BNP,  JP  and JI).
Figure 4.2: Violence by major political parties
Total no. of violence Average violence /year Increase in violence
2002-06 2008-12
ASK 1332 1861 266.4 39.71%
Survey data 1541 15.69%
2002-06
372.2
308.2
2008-12
4. Compared to our record of 2600 incidents, they record 2700 incidents of violence in these six years. However, our record 
of 2013 incidents were 40 percent higher than ASK data, whereas we recorded 28 percent less events in 2012.  According 
to ASK data, in 2001-2006 period, there were 2632 total number of recorded violence which is slighlty lower than the 
number recored in the period of 2008-13.
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Interestingly, figure 4.2 shows that the party in power was engaged in more violence than the 
opposition which is similar to the pattern reported in previous studies. Alamgir's (2011) study on 
political violence for the period of 2001-06 found that the ruling party was responsible for more than 
twice the number of incidents of political violence compared to those perpetrated by the main 
5opposition. In the current study, the records show that the ruling party,  AL, was engaged in 58 percent 
of the total violence. The major opposition party, BNP, was involved in about 25 percent of the reported 
violence, followed by JI which was engaged in 8 percent of the reported political violence. Other parties 
such as JP, Leftist parties and other Islamic parties were involved in around 2 percent or even less, in the 
entire period. 
Reported violence for the year 2013 however reveals a different pattern compared to previous years, 
whereby 76 percent of the violence had involvement of the BNP-JI alliance and their student wings, and 
AL and its groups were responsible for about 21 percent of the violence conducted. 
Factional violence in politics
Factional violence constitutes a larger share in the reported political violence of Bangladesh. Previous 
studies have shown that between 1991-2001, 20 percent of violent incidents were between intra-party 
factions (Islam 2006). Our survey data, when disaggregated, shows that the rate of factional violence is 
even higher in current years. During the period 2008-2012, there were 523 events of intra party 
violence, amounting to 40 percent of total reported violence.
Table 4.2 reveals an interesting pattern; 
despite an increase in political violence in 
the election years, the percentage share of 
intra-party violence is relatively less in 
those years compared to non election years. 
Both 2008 and 2013, being the election 
years, reported a higher rate of inter-party 
violence whereas in other years the share of 
inter and intra-party violence is more or less 
equal. 2011 is certainly an exception, 
however this could have been due to the 
local government election held at that time. In times of high political competition, it seems, the 
party factional disputes are minimised to attain the bigger goal of winning the election. In 2013, for 
example, the share of intra party violence went down to as low as 7 percent compared to 43 percent 
in the previous year. 
Table 4.2: Patterns of violence by year
5. Along with its youth wings Jubo League (JL), student association Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) and multiple other 
wings and association including Sromik League (labour association), Shechchasebok League (volunteer wing) and Krishok 
League (peasant wing).
Year Between parties Within parties
2008 74.5% 25.5%
2009 52.4% 47.6%
2010 57.9% 42.1%
2011 70.7% 29.3%
2012 56.7% 43.3%
2013 93% 7.00%
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Figure 4.3: Intra-party and between party violence
The current study found that the 'winning 
party's' absolute control over resources 
increases the competition among party 
factions, which results in even more 
factional violence. Figure 4.3 shows the 
disaggregated share of intra and inter-
party violence among total violence of 
6three major political parties.  During the 
period 2008-12, the ruling party was 
engaged in highest 73 percent of the intra-
party violence. In previous regime, during 
2001-06 period, BNP had the higher intra-
party clashes compared to AL (CPD 2014). This implies that conflicts within party factions largely occur 
due to distribution of political power and economic opportunities. This could also depend on the 
structure of the party as an institution, as well as its internal democratic practices. Boucek (2009) called 
it a 'Degenerative' form of factionalism, which may arise as a result of 'weakness of the party as an 
7institution'.
Political violence by student wings 
Student politics is a major concern of the current political scenario. The surveys on political parties 
reveal that student fronts are mostly responsible for political violence in Bangladesh. All the major 
parties rely on these wings for creating and maintaining their political base. According to the data, 
during 2008-12, student wings were 
involved in 35 percent of violent events. 
When disaggregated party-wise, the 
pattern is very similar to their parent 
parties. Figure 4.4 shows that ruling 
part (AL) student wing accounts for the 
majority of student violence followed 
by BNP and JI student wings. Alamgir 
(2011) noted the same phenomenon 
(ruling party student wing mostly 
responsible) during 2001-06 period and 
argued that the parties 'enjoyed relative 
8immunity by virtue of being in power'.
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
  AL BNP Jamat  
 Intra-party Between parties 
6. As we have noted earlier that 2013 constitutes only 7 percent of intra party violence, we have excluded this year from the 
analysis. 
7. See Rethinking Factionalism, Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of Factionalism , Françoise Boucek 2009
8. It is not possible to segregate 2013 events by any individual party as the violence was mostly done in groups where the 
main political parties, their student wings and allies were also involved. 
% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
AL student
wings
BNP student
wings
JI student
wings
Figure 4.4: political violence by different student fronts
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4.4. 2 Severity of political violence
It is not possible to get a clear picture about the severity of political violence in Bangladesh just by 
looking at reported incidents of violence. In reality, violence has intensified both in nature and in 
casualties. At the same time, it is thought that due to availability of small arms and explosives, the 
nature of political violence has become more and more violent (Alamgir 2011). Unfortunately, the 
majority of the victims of violence are the general public, who are not connected to politics. 
Figure 4.5: Disaggregation of violence incidents by nature in 2008-12 (left panel) and 2013 (right panel)
This study looked at the severity of political violence by considering three aspects: the changing 
composition of violence, the number of casualties reported and commonly used weapons for violence. 
Figure 4.5 shows seven broad categories of reported violence. In normal years, injury constitutes the 
major share of reported events. As shown, between 2008-12, 66 percent of the total reported incidents 
mentioned injuries as the major manifestation of violence followed by vandalism (17 percent) and 
murder (13 percent).  However, the year 2013 was more violent than previous years. The number of 
injuries went down by 21 percent, whereas murder and arson increased by 3 and 4 percentage points 
respectively.  Vandalism was almost double than previous years. Threat and abduction are the least 
reported, in both 2008-12 and in 2013. 
Table 4.3: Casualties reported in the period of 2008 -12 and 2013
As the table 4.3 shows, more than 500 people were killed during this regime only due to political 
party-induced violence and more than 33 thousand people were injured. On an average, each 
incident of political violence resulted in about 13 injuries and there was one murder for every five 
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Type of causalities 2008-12 2013 2002-2006 (ASK)
No. of people killed 246 273 158
Injured 16211 17492 14685
No. of shops/vehicles/properties vandalised 2903 3056 -
No. of shops/vehicles/ properties vandalised & burnt  257 257 -
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incidents. In five years from 2008-2012, 273 people were killed and 17,492 people were injured as a 
result of politically induced violence. Along with this, at least 3,313 vehicles, shops and offices were 
9vandalised or set on fire.
Weapons of violence
10Local arms  were found to be most commonly used (61 percent) for violence during 2008-12 followed 
11by 'Firearms'.  Interestingly, the use of weapons varied significantly in 2013, compared to previous 
years; the use of local arms decreases to 47 percent from a previous average of 60 percent, whereas the 
12use of explosives  increased significantly to 33 percent. Violence seemed to have reached its peak 
during 2013, with more violent forms of weapons were being used. 
Figure 4.6: Weapons used in political violence in 2008-12(left) and 2013 (right)
134.4.3   Regional distribution of violence
For the period 2008-2012, political violence was recorded in all 64 districts of Bangladesh. Figure 4.7 
shows that Dhaka and Bandarban reportedly record the highest and lowest frequency of violence, 
respectively. Violence is reportedly high in divisional headquarters; all the six divisional headquarters 
including Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, Barisal, Rajhshahi, and Khulna belong to the top ten violent 
districts. Districts closer to Dhaka, such as Narayanganj and Gazipur, also recorded a higher number of 
14violence cases.
9. These numbers are very naive representations, in most cases numbers of vehicles/shops were not mentioned 
specifically, we could not include them here. Again when multiple numbers are reported for example 7/8 shops, we have 
considered the lowest number. 
10.  It is also because that it includes all categories except firearms and explosives; this category of tools include stick, bat, 
hockey sticks, knife, rod, machete, chopper, axe and anything that is capable for performing any kind of violence like 
injury and murder
11. Includes any kind of guns like shotguns, rifles, revolvers, pistols and so on
12. 'Explosive/fuel' includes anything like bombs, petrol bombs, cocktails, tear gas shells and anything else that can be 
exploded. This also includes incidents where petrol and other fuels have been used for conduction of violence
13. Please see Map 2-1, 2-2 of Annex 2. 
14. A similar trend is apparent in previous years. Alamgir (2011) shows that during 2001 to 2006, Dhaka, Khulna, Chittagong, 
Rajshahi and Barisal were the top ranked violent districts. According to Islam (2006), during the period of 1991-2001, the 
four district headquarters, Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and Khulna reported highest number of violence incidents.
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Figure 4.8 shows the population adjusted violence in districts. As it shows, the magnitude of difference 
in terms of violence incidents between districts is not so apparent after being scaled to the population. 
Dhaka and Narayanganj have an almost equal number of violence incidents. Most importantly, Dhaka, 
Naryanganj, Rajshahi, Barisal and Khulna in terms of both numbers and per ten thousand, remains at 
the top of the rank for recorded violence. Except the divisional headquarters, Meherpur, Munshiganj, 
Manikganj and Kushtia recorded more violence per ten thousand populations than the others. Data 
from the last four national elections reveals that these districts were traditionally dominating by BNP. 
This indicates that political violence in those districts can be high due to strong competition between 
the ruling party and the opposition.  
Distribution of violence over the districts in 2013 is shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.  Dhaka remains 
the most violent district in terms of the number of violent incidents reported, followed by Satkhira and 
Narayanganj.  Among the district headquarters, Chittagong, Rajshahi and Sylhet remain as the topmost 
violent districts in terms of number of incidences reported, while Khulna and Barisal reports much 
lower levels of violence.
However, figure 4.10 shows that, after scaling for population, Rajshahi turns out to be the most 
violent district of 2013 followed by Satkhira, Narayanganj, Gazipur, Joypurhat and Feni. In terms of 
electoral competition, it consipires that these are mainly opposition party dominating districts. In 
Joypurhat and Feni, BNP as an opposition always had the absolute majority in national elections, 
whereas Satkhira is known as traditional JI stronghold. As 2013 was the year of the war crime trials 
and BNP-JI alliance was the key actor of violence, this might explain the high violence rate in these 
three districts. Sherpur, Jhalokathi and Gopalganj remain in the lowest bracket in both in terms of 
frequency of violence and in per 10,000 people in 2013.  In both 2008-12 and in 2013, it generally 
seems that which have a lower rate of violence are traditionally ruling party districts, though this 
does not hold true for all ruling party districts.
Pockets of regional violence
When the top ten violent districts in terms of number and population adjustment are considered for 
15both periods,  Narayanganj, Rajshahi, Dhaka and Gazipur remain in the top ten of the most violent 
districts. From 2008-12, five of the six district headquarters Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Barisal and 
Khulna consistently belong in the top rank violent districts.  Previous studies show that during 1991-
2000, Dhaka and Narayanganj (Sattar 2008) and in 2001-06, Dhaka, Rajshahi, Barisal and Khulna were 
among the top violent districts (Alamgir 2011).
The trend reported in other studies reveals that there has not been much change in pockets of violence 
over the years. A number of these changed with the change of government, but some of them remain 
the same despite the change in power. Dhaka, being the capital, always remains in the top rank along 
with Narayanganj. Khulna, Barisal, Chittagong and Rajshahi also reports higher violence with some 
minor exceptions. Between 1991-2000, Chittagong reported higher violence, whereas in the last 10 
years Khulna and Rajshai were more violent. 
15. See Table 2-1 of Annex 2
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Among the headquarters along with Gazipur and Narayanganj, two common factors are noticed. 
Firstly, in terms of election results, these are mostly swing districts where in the last four parliamentary 
elections, the distribution of constituencies were more or less equal; in other words, no party had 
absolute control. Secondly, being the divisional headquarters with industrial zones, they are also the hub 
of economic activities. These two factors raise political competition between parties, as well as creating 
grounds for more intra-party violence. When disaggregated further by patterns, it is seen that in Dhaka, 
Barisal, Gazipur and Narayanganj, the distribution of inter and intra-party violence is almost equal. 
Closer inspection to the causes of violence in Naryanganj and Gazipur reveals that most reported 
causes are economic. Political violence in Narayanganj happens mostly due to tender and contract 
related issues, followed by violence over controlling business of scrap garments materials, along with 
the drug business, whereas in Gazipur it is mostly garments and drug related issues. 
Looking at district headquarters, especially Dhaka and Rajshahi, political dominance remains as a 
major reason of violence, along with many other causes such as hartal (strike)-related violence, 
economic causes and campus dominance. In Dhaka, fighting over committee positions remains a 
significant cause of political violence. 
4.4.4  Reasons for political violence
While reporting political violence, newspapers mostly state the immediate reasons for violence. Islam 
(2006) conducts an extensive study on violence for the period of 1991-2001, which finds that attack on 
political activities, internal conflict and hartal (strike) stood out as the most reported reasons of 
16political violence.
Figure 4.11: Reported causes of political violence in 2008-12 and in 2013
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16. Sattar (2008) also notes that violence at national level is usually caused by issues such as policy reforms, trials along with 
protests regarding different oppression and mistreatment, whereas violence in local areas mostly originate from local 
leaders who behave in a autocratic manner.
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The reasons mentioned in newspapers were recorded, grouped under broad categories and presented 
in figure 4.11. As shows, during 2008-12, political dominance was the single largest reason (21 percent) 
of political violence. The term 'political dominance' includes incidents such as when one party/ faction 
tries to establish control in a certain region or institution (e.g. educational institution or dorm) with the 
motive of gaining economic benefit, or establishing political control. Conflict and enmity between 
parties and party factions remain the second largest reason (15 percent) for political violence, followed 
by local government election (10 percent). Hartal (strike)/oborodh (blockade) are also major reasons 
behind political violence. Economic reasons, such as fighting for tender/submission/contracts, 
encroachment of land and applications for jobs, account for more than 7 percent of the total violence. 
Looking at the causes of violence in 2013, there appears to be a different pattern compared to the 
previous years. As data shows, among different types of causes, hartal/oborodh (strike/blockade) 
stood out as the primary cause of political violence in 2013, and accounted for more than 50 percent of 
the violence. Significantly, nearly 20 percent of political violence took place due to the war crime trial 
issue. Establishing political dominance and political enmity/conflict went down to 8 and 6 percent on 
average respectively.  
Interestingly, establishing intra-party dominance stands out as a single largest reason (more than 
30 percent) for 'within party' fights, hence establishing control over regions or institutions 
remains a primary focus of party factions (see table 4.4). It proves that the nature of political 
violence has now shifted from broad ideological issues to self-serving motivations like the need to 
secure dominance over property and resources. Intra-party violence also arises because of 
internal political conflicts among factions (18 percent), followed by distribution of economic 
resources (11 percent). Local government elections also emerge as a source of conflict between 
party factions. 
Table 4.4: Major causes of violence in 2008-12 (by intra and inter-parties)
Causes Between parties Intra-party
Argument/altercation 2.9% 5.7%
Contract/property/land/job 5.0% 11.3%
Dominance 13.6% 29.4%
Election 5.5% 4.6%
Formation  of/position in Council/Committees .3% 4.8%
Hartal/Oborodh 14.0% 1.7%
Political enmity/conflict 14.1% 18.2%
Procession 9.3% 2.1%
War Crime Tribunal 5.2%
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17. For instance, Regan and Henderson (2002) studied the relationship for 91 Less Developed Countries (LDCs) for a period of 
14 years. One of their findings suggests that semi-democratic LDCs have the highest level of repression. When Licchbach 
(1981) argues that inequality is a major reason behind conflict, Piazza (2006) suggested otherwise. He conducted a study 
on 96 countries for a period 1986-2002 and found that no specific relationship with economic development and violence 
could be established. In fact population, ethnic and religious diversity, along with political party politics were seen to be 
the most important determinant of terrorism and violence. Nevertheless, variation of political violence within a country 
is under-researched. In the context of Bangladesh, Sattar (2008) found that presence of 'authoritarian' figures in districts 
significantly affects political violence. She argues that most of this locally directed violence occurs due to distribution of 
resources. In 'zones' of economic and political competition, violence is high. 
18.  For the tabular representation of variables and sources, see Table 2-2 of Annex 2.
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4.4.5  Explaining political violence
Democracy and its relationship with violence has been analysed in many countries in the world using 
17cross-country data.  Here we test a hypothesis that strong political competition, along with economic 
concentration explains the district variation in political violence. In this test the dependent variable is 
political violence by per 10,000 population. To determine level of political competition, two different 
18variables are used.  The first variable is the concentration of 'political power', which shows how well the 
political power is distributed across regions. To represent the level of political competition, we used a 
variable of 'party stronghold', which is a dummy of districts where any political party had majority of the 
seats in the last four parliamentary elections. The second variable is 'power' captured by executives of the 
government, which is the share of minister/ chairman of the parliamentary standing committee/ cabinet 
member as a percentage of elected representatives. To represent district level economic variation, 
poverty data (percentages of people under upper poverty line) from BBS was used. Another dummy was 
used to capture the divisional headquarters effect. As student violence constitutes a major share of 
political violence, a dummy of university location was also used to see how this affects political violence. 
Table 4.5: Findings
Note: Values in the parenthesis shows the corresponding t-values. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Power 2012 0.0803** 0.074* 0.0744* 0.0702* 0.0796**  
(-2.01) (-1.79) (-1.88) (-1.83) -2.56
Party strong hold -0.0134 -0.00775 -0.00281 0.0102
(-0.64) (-0.38) (-0.14)   -0.63
Poverty 2005 -0.00179*** -0.00185** * -0.0011**
(-2.53) (-2.70)   (-2.07)   
University location 0.0452***  -0.0101
(-2.19) (-0.52)   
District and industrial HQ 0.153***
-5.69
_cons 0.0836*** 0.0899*** 0.168*** 0.157*** 0.116***
-6.47 -5.5 -4.86 -4.63 -4.11
N 64 64 64 64 64
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Table 4.5 presents the results of the regression analysis when political violence is the dependent 
variable. The first model used 'political power' as a single variable, and found that political violence is 
positively and significantly affected by the distribution of power. Violence was high in the districts 
where a politically powerful person is located. It remains significant in all five models despite using 
different controls such as party strong-holds, poverty, university location, and district headquarters. 
However, when it comes to party-strong hold, we find no significant affect of party strong holds on 
violence. This study also shows that, unlike many other countries, poverty has no positive association 
with violence in politics. In fact, it actually has a significant negative coefficient, which shows that 
political violence is associated with high-income regions. Divisional headquarters also has positive and 
significant association with violence. In addition, public university location has significant impact on 
political violence, if tested separately from divisional headquarters. There is a connection with violence 
and economic motive and it is observed that lower income regions have less violence. At the same 
time, positive and significant association with divisional headquarters implies violence is mostly 
directed by economic motive. 
The findings imply that the presence of powerful leaders causes more violence. In districts where there 
are powerful leaders, they try to establish 'political dominance' within and outside the party domain, 
which results in further violence. This suggests that 'democratisation' as a process is not realised across 
the country. Leaders, even if elected democratically, do not ensure democratic practice in their 
constituencies and are more concerned about 'fighting' for local and national supremacy. The general 
public, when asked about the causes of political violence, mostly ranked 'lack of democratic practice 
within parties' as the major cause of violence (BIGD HH Survey 2014). 
The study confirms that violent practice in politics is rising increasingly over the years. Most 
importantly, elections (the only democratic practice by citizens) are becoming subject to violence. 
Election year violence outweighs violence of non-election years. Factional violence also constitutes a 
major share in total political violence, which is higher in normal years but goes down in election years. 
The findings confirm that the political culture of Bangladesh goes beyond 'healthy competition' and is 
becoming more confrontational day-by-day. Parties prefer to solve their differences on the streets, 
rather than in a democratic way.
The ruling party was found to be engaged in more violence than the opposition, and the rate of 
factional violence is also very high among the ruling party, which ultimately indicates that control of 
economic resources could be the ultimate determinant of political violence. The party which has 
control over resources, fights over it more, and this leads to more violence. The quantitative findings 
also confirm that districts which are economically better off, have more political violence compared to 
others.
The high rate of factional violence also illustrates the fact that the political party as an institution cannot 
hold its membership together. Ideological harmony is compromised by self or group interests, which 
results in factions fighting against each other. However, it is also evident that during elections, these 
factions are more united towards fighting against the opposition, with the ultimate aim of 'being in 
power', thus ensuring control of resources.  
4.5  Concluding observations
Political Violence in Bangladesh: District Level Evidence for 2008-2013
58
It is also observed that locations which have a higher concentration of political power, in terms of 
presence of higher-ranked political leaders, have more violent incidents. Leaders holding more power 
are perhaps not ready to compromise, leading to more violence. This is aligned with the findings in 
chapter three of this report, that both major political parties in Bangladesh do not ensure democratic 
practices within party. The lack of 'intra-party democracy', along with absence of ideological harmony 
and weak institutional mechanisms, are promoting 'rent seeking' attitudes among political parties. To 
serve that interest, violence is being used by political parties.
Finally, it could be argued that current political practice in Bangladesh is delivering violence. To abolish 
violence from party politics, there seems no alternative, but to ensure democratic practices within the 
parties. This will strengthen the 'political party' as an institution. At the same time, it can ensure a 
balanced distribution of power and resources within and between parties, which will lessen the scope 
of the 'authoritarian' practice of the political leaders, and ultimately will help to establish true 
democracy in Bangladesh.
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5.1  Introduction
A scrutiny of various aspects associated with political parties is imperative, as is the general concern 
that the democratic deficit apparent is ultimately shaped by how political parties behave in our 
socio-political space. This study analyses profiles of those who have emerged as political 
representatives in Bangladesh through receiving political support from the dominant political 
parties. It also explores whether leadership type has any significant relationship to democratic 
practices in parliament. This is an important exercise, since the re-introduction of parliamentary 
democracy in 1991 facilitated the participation of politicians from various segments of society. It is 
still not known how the change of composition of the parliament over time has influenced its 
democratic nature.
The focus on the personal characteristics of legislators is essential for two reasons. Firstly, even 
though economists and political scientists believe that effective institutions enhance the quality 
1of government , there is similarly acknowledgement that institutions which are weak offer only 
limited restraints on political, bureaucratic and economic actors (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 
Besley 2005). Hence, the individual motivations of policymakers are likely to play a considerable 
role in shaping policies and socio-economic outcomes (Besley 2005). Political theorists have also 
often highlighted the importance of adequate leadership in influencing the performance of 
2governments.
1. Perhaps this is best captured by Buchanan (1989), who argued: “To improve politics, it is necessary to improve or reform 
rules, the framework within which the game of politics is played”. 
2. For example, American political scientist Key (1956) noted, “The nature of the workings of government depends 
ultimately on the men who run it.  The men we elect to office and the circumstances we create that affect their work 
determine the nature of popular government. Let there be emphasis on those we elect to office.” 
5 Politicians in theParliament
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Secondly, recent evidence indicates that leader type can have significant policy implications. Jones and 
Olken (2005) propose that the identity of national leaders matter in shaping development outcomes of 
3a nation.
While political prescriptions have mostly focused on attaining the right institutions to improve the state 
of play within the political landscape, the quality of political class that ultimately governs political 
society has been much less scrutinised. There is no systematic empirical analysis of the types of leaders 
that find representation in the Bangladeshi political landscape, nor any data on whether the quality of 
the political representatives affects the nature of democracy. This study looks at the types of politicians 
who have found representation in the National Parliament, as well as how their personal 
characteristics are correlated with parliamentary performance. Here various dynamics associated with 
political parties are looked at by examining the type of leaders they nominate for the electoral process. 
thIt examines how the characteristics of MPs elected have changed over time, especially between the 8 , 
th th 49  and 10  Parliament.  The analysis then explores if personal attributes of individual legislators are 
5associated with their legislative performance.  To this end, it evaluates three key indicators of 
parliamentary performance of legislators: (i) attendance in the parliament; (ii) budget speech 
participation; (iii) attendance in standing committee meetings. Collectively the evaluation of legislator 
characteristics provides an assessment of the political class and how it has shaped some specific 
democratic practices.    
To evaluate the composition of the parliament in Bangladesh this work scrutinises some distinct 
personal features of legislators, which include: (i) legislative experience of lawmakers, (ii) gender, (iii) 
educational achievements, (iv) dynastic identity, (v) age, (vi) professional affiliation and (vii)'criminal' 
6profile (facing legal charges).  Each of these personal characteristics are measured through separate 
7indicator variables.  MP's legislative experience (Number of times MP) is measured by the total number 
5.2  Data and methodology
3. See Besley et al. 2011, Zhang and Congleton 2008, Pande 2003, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Rehavi 2007, Rahman 
2013a and Asako et al. 2010.
th th th th th4. For studying the variation in some personal traits such as gender, the study examines 5 , 7 , 8 , 9  and 10  National 
Parliaments. 
5. Given the study descriptively examines the types of political leaders and how such personal characteristics are associated 
with parliamentary behaviour, it contributes to a handful of work that empirically explores issues of such nature in 
Bangladesh (IGS 2012, Rahman 2013a).
6. Bangladesh is a unitary parliamentary republic consisting of 300 parliamentary constituencies where direct election 
determines people's representatives. These constituencies are located in seven administrative Divisions, which in 
turn are subdivided in 64 Districts. This means that each District has one or more parliamentary constituencies, and 
each Division has more than one District. There is a unicameral parliament known as the Jatiyo Sangsad. 
7. The data for evaluating personal characteristics of legislators is derived from various sources. Information on legislators 
th thin the 9  and 10  National Parliament is from the personal affidavits of MPs submitted to the Bangladesh Election 
th thCommission (BEC). For more information on MPs in the 9  Parliament, the Member Directory on the 9  National 
thParliament produced by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) was used. Information on personal traits of MPs in the 8  
National Parliament are taken from Rashid and Feroz (2002). Electoral constituency specific geographic, economic and 
th th th thpolitical variables are taken from the Statistical Report of 5 , 7 , 8  and 9  of Parliament Election produced by the BEC 
and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). 
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of times a leader is elected to the parliament. Female is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
legislator is female, and zero otherwise. Educated is an indicator variable equal to one if an MP has an 
undergraduate degree, and zero otherwise. To categorise politicians from political dynasties an 
indicator variable Pre-relative is created, which is equal to one whenever a legislator has or had a 
8 9relative  entering office before he or she did, and zero otherwise.  This information is primarily taken 
from the Documentary on the Parliament by Rashid and Feroz (2002) and Rahman (2013a) which 
th thprovides detailed information on dynastic MPs in Bangladesh for 8  and 9  Parliament. Age is a 
continuous variable measuring the age of an MP when he or she was elected to the parliament. In order to 
measure professional affiliation, three indicator variables are constructed: Military is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a leader had a military career some point in his or her career, and zero otherwise. Lawyer is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the leader had a law degree from university, and zero otherwise. 
Businessman is an indicator variable equal to one if the leader is or was businessman by profession, and 
zero otherwise. To categorise leaders in the cabinet, we use Minister as an indicator variable equal to one if 
the leader was in the cabinet, and zero otherwise. Lastly, to capture the criminal profile or legal charges of 
th thlegislators in the 9 and 10  National Parliament, we examine the personal affidavits submitted by each 
parliamentarian to the Bangladesh Election Commission. We then use this information to construct 
10two binary dependent variables - Legal Charges and Corruption Charge.
5.2.1  Measuring legislative performance 
The indicators below quantify the behavior of Member of Parliaments. They reflect the extent to which 
MPs perform their parliamentary duties, which is important for the effectiveness of parliament. 
I. Average attendance of MPs (Attendance)
'Average attendance of MPs' measures a legislator's general involvement with the daily legislative 
thbusiness. For the 8  National Parliament, the attendance ratio for each legislator is computed by 
dividing the number of parliamentary days attended, by the number of days a legislator can attend all 
23 sessions. For the 9th National Parliament, the ratio is computed by repeating the same procedure 
for the first fifteen sessions. This makes a score of one indicate that the legislator has not been absent 
for a single day in the parliament. Though legislators are expected to perform various tasks, one of their 
focal duties is to represent their constituents in Parliament; and thus participate in parliamentary 
debates, other proceedings and voting. 
8. Anyone with a biological or social  connection to the leader is considered a relative, For example-  Wife, Brother, Son, 
Daughter, Cousin, Grandson, Son-in-Law, Brother-in-law, etc. A similar indicator variable is used in Dal Bo et. al. (2009) to 
understand the self-perpetuation of political dynasties in US Congress.  
9. For a better understanding of how this data was gathered, please see Rahman (2013a).
10. Two kinds of charges are categorised as corruption charges: political leaders charged under “Prevention of Corruption 
Act, 1947”, or political leaders charged under “Anti-Corruption Act 2004”. The Annual Report 2007-08 published by Anti- 
Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh was used to ensure access to a complete set of information. Furthermore, 
for the 8th National Parliament it was not mandatory for legislators to submit personal affidavits. It was therefore not 
thfeasible to obtain information on legal and corruption charges for legislators in the 8  National Parliament. Therefore, the 
th thdata set is relatively more informative for the elected parliamentarians in the 9  National Parliament and 10  
thParliamentarians, in comparison to the elected legislators of the 8  National Parliament.
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II. Budget speech participation of MPs (BSP)
There is a responsibility of parliamentarians to ensure all public revenue and spending receives 
adequate scrutiny so that it is fiscally sound, accommodates the aspirations of the citizens, and is 
utilized appropriately. As a result, through debate on various aspects of the budget, MPs have an 
opportunity to offer their views for consideration. We therefore track the total length of the budget 
speech in minutes by each parliamentarian, and then employ the formula for standardisation 
(mentioned below) to compute BSP. Hence, a score of one represents the budget speech participation 
of an MP with the longest speech and a score of zero standing for no or least participation.
BSP  = (  - Min (X)) / (Max (X) - Min (X))i
Therefore, this indicator provides a unique proxy for measuring the extent that MPs participate in the 
11budget sessions.
III. Attendance in standing committee meetings (ASC)
The purpose of 'Standing Committees' is to ensure the accountability of their respective line 
th12 ministries to parliament and function as an oversight body. For the 8  National Parliament, the 
attendance of legislators is not computed, since the institution was not functional. However, for the 
th9  National Parliament, the number of days attending the respective standing committee meetings 
is divided by total number of days that one could have attended. This makes a score of one reflect 
that the MP has not been absent in any meetings, and zero is indicative that the legislator has missed 
13all meetings.
This section will evaluate the trends in various personal characteristics of parliamentarians and provide 
insights on the changing composition of the parliament in Bangladesh over time. It discusses these 
trends to better explain the changing nature of the composition of parliament across some distinct 
14 categories, detailed out in Table 5.1. Additionally, the focus is primarily on the four dominant parties, 
namely AL, BNP, JP and JI.  
Xi
5.3  Parliamentarians' characteristics
11. This indicator, as opposed to measuring only attendance, functions as a better proxy of legislator's involvement with the 
daily legislative business of the parliament. The drawback is that we do not know whether the content of the speech has 
any meaningful assessment of the proposed budget. 
12. The most evident objective of committees is to examine the activities of the executive branch, which constitutes both 
administrative oversight and financial oversight (Mahiuddin 2009). 
13.  It is essential to mention that that present study does not benefit from information on attendance of legislators in all 
Standing Committees. The information is only available for 36 Standing Committees out of the 50 Standing Committees. 
th14. It must be mentioned that given that the BNP-led 18 Party Alliance boycotted the 10  National Parliamentary elections, 
thno data is available on BNP and JI leaders for the 10  National Parliament.  Furthermore, given JI only had two elected 
th thlegislators in the 9  National Parliament, the data on JI for the 9  National Parliament must be interpreted with caution.
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National average within elected MPs
Women as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI 
National average within elected MPs
Dynastic as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI 
National average within elected MPs
Businessmen as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI 
National average within elected MPs
Legal charges as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI 
National average within elected MPs
Corruption charges as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI
National average within elected MPs
Educated as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI 
National average within elected MPs
Lawyer as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI
National average within elected MPs
Military as % of elected MPs in:
AL
BNP
JP
JI
Individual  National Parliament 
characteristics 8th 9th 10th 
Women 2 6 6
4 6 6
2 10 .
7 8 9
 0 0 .
Dynastic 17 19 .
16 17 .
19 17 .
14 20 .
 0 0 .
Businessmen 59 62 64
59 60 65
61 77 .
50 68 63
 47 100 .
Legal charges . 52 43
. 52 44
. 79 .
. 44 26
 . 50 .
Corruption charges . 14 11
. 12 12
. 33 .
. 16 9
 . 0 .
Educated 89 84 82
95 85 84
89 77 .
77 77 77
 88 100 .
Lawyer 12 17 15
17 17 15
13 17 .
0 12 20
0 0 .
Military 5 5 2
5 5 3
6 0 .
0 4 3
0 0 .
Table 5.1: Composition of the national parliament
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5.3.1  Participation of female politicians 
In this section we briefly review the changing representation of female leaders. Table-5.2 shows that 
ndover the last four decades there has been a considerable rise of female leaders in parliament. In the 2  
th National Parliament, only two female leaders were directly elected.  In contrast, the 9 Parliament and 
th 1510  Parliament witnessed respectively 19 and 17 female members through direct elections.   This is a 
substantial improvement, since in all preceding parliaments no more than eight lawmakers were 
female. Table 5.2 also shows that the provision of quotas has also has created a scope for them to enter 
th thparliament. In both 9  and 10  Parliament, for example, more than 18 percent of parliament in 
16Bangladesh constituted of women representatives.
Table 5.2 :  Women in Bangladesh parliament
5.3.2  Participation of dynastic politicians 
Political dynasties have been an integral part of Bangladesh's political development, since the two 
major political parties  AL and BNP  are chaired by two influential dynastic leaders. It is worth examining 
17 whether or not political dynasties adversely shape political and economic outcomes. Thus, this 
analysis investigates the extent to which dynastic leaders are present in the National Parliament of 
Bangladesh, and their effect on the quality of democratic practices within the parliament. 
th15. Since the principal opposition parties boycotted the 10  National Parliament election, the results must be viewed with 
this political context. 
16. As discussed in IGS (2012), these estimates are slightly greater than the Asian average and marginally lower than the 
world average. It must also be noted that underlying such aggregate political dynamics, there are some structural 
constraints – at the local level – that have contributed to this 'missing women leader' phenomenon. In other words, it is 
observed in earlier work that there are there are 39 districts that never produced a single elected female representative 
between 1991 and 2009 (IGS, 2012). 
17. There are current studies which empirically examine outcomes that are associated with political dynasties (Rahman 
2013a, Asako et al. 2010), and why they emerge across countries and in certain countries (Rahman, 2013a, Dal Bo et 
al. 2009). Most empirical work identifies an adverse relationship between political dynasties and socio-political 
outcomes.
 Source: Amundsen and Jahan (2012)
Parliament Quota Directly elected Total Representation (%)
First (1973-75) 15 15 4.8
Second (1979-82) 30 2 32 9.7
Third (1986-87) 30 5 35 10.6
Fourth (1988-90) 4 4 1.3
Fifth (1991-1995) 30 4 34 10.3
Sixth (1996-96) 30 3 33 10
Seventh (1996-2001) 30 8 38 11.5
Eighth (2001-2006) 45 7 52 15.1
Ninth (2009-14) 45 19 64 18.6
Tenth (2010- 50 17 67 19.1
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th th  Figure 5.1, for example, shows that in both the 8  and 9 National Parliament, more than 50 legislators 
had hereditary ties with existing or former lawmakers. Likewise, Table 5.1 shows that out of all elected 
MPs in AL, BNP and JP, approximately 17 percent were dynastic in case of both AL and BNP, and 20 
th thpercent in case of JP in the 9  National Parliament. In the 8  National Parliament, out of all elected MPs 
in AL, BNP and JP, approximately 17 and 19 percent were dynastic for AL and BNP respectively, and 14 
th thpercent were dynastic for JP. In contrast, JI Bangladesh produced no dynastic MPs in both 8  and 9  
18National Parliament.
th th
To illustrate the influence of 
dynast ic  leaders  across  
political parties, Table 3-1 of 
Annex 3 shows that out of the 
eight political parties that had 
that least one legislator in the 9  
National Parliament, four were 
chaired by legislators who are 
descendants of politicians. 
Table 3-2 of Annex 3 also 
identifies five unique dynasties 
that have produced leaders 
over three generat ions.  
Overall, the evidence shows 
the strong presence of political 
dynasties within our political 
19system.
5.3.3  Participation of businessmen in politics 
The presence of businessmen in politics has always raised concerns among political and social 
scientists. This is because while politicians are expected to serve public interest diligently, it is well 
established that a political career can produce substantial private monetary gains for legislators. In this 
th th thstudy, we document the presence of businessmen in the 8 , 9  and 10  National Parliament. 
As reflected in Figure 5.2, there is an increasing presence of businessmen in the last three parliaments. 
In fact, the figures show that more than 60 percent of the parliamentarians are businessmen by 
th th th profession in the 10  National Parliament. Table 5.1 provides detailed data on MPs from the 8  and 9
National Parliament, which reveals that within both AL and BNP more than half of the elected 
thlawmakers were businessmen. In the 9  National Parliament more than three-fourth of elected MPs 
th th th from BNP were businessmen. For JP, the ratio varies between 50 to 68 percent in the 8 , 9 and 10
National Parliament. There is also a considerable presence of businessmen in Jamaat-e-Islam. This 
development provokes questions concerning the nature of this political evolution. Firstly, is the 
Figure 5.1: Dynastic MPs in 8  and 9  Parliament 
18. The factors underlying this outcome are not yet understood, but future research can explore if dynasty politics are likely 
to emerge from 'religion based' political parties.
19. To derive a better understanding of the factors that facilitated the rise of dynastic leaders in Bangladesh, please see 
Rahman (2013a).
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political class increasingly being 
penetrated by businessmen since 
political affiliation allows illegal 
monetary returns? Or is it a resultant 
outcome of increasing costs of 
electoral politics, which makes 
political parties dependent on 
businessmen for financing, which in 
turn creates a scope for businessmen 
to gain representation? Secondly, 
how do such individuals with prior 
private sector careers perform as 
legislators? 
5.3.4  Participation of veteran politicians  
The role of veteran and non-veteran parliamentarians in making parliament effective is not yet 
understood, and empirical literature on the role of experienced legislators has offered mixed 
perspectives. The study looks at the changing composition of the parliament over the last three terms, 
and examines how first-time MPs have performed as opposed to veteran MPs. As reflected in Figures 
th th5.3a & 5.3b, both the 9  and 10  National Parliament witnessed the entry of a large number of first-
thtime MPs. In fact, in the 9  National Parliament, more than half of the legislators were first-time MPs. 
thThe 8  National Parliament reflected a more balanced distribution of MPs in terms of their relative 
experience (see Figure 5.3c). While this analysis did not explore the factors influencing the rise of first-
thtime MPs in the 9  National Parliament, it is worth exploring whether the caretaker government (2006-
2008), that implicated various political leaders with corruption charges, provided an opportunity to 
threlative newcomers to fill the vacuum created due to the ineligibility of many veterans to contest the 9  
parliamentary election (IGS 2006, IGS 2007, IGS 2008). Moreover, whether this influx of 'fresh blood' 
has any adverse or positive effect on the functioning of the parliament remains empirically unverified.
thFigure 5.3a: Number of Times MP - 10  Parliament (%) 
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Figure 5.3b: Number of Times MP - 9  Parliament (%) 
thFigure 5.3c: Number of Times MP - 8  Parliament (%) 
5.3.5  Participation of politicians facing legal charges
The percentage of MPs in the parliament of Bangladesh who have faced legal or corruption charges 
against them was also examined. Rahman (2013a) noted that approximately 54 percent elected MPs 
thhas or had a legal charge against them in the 9  National Parliament. Moreover, approximately 14 
thpercent of elected MPs had corruption charge(s) against them before they were elected to the 9  
thNational Parliament. In terms of variation across political parties, in the 9  National Parliament, 
approximately 79 percent of elected legislators from BNP, 52 percent of elected legislators from AL, 
50 percent of elected legislators from Jamaat-E-Islam and 44 percent of elected legislators from JP 
thhad legal charges against them. In the 10  National Parliament more than 40 percent of legislators 
have or had a legal charge against them and at least 10 percent had corruption charges against them 
th
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th(see Figure 5.4).  Table 5.1 reveals that in the 9  National Parliament, approximately 33 percent of 
elected legislators from BNP, 12 percent of elected legislators from AL and 16 percent of elected 
legislators from JP had legal charges against them. It is yet to be validated whether the presence of 
politicians facing legal charges shape parliamentary performance. 
th th
5.3.6  Participation of educated political leaders
The role of educated leaders in the political space has received interest, since education can proxy for 
21individual competence.  Hence, the participation of educated leaders within Bangladesh's electoral 
politics was documented. Three specific trends are observed from Table 5.1. Firstly, over the last three 
terms, more than 80 percent of all elected legislators had a university degree. Secondly, there is a 
gradual decrease in the proportion of elected lawmakers who have a university degree from 89 percent 
th thin the 8  National Parliament to 82 percent in the 10  National Parliament. Thirdly, educated MPs have 
a marginally greater presence among AL lawmakers in comparison to BNP lawmakers. Table 5.1 shows 
that across almost all political parties, more than 77 percent of all elected legislators are educated. A 
high proportion of lawmakers have a university degree, and it makes it interesting to explore whether 
22or not educated legislators have, on average, a better legislative performance.
5.3.7. Participation of lawyers and ex-military personnel
th th thThere is a notable presence of lawyers within all three 8 , 9 , and 10  National Parliament (see Figure 
th5.5). In the 9  National Parliament, 17 percent elected lawmakers from both AL and BNP categorised 
20
Figure 5.4: Criminal profile of politicians in 9  and 10  parliament 
th 20. This is a substantially high ratio if we consider the quality of legislators in the 16 Lokh Sabha of India where every third 
legislator has a criminal record. To be specific, o
http://www.indiatimes.com/news/more-from-india/16th-lok-sabha-
every-third-newly-elected-mp-is-a-criminal-149044.html
21. For example, human capital theory documents how education increases skills and productivity in market setting (Card 
1997). An alternative view of education is that under an environment of imperfect information, it signals potential 
employers the quality of the job-seeker so that they can screen out high calibre individuals. This view also notes that 
educated leaders are likely to be more competent if education could serve as a signal for competence.
22. As noted in Rahman (2013b), this is relatively high given the percentage of graduates in  Indian Lok Sabha has increased 
from 58 per cent in 1952 to 79 per cent in 2009.
f the 186 new members, 112 (21 percent) have declared serious criminal 
cases, including those related to murder, attempt to murder, causing communal disharmony, kidnapping, crimes against 
women, etc. For more information, please see: 
10  Parliament th 9  Parliament th
Legal Charges ACC 
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themselves as lawyers in the personnel affidavits.  Table 5.1 also shows that five percent of all elected 
thlegislators were ex-military personal in the 8  National Parliament, even though here is a decreasing 
thtrend as the 10  National Parliament has only seven legislators who are former military personnel (see 
Figure 5.6). This is also not surprising, since BNP's absence in the current parliament reduces the scope 
of many former military personnel-turned-politicians, who are not represented in the current 
24parliament.
Figure 5.5: Number of lawyers in 8 , 9  and 10  parliament 
th th thFigure 5.6: Number of ex-military in 8 , 9  and 10  parliament
23 
th th th
23. This is not unusual as a review of 443 former executive head of countries between 1950 and 2004 from 65 countries 
reveal that more than 25 percent national leaders were lawyers (Rahman 2013a). Likewise, it is argued that skills 
acquired through legal training such as oratorical skills and the ability to master a multifarious brief swiftly, as well as the 
art of persuasion are generally more useful in politics (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011).
24. Given BNP was founded by a military personnel and Bangladesh was under military rule between 1975 and 1991, the 
presence of military personnel in politics is not surprising.
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5.4  Do leader traits matter?
Here we examine any systematic relationship between MP characteristics and their respective 
th thlegislative performance in the 8  and 9  National Parliament. A multiple regression framework is 
employed which allows the study to see if there is a systematic relationship between the behaviour 
of MPs and their individual characteristics. Given that the data on parliamentary behaviour is only 
th th  available for legislators in the 8  and 9 parliament, this analysis is conducted on legislators for these 
two terms. Information for leaders who died during their tenure or are elected through by-election 
was omitted to ensure the comparability. Structural, individual and party characteristics that are 
25deemed essential determinants of legislator behaviour were controlled for.  Table 5.3 reports the 
thregression results for all the MPs elected to the 9  National Parliament. Column 1 provides 
estimations of the model that studies the role of distinct individual features of MPs. 
Three key insights are noticeable. Firstly, individual tenure of legislators maintains a negative 
association with average parliamentary attendance, which is significant at 5%. This does not correlate 
with the 'learning by doing' hypothesis, that notes legislative experience will positively affect legislative 
performance (Padro i Miquel and Snyder 2006). In contrast, the results are in line with Besley and 
thLarcines (2011) who find a similar relationship for parliamentarians in UK. The 9  National Parliament 
witnessed the injection of substantial number 'first-time' MPs, and the results suggest that this is 
unlikely to influence under performance in the parliament. 
Secondly, the coefficients for Businessmen and Corruption Charges are -6.27 and -14.9 and are significant 
at 10% and 1%. This means that legislators who have categorised themselves as 'businessmen' on their 
personal affidavits are on average associated with a 6.5 percentage points less attendance than non-
26businessmen legislators.  Likewise, the coefficient for Corruption Charges is indicative that legislators 
with current or past corruption charges on average have approximately 15 percentage point less 
attendance than legislators with no charges. Third, the variable Age maintains a positive coefficient, which 
is significant at 1%. This is, to an extent, counter intuitive as it suggests that relatively older MPs are more 
attentive.
In Column 2, we control for constituency characteristics such as distance from Dhaka, border 
constituency and whether the constituency is geographically contiguous to Dhaka. This helps us 
control for geographic factors that can shape attendance among lawmakers. Moreover, the results 
remain qualitatively similar after the inclusion of these factors. Column 3 introduces political 
variables for the electoral constituencies. For example, the variable Vote-Difference examines the 
role of the margin of victory on a legislator's behaviour in the parliament. Similarly, Number of 
Candidates quantifies the total number of candidates who participated in electoral competition in a 
given constituency. The results show that Vote-Difference has a positive coefficient significant at 1% 
and Number of Candidates has a negative coefficient significant at 5%. Taken together, these 
findings are suggestive that legislators who emerged from highly contestable seats have lower levels 
of attendance. Interestingly, the coefficient for BNP, Jamaat-E-Islam and JP are all larger than 50 
percentage points and are significant at 1%. This, in essence, captures the role of party affiliation in 
25. see Rahman 2013a,  Besley and Larcinese 2011, Eggers and Hainmueller 2009, Gagliarducci et al. 2008. 
26. Of course, one possible explanation is that business MPs are more attentive in their respective businesses, and thus have 
lower time available for parliamentary duties. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out that the estimations are suffering from 
endogeneity. 
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thTable 5.3 Performance of parliamentarians (9  Parliament) 
Dependent Variable: Parliament Attendance Ratio between 2009-12 from First Fifteen Sessions
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1.41 -4.02 -5.06 -4.75 -5.43* -5.43
(3.85) (4.01) (3.82) (2.98) (3.10) (3.77)
-3.03** -2.74** -3.94*** -1.76** -1.94* -1.94*
(1.23) (1.25) (1.27) (0.85) (1.03) (1.14)
-1.39 -2.81 -5.34 -8.70** -10.70** -10.70*
(3.91) (4.19) (4.07) (3.86) (4.68) (5.65)
-0.58 -3.79 -2.92 7.07 8.04 8.04
(6.70) (8.11) (7.31) (5.02) (5.76) (5.99)
-6.27* -7.64* -5.62 1.16 1.22 1.22
(3.68) (4.09) (3.87) (2.95) (3.72) (3.78)
0.59 -1.60 0.19 4.60 2.37 2.37
(4.5) (4.96) (4.97) (3.29) (3.93) (3.50)
-1.02 -2.48 -2.99 -2.30 -5.70 -5.70
(6.16) (5.87) (5.99) (5.93) (7.05) (8.15)
0.47*** 0.45*** 0.56*** 0.33** 0.36*** 0.36**
(0.17) (.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16)
2.01 3.97 5.71 1.80 0.86 0.86
(4.38) (4.60) (4.24) (2.67) (3.23) (3.50)
-14.9*** -15.06** -15.9*** -8.15** -7.38 -7.38
(4.82) (5.22) (4.97) (3.62) (4.83) (5.63)
0.36*** 0.10 0.07 .07
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (.10)
 -1.75** -0.89 -0.40 -.40
 (.87) (0.59) (.75) (.79)
 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00002 0.000002
 (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.000003)
-58.13*** -57.36*** -57.36***
(2.37) (4.02) (4.57)
-55.66*** -54.99*** -54.99***
(3.67) (4.32) (3.67)
-62.6*** -59.2*** -59.19***
 (4.34) (14) (4.42)
48.60*** 65.22*** 54.67*** 69.60*** 76.25*** 76.25***
(11.17) (13.03) (16.00) (11.41) (21.21) (19.66)
NO YES YES YES YES YES
NO NO NO NO YES YES
277 258 258 258 257 257
0.13 0.18 0.23 0.67 0.75 0.75
Pre-Relative
Num. Times MP
Minister
Female
Businessman
Lawyer
Ex-military
Age
Education
Corruption Charges
Vote-Difference 
Number of 
Candidates
Valid Voters
BNP
Jamaat-E-Islam
BJP
Constant
Constituency 
Characteristics
District Effect
N
R-square
(*),(**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis; Robust Standard Errors are clustered at District Level in column- 6
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shaping parliamentary attendance of legislators. In other words, given that the Bangladeshi political 
arena suffers from the chronic culture of boycotting the parliament by opposition parties (IGS 2012), 
the estimation simply reinforces faith in the conventional narrative. Additionally, the size of the 
coefficient is suggestive that MPs from opposition parties on average have at least 50 percent lower 
attendance in comparison to others. Interestingly, the explanatory power of the overall model also 
improved substantially as the R-square is 0.67, highlighting the model explains more than 60 
27percent of the variation in the data.
thIn Table 5.4, we repeat the exact same analysis for all elected legislators in the 8  National Parliament. 
Individual characteristics that are seen to have a robust relationship with parliamentary attendance is 
Number of Times MP. The coefficient for Pre-Relative is also negative and significant at 10%. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is -0.069 and it points out that dynastic legislators on average have 
approximately seven percentage point less attendance than others. This is in line with Rahman (2013a), 
who identifies that dynastic identity can influence shirking among legislators. However, multiple factors 
might influence this outcome. Firstly, dynastic legislators often emerge from less competitive 
parliamentary constituencies (Dal Bo et al. 2009), and hence they might be less concerned about how 
people evaluate their parliamentary performance. Secondly, dynastic legislators might be undertaking 
other types of political activities that correspond to their strengths, such as organising party bureaucracy 
etc., since they are more likely to have a better understanding of how inner party machinery functions. 
These issues, however, are not explored in this analysis since the factors that shape the emergence 
28dynastic politicians nor other political activities that legislators often associate with, were explored.
Party affiliation also remains a strong predictor of attendance across legislators, with a clear indication that 
legislators from the opposition on average attend fewer parliamentary sessions than others. This exemplifies 
the political party's control over individual legislator's attendance decisions and how it influences the nature 
of democratic practices in parliament. Lastly, Column 6 shows that Vote-Difference has a positive coefficient 
and Number of Candidates has a negative coefficient  both significant at 5%.  These results are similar to what 
thwas observed for the 9  National Parliament; that those who emerged from more contestable seats have 
higher levels of shirking. On the whole, these results are not supportive of the idea that political competition 
29has any positive relationship with how legislators ultimately perform in the parliament.
27. To conduct more robustness checks, in Column-5 of Table 5.5 we introduce Districts dummies to control for district specific 
effects that are common to all parliamentary constituencies within a district and in Column-6 we cluster robust stand errors at a 
district level. In addition, the results point out that the variable that maintains significant coefficients in all six columns are Num. 
of Times MP and Age. In both Column-5 and Column-6, the coefficient for the variable Minister is -10.7 and is significant at 5% 
and 10%. This indicates that legislators who are ministers on average have 10 percentage point lower attendance than others. 
Overall, the negative association that we witnessed between legislative experiences and being a minister with 
parliamentary attendance is in with line evidence from British House of Commons (Besley and Larcines 2011). 
28. In unreported results, we also interacted variables Pre-Relative and Num. of Times MP. The idea here is to check if veteran 
dynastic MPs are more or less attentive in comparison to relatively inexperienced dynastic MPs. Nonetheless, the 
estimation provide no support of any differential relationship. 
29. This inference is difficult to square with the notion that suggests higher political competition will either screen better 
political candidates for public representation or will provide electoral incentive to derive the best behaviour from 
politicians (Galasso and Nannicini, 2009). It is, nonetheless, not difficult to align with the view that increased political 
completion in a weakly institutionalized polity often results in increased confrontation between political actors, which is 
harmful for overall democratic consolidation within nations (IGS 2008). On the other hand, it can also be argued that 
legislators from competitive political constituencies provide more time in their respective constituencies, which means 
they have less time to participate in daily legislative business.
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1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.069* -0.06 -0.07* -0.073** -0.069** -0.069*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.034) (0.04)
-0.02 -0.02 -0.023* -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.012) (0.01) (0.012) (0.01) (0.001) (0.01)
0.07** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.016 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.037) (0.04)
-0.08 -0.11 -0.15 -0.04 -0.094 -0.093
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.017 -5.98e-06 -.5.98e-06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
-0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.07 0.105** 0.10*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.045) (0.06)
-0.05 -0.04 -0.044 0.002 0.23 0.023
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.067)
0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.002 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.002)
-0.07* -0.07* -0.06 -0.007 0.027 0.027
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.036) (0.039)
0.002 0.002*** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0013) (0.001)
-0.002 -0.012* -0.014** -0.01**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
4.20e-07 3.87e-07 2.40e-07 2.40e-07
(3.29e-07) (2.31e-07) (2.93e-07) (2.78e-07)
-0.397*** -0.42*** -0.42***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
0.04 0.21 0.21***
(0.06) (0.14) (0.045)
0.70*** 0.71*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.97*** 0.97***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.29) (0.30)
NO YES YES YES YES YES
NO NO NO NO YES YES
266 255 255 255 255 255
0.06 0.09 0.11 0.51 0.66 0.66
Pre-Relative
Num. Times MP
Minister
Female
Businessman
Lawyer
Ex-military
Age
Education
Vote-Difference
Number of 
Candidates
Valid Voters
AL
JP
Constant
Constituency 
Characteristics
District Effect
N
R-square
(*),(**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis; Robust Standard Errors are clustered at District Level in column- 6
thTable 5.4 Performance of parliamentarians (8  Parliament)
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Dependent Variable: Budget Speech Participation between 2010-13
BSP 2010 BSP 2011 BSP 2012 BSP 2013
-0.03 -0.037 -0.035 -0.06
(0.02) (0.024) (0.03) (0.04)
0.004 0.003 0.01 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01)
0.015 0.04 0.03 0.026
(0.022) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
-0.02 0.005 -0.02 -.003
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
-0.03 -.005 -0.05 -0.07
(0.02) (0.03) (.03) (0.05)
-0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.06
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
-0.05 -0.09* -0.12** -0.13*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
0.001 0.001 0.0015 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.002)
0.014 0.02 0.03* 0.03
(0.013) (0.02) (0.02) (.03)
-0.0003 -0.001 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
0.0004 0.001 0.0002 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01)
-7.82e-08 -5.54e-08 6.78e-09 -5.55e-08
(1.20e-07) (1.56e-07) (1.58e-07) (2.45e-07)
-0.09*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.17***
(0.014) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.12*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.23***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (.03)
-0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.055)
-0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -.03
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.24)
YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
263 263 263 263
0.43 0.45 0.49 0.45
Pre-Relative
Num. Times MP
Minister
Female
Businessman
Lawyer
Ex-military
Age
Education
Corruption Charges
Vote-Difference
Number of Candidates
Valid Voters
BNP
Jamaat-E-Islam
BJP
Constant
Constituency Characteristics
District Effect
N
R-square
(*),(**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis clustered at District Level in all columns
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Table 5.5 studies budget speech participation as an alternate measure of legislative performance. From 
Column 1 to Column 4, the variation in budget speech participation between 2010 and 2013 was 
explored to investigate whether individual traits of legislators explain its variation. The results reveal 
that no single individual characteristic consistently explains the variation in budget speech 
participation between 2010 and 2013. The results also validate the idea that parties ultimately shape 
legislator behaviour as the coefficient for the primary parties in the opposition are negative and 
significant at 1%.  
Lastly, the estimations in Table 5.6 study the relationship between legislator characteristics and 
30legislative performance, by their involvement in standing committee meetings.  Given the standing 
committee for each ministry is in charge of ensuring accountability of the ministry to the parliament, 
average involvement of legislator in such meetings indicate how legislators have performed during 
their tenure. However, the estimations reveal that the legislator characteristics do not predict the 
variation in standing committee attendance. Interestingly, being affiliated with a political party in the 
opposition is also not a strong predictor of attendance in standing committee meetings. This is 
probably suggestive that in areas where political parties do not exercise a strong whipping control, 
legislators often perform the legislative duties expected of them. For example, though BNP 
thconsistently boycotted the 9  National Parliament and average attendance for BNP MPs varies 
between only two percent to 16 percent, the range for attendance in standing committee meeting is 
thsignificantly larger. Some BNP legislators in the 9  National Parliament had standing committee 
attendance as high as 80 to 100 percent. This is a noteworthy issue and it possibly indicates that the 
primary source of underperformance of MPs in opposition is the undue influence of their respective 
party and not their individual characteristics. 
Overall, the results taken together provide a few interesting insights. Firstly, the estimations from Table 
5.5 and 5.6 show that certain individual characteristics can predict the variation in parliamentary 
performance across MPs. For example, being a veteran MP or being in the cabinet has a strong negative 
relationship with attendance. There is also some indication that leaders with corruption charges or 
who are businessmen by profession are associated with lower involvement in daily legislative business. 
thFor the 8  National Parliament, the findings are also indicative that dynastic legislators on average had 
lower levels of attendance. Surprisingly perhaps, educated legislators do not have a better attendance 
record. There is a strong indication that it is ultimately the identity of political party (that an MP is 
affiliated with) that shapes legislative behaviour across MPs. In particular, MPs affiliated with 
th thopposition parties significantly underperform their legislative duties in the 8  and 9  National 
Parliament. 
Lastly, the findings support the view that when political parties do not strictly monitor or control 
certain aspect of legislative performance (such as attending standing committee meeting), then even 
31MPs from the opposition do not necessarily underperform those legislative duties.
30. It must be mentioned that we only computed this measure for legislators who could have attended at least 11 standing 
committee meetings, so that our results are not driven by outliers. It is also essential to point out that for 56 elected 
legislators, no data was available on their standing committee attendance. 
31. Future research might find it insightful to explore what motivates standing committee attendance amongst legislators 
and whether the institution has done an adequate job in ensuring the accountability of their respective line ministries.
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Dependent Variable: Standing Committee Attendance Ratio 2009-13
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.01 -1.47 -2.47 -0.50 -4.79 -4.79
(5.64) (6.38) (6.33) (6.08) (8.87) (7.74)
0.43 -0.15 -0.78 -0.34 1.38 1.38
(1.47) (1.50) (1.59) (1.53) (2.24) (2.37)
6.65 4.97 3.73 2.99 10.61 10.61
(5.81) (6.31) (6.18) (6.24) (8.39) (10.62)
2.13 -5.48 -4.84 -4.04 8.13 8.12
(8.65) (10.01) (9.86) (10.37) (12.8) (14.39)
-2.55 -4.11 -2.45 -1.47 0.59 0.59
(5.39) (5.62) (5.82) (5.81) (7.10) (8.12)
-0.31 -2.47 -1.18 1.00 -0.26 -0.26
(5.99) (6.48) (6.59) (6.32) (8.88) (10.36)
8.23 5.29 5.67 6.08 5.24 5.24
(7.16) (7.58) (7.59) (7.63) (10.52) (10.73)
0.16 0.22 0.28 0.18 -0.16 -0.16
(0.22) (0.22) (.22) (0.22) (0.28) (0.32)
-0.65 -1.62 0.28 -1.38 -2.55 -2.55)
(4.97) (4.96) (4.97) (5.29) (7.74) (8.55)
-5.17 -1.57 -3.08 -0.52 -1.69 -1.69
(6.31) (7.18) (7.22) (7.34) (9.99) (11.9)
0.31 0.22 0.34 0.34
(0.11) (0.12) (0.22) (0.22)
-0.85 -0.47 1.02 1.02
(1.11) (1.13) (1.76) (1.97)
0.00003 0.00002 -4.41-e-06 -4.41e-06
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00006)
-14.67* -18.96 -18.96
(7.81) (12.6) (13.1)
-12.3 -15.4 -15.4
(7.74) (9.83) (10.7)
-60.8*** -57.1*** -57.1***
(6.88) (18.6) (9.69)
55.22*** 59.90*** 45.58** 52.85*** 55.28* 55.28*
(14.67) (17.22) (20.64) (20.30) (29.20) (32.17)
NO YES YES YES YES YES
NO NO NO NO YES YES
205 190 190 190 189 189
0.03 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.41 0.41
Pre-Relative
Num. Times MP
Minister
Female
Businessman
Lawyer
Ex-military
Age
Education
Corruption Charges
Vote-Difference 
Number of 
Candidates
Valid Voters
BNP
Jamaat-E-Islam
BJP
Constant
Constituency 
Characteristics
District Effect
N
R-square
(*),(**) and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Robust Standard Errors are in the parenthesis; Robust Standard Errors are clustered at District Level in column- 6
Table 5.6 Performance of parliamentarians: Standing Committee Attendance
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5.5  Concluding observations 
This chapter examines the specific dimensions of our political space, which are: (i) what types of 
politicians have received representation in the parliament through receiving support from the 
dominant political parties, and (ii) whether their individual characteristics are associated with how 
they perform in the parliament. 
Several observations emerge from this study. Over the last four decades there has been a considerable 
rise of female leaders in the parliament. Two specific issues that have facilitated this outcome are an 
increment in the provision of quotas and a noticeable rise in the number of women leaders who have 
32emerged through direct elections.  In addition, there is a strong presence of dynastic leaders in both 
th ththe 8 and 9  National Parliament. 
th th thThe presence of businessmen in the 8 , 9  and 10  National Parliament witnessed a remarkable rise. 
th thThere is also significant injection of first-time MPs in the 10  and 9  National Parliament in comparison 
th th thto the 8  National Parliament. The investigation also noted that in both 9  and 10  National Parliament 
at least 10 percent members had corruption charges against them. 
Over the last three parliaments more than 80 percent elected legislators have an undergraduate 
th thdegree, even though there is a slight decline in this ratio from 88 to 82 percent between 8  and 10  
National Parliament. It is also noted that across all the political parties, most legislators have an 
th th thundergraduate degree. There is a strong presence of lawyers in the 8 , 9  and 10  parliament. 
Therefore, the descriptive scrutiny has allowed us to show the changing nature of the composition of 
the parliament over time.
The descriptive evidence is also indicative that dynastic MPs have a strong presence in the parliament. 
Finally, the noticeable presence of legislators in the parliament with legal and corruption charges bring 
to attention the quality of our electoral arrangements in screening clean political candidates. This is 
also a matter of concern as it suggests that the dominant political parties accommodate individuals 
with undesirable track records, such as corruption charges and other legal issues.  
The scrutiny also has offered some insight on what kind of personal characteristics matter in shaping 
legislative performance. There is strong evidence, for example, that legislative experience has a strong 
negative relationship with attendance. Additionally, there is also some support for the notion that 
businessmen and legislators with corruption charges, on average, have lower levels of attendance. 
Interestingly, these derived observations do not necessarily contradict political narratives that argue 
political parties should offer lower support to businessmen or individual with corruption charges, if we 
solely judge the usefulness of legislators by monitoring their legislative performance. Our results also 
do not validate claims that educated legislators are necessarily better in their legislative duties than 
others. The chapter also identifies a strong role of political parties in shaping two types of 
parliamentary performance: attendance and budget speech participation. However, there is some 
suggestion that political parties do not necessarily influence the extent parliamentarians attend 
32. It was noted in earlier research that there are more than 39 Districts which never elected a single female MP between 
1991 and 2013 (IGS 2012). Additionally, Jamaat-E-Islam remains the only dominant party that did not elect a single 
female during the studied time interval.
Politicians in the Parliament
78
standing committee meetings. Hence, even MPs from the opposition bench do not necessarily 
underperform their respective legislative duties. Thus, there is an implicit indication that a key source 
of underperformance of legislators in the parliament is the identity or influence of their political party, 
and future research needs to examine this phenomenon. 
To conclude, as eminent political scientist Key (1956) argued, “…Let there be emphasis on those we 
elect to office”. This, in essence, has been the central motivation of this analysis. Collectively, the 
descriptive and empirical evidence indicates that it is essential to further examine the systematic 
relationship between who leaders are and how they behave, and what it means for the overall 
democratic nature of a political landscape. In the process, this chapter contributes to the 
contemporary empirical literature on both political selection and political shirking. 
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6.1  Introduction
The relationship between women's representation in formal politics and democracy is a contested one 
(Krook 2013a, 2013b). Definitions of democracy and democratisation have traditionally overlooked 
women's contributions. Generally, enhancing women's political participation and democratic 
practices that promote gender equity are conceived as major components of a representative 
democracy that is inclusive. However, women's inclusion in politics is treated as a normative concept of 
democracy, rarely integrated into assessing the democratic nature of regimes (Caraway 2004). There is 
no guarantee that space and opportunities for women's inclusion and participation increase as a 
country's democracy matures (Bauer and Burnet 2013). Literature on democratic transition that deals 
with women's inclusion in formal politics show that women's effective presence in politics depends on 
the nature of transition and the parameters of their inclusion (Krook 2013b).
Studies on women in politics in Bangladesh have mostly analysed quotas as a pathway for women's 
inclusion in politics, and have also looked at the effectiveness of women's representatives in promoting 
gender equity concerns (Chowdhury et al. 1994, Chowdhury 2002, Frankl 2004, Khan and Ara 2006, 
Khan and Mohsin 2008, Panday 2013, Jahan 2012). A significant strand of this debate has focused on 
the top leadership of the two centrist parties (AL and BNP) being female, and whether their presence 
creates opportunities for promotion of female leadership in Bangladesh. This study moves beyond this 
and explores the following questions: 
a) What is the impact of democratisation in Bangladesh on the presence and participation of women 
in formal politics, especially inside the political parties? 
b) How has the way women were included in formal politics influenced their ability to promote 
women's political empowerment within political parties and other spaces?  
The analysis here is based on secondary literature and data collected under various research projects 
conducted during the period of 2008-14, which focused on women in politics at the national and local 
levels. Data collected was largely life histories of female politicians, participatory observation of 
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elected officials, discourse analysis of various documents of parties made publicly available, and 
interviews with policymakers and researchers who work on women in politics.
Bangladesh presents an interesting paradox when it comes to women's representation and 
participation in politics. Bangladesh, a neo patrimonial state, has a social structure that is hierarchical 
by gender and class (Goetz 2001). For the last three decades, the two centrist political parties, the 
Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have been led by women, Sheikh 
Hasina and Khaleda Zia respectively. They have alternatively held the posts of the prime minister and 
the leader of the opposition since 1991. Both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia became the head of their 
parties based on their kinship ties. Sheikh Hasina is the daughter of the founder leader of AL, Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, and Khaleda Zia is the widow of the founder leader of BNP, Ziaur Rahman. They were 
acceptable figureheads to the party during the resultant leadership crisis that these parties faced after 
the assassination of their founder leaders. The leadership of these two women have played a pivotal 
role in ensuring the survival of their parties. Both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia also consolidated party 
strength and spearheaded the pro-democracy movement against the then military dictator in the 
1980s. In the previous government, women headed the following four ministries: home, foreign affairs, 
agriculture and women's affairs. At present, the country has a female Speaker of the House and women 
head the following four positions in the Cabinet: defence, agriculture, women's affairs and public 
administration. Yet despite women's accession to these top positions, the overall number of women in 
leadership positions within political party structure and in different electoral and decision-making 
bodies has been low. 
A reservation of 50 seats in the parliament and 30 per cent at various tiers of local government ensures 
women's representation in various electoral bodies (Chowdhury et al. 1994, Nazneen et al. 2014). 
Except for the last two national elections, women's representation was under or around two per cent in 
the various national parliamentary elections in the general seats (Chowdhury et al. 1994, Khan and 
Mohsin 2008, Akter 2014a). In the 2008 and 2014 parliamentary elections, seventeen and ten women 
were directly elected to the general seats respectively. Taking the 50 women MPs in reserved seats into 
consideration, the number of women in parliament rose around 18 per cent in the current and the 
previous parliament, which is higher than the global average (IPU 2008). It is questionable whether this 
numerical increase of women in parliament signals a greater voice for women. The majority party and 
those in the ruling coalition are allocated these reserved seats based on the proportion of seats they 
have won. The women MPs in reserved seats are nominated by their parties. This process of 
nomination, and the perception that some of these MPs are proxy candidates, have limited their ability 
to speak out in parliament (Chowdhury et al. 1994, Nazneen et al. 2014). Despite strong demands from 
women's movement organisations and female party members, none of the major political parties are 
willing to support the idea of direct elections to the reserved seats. This is because the majority party is 
1able to use the seats as leverage to make deals.
6.2  Women in politics: the Bangladesh context
1. In 2001, Bangladesh JI was a part of the coalition government for the first time. JI had 17 seats in the Parliament and were 
given two ministries as a part of the deal on power sharing with BNP. Later on, JI had negotiated with BNP and added four 
female members of parliament in the reserved seats for women.
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After the democratic transition in 1991, the most dynamic changes regarding women's participation in 
politics have occurred at the Union Parishad (UP) level (the lowest tier of rural local government). In 
1997, direct elections to reserved seats (three seats in each Parishad) were introduced by the AL 
government. In 1998, several provisions were also passed to ensure mandatory inclusion of women UP 
members as chairs of one-third of the project development committees, and as members of one-third 
of project implementation committees. After introduction of direct elections to reserved seats, more 
than 12,000 women were elected to these reserved seats and more than 39,000 women contested the 
last round of elections (Panday 2008). Although women UP members face both structural and 
attitudinal barriers (Panday 2008, Frankl 2004), they have gained social legitimacy in dealing with 
'women's issues' (adjudication by the UP over marital and inheritance related disputes etc.). Studies 
also show that their aspirations about participation in politics have changed (Khan and Mohsin 2008, 
Nazneen and Tasneem 2010). In the recent 2014 Upazila (the tier immediately above the Union 
Parishad) elections, the reserved seats for female vice chairs of the councils were heavily contested. 
However the number of women candidates in general seats at the Union and Upazila level remains low, 
which indicates a ghettoization of women into these reserved seats (see Annex 3: Table 3-1 for details 
2of women's representation at the local level).
Despite the provision for 30 per cent representation of women in all elected bodies (Chowdhury et al. 
1994, Nazneen et al. 2014), gender division of labour, restrictions on mobility, lack of knowledge about 
government rules and functioning, lack of political skills, economic resources and social capital, gender 
biased cultural practices and norms of the political parties, and administrative structure, limit women's 
3 effective participation in politics. Gender division of labour, particularly the responsibilities of care 
work at home, limits women's time and ability to participate in formal politics (Nazneen et al. 2014). 
Purdah norms and notions about gender-segregated public spaces restrict women's mobility as well as 
access to formal political and public spaces. Lack of knowledge about government functioning and 
rules limits the capacity of women to perform, once elected to office (Frankl 2004, Panday 2008). In 
Bangladesh, even though two women head the two major political parties, all political parties in 
general are notoriously gender biased (Jahan 1976, Ahmed 1985, Guhathakurata 1994, Chowdhury et 
al. 1994, Jahan 2012, Jahan and Amundsen 2012, Nazneen et al. 2014). Male resistance against female 
candidates, and workers within the political parties, create an adverse climate for women to rise up the 
party ranks. In addition, political violence discourages women's participation in party politics. Though 
the major political parties are willing to pay lip service to women's political empowerment and 
women's rights, these issues have little currency in mainstream politics (Chowdhury et al. 1994, 
Nazneen 2009). The marginalisation of women's issues in mainstream politics restricts women's ability 
to claim that they represent the interests of a large and politically important constituency (Jahan 2012, 
2. In Union Parisahd elections held in 2003, 22 women were elected as chairpersons out of a total of 232 women candidates 
who contested, and 79 won in the general seats out of 617 women candidates. The Upazila Parishad Act 2008 reserved 
one seat for women among the two elected vice chairpersons. The provision of reserved seats for women does not limit 
rights of women's direct election to compete for the general seats (The Upazila Parishad Act, 2009). In elections held on 
22 January 2009 under the RPO 2008, 480 women have been elected to the reserved post of vice chairpersons in 480 
upazilas, out of a total number of 1,936 contestants (Sumi and Rekha 2009). Elections in four City Corporations and nine 
pourasavas were held on 4th August 2008, in which 194 (2.4 per cent) women candidates contested for 39 reserved 
councilor's seats. In nine pourosavas, 120 (0.47 per cent) women contested for 27reserved seats (Bangladesh Election 
Commission, 2008).
3. Fawcett society (UNIFEM 2008) defines these as the four 'C's: [lack of] confidence, [violent and gender biased political] 
culture, [lack of patronage]cash, care/responsibilities [i.e., childcare, elderly care etc. within the home and other unpaid 
care work/ reproductive work done by women].
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4. Info available at http://dhakacitybnp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=46 
&Itemid=80&lang=en, [Accessed on 28 June 2014]
5. Khaleda Zia and Sarwari Begum
6. Available at  http://www.albd.org/index.php/en/party/organisation, [Accessed on 28 June 2014]
7. Info available at http://www.jatiyoparty.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=622&Itemid=130, 
[Accessed on 28 June 2014]
8. The information has taken from the report on Women in Politics (Akter, 2014). No information is on their website.
9. http://www.jasod.org.bd/leadership/permanent-commitee.html, [Accessed on 25 June 2014]
Nazneen and Mahmud 2012). In this context, understanding the following are important to provide 
insight into ways to strengthen women's presence in politics: 1) how women are formally incorporated 
into the party structure, 2) where and how women learn about politics, 3) how women engage and gain 
formal political power.
Underrepresentation of women within the political party structure and decision-making bodies is a 
feature of Bangladeshi politics, which has been slow to change even under democracy. The dominance 
of men in politics has turned politics into a 'male' arena. Women's access to political parties is often 
circumscribed by gender role expectations (i.e., qualities attributed to the nature of women and their 
desired role in society; Chowdhury 2002). This is particularly true with respect to women's presence in 
leadership positions within the parties. Underrepresentation of women in leadership positions inside 
political parties raises questions about the opportunity and scope for women's participation, and 
about the quality of representation and inclusiveness in Bangladeshi democracy. 
Table 6.1  List of women members in the party hierarchy of five major political parties in Bangladesh 
(2014)
6.3  Women's presence in political party structures and decision-making bodies
Name of party Name of preparation Total member Women member
4BNP  Advisory Committee 32 0
5National Executive Committee 38 2  
Standing Committee 21 2
Divisional Organizing Committee 6 0
6AL  Secretaries 31 3
Presidium Member 12 4
Advisory Committee 33 2
Members 24 1
7JP(Ershad)  Presidium Member 41 2
Central Executive Committee 23 1
Advisory Committee 14 2
Executive Member 89 4
8JI  Majlish-e-Shura 141 -
9JSD  Executive Committee 15 1
Advisory Committee 31 1
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Data on female membership and leadership within the major political parties is difficult to obtain, as 
gender disaggregated data is not available for all levels of the party structure. However, available data 
reveals the presence of women to be very low. A study of five major political parties in Bangladesh (AL, 
BNP, Jatiya Party, Samajtantrik Dal, Jamaat- E- Islam) conducted in 2013, show that only five to seven 
percent of the top leaders are women (Akter 2014b). The above table presents the current situation of 
women in leadership positions within these five major political parties.
Table 6.1 shows that only a few women occupy leadership positions within the party structure. It is not 
that women do not participate in politics, but that they are relegated to the lower levels in party 
hierarchies, and are used mostly for community mobilization work. An analysis of heads of the different 
committees formed by these political parties reveal that women are usually given positions that are 
10traditionally considered to be women's domain or less challenging (Akter 2014b).
To increase women in leadership positions within the political parties, Article 90B of the 
Representation of People's Ordinance of 1972 (amended in 2008), specifies some provisions that a 
registered party must fulfill in order to participate in national elections. These include the following:
! 90(b)(ii)- to fix the goal of reserving at least 33% of all committee positions for women 
including the central committee and progressively achieving this goal by the year 2020;
None of the political parties currently fulfill the above stipulation stated in the RPO. Initially, the 
Election Commission proposed direct elections in reserved seats, a reservation of 33% of the seats in 
the parliament and a 33% representation of women within the political parties in 2008. The political 
parties objected to these provisions, arguing that the number of qualified female leaders was 
insufficient and asked that the time period to meet these goals be extended to 2020. Eventually the 
Election Commission extended the time period to 2020 to reach the target of 33% women's 
representation within the political parties. However, they are yet to take necessary initiatives to 
achieve the target (Akter 2014b). The failure to meet this target by all political parties is a result of 
various factors; ideology (in the case of JI), gender bias practices, structures and norms that limit the 
rise of women leaders within parties, and also practical considerations regarding distribution of seats 
for patronage, and to secure electoral gains. 
Strong women's wings of parties may act as a key mechanism through which women's voices and 
leadership are nurtured, and serve as a channel for promoting gender equity concerns. Though all of 
these five political parties have their own women's wing active at the grass roots level, their 
functions have been primarily subservient to party interests and ideologies (Guhathakurta 1994, 
Nazneen and Mahmud 2012, Akter 2014a). In the case of JI, the members of the women's wing are 
primarily used to recruit female members and to create a separate space for women's activities to 
uphold the complementarity of gender roles within society (Shehabuddin 2008). In the last decade, 
members of the women's wing of AL and BNP have been active in the confrontational street politics 
during hartals, and later some have served in the reserved seats in the parliament. However, most of 
these women are not seen in key leadership positions in the various committees of executive bodies of 
these political parties.
10. Female membership lists are not available for Jamaat-E-Islami
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6.4  Women's pathways of political power
The absence of women leaders in party decision-making structures, and also in the general seats at the 
national and local electoral bodies, largely reflect gender-biased processes of recruitment, lack of 
opportunities for political apprenticeship and support for female candidacy, and limited scope for 
women to negotiate patronage based relations. 
Gendered recruitment practices and limits on the scope for Political Apprenticeship
The traditional routes through which people learn political activities, skills, and prepare for an entry at 
the national level are through participating in student politics, being active in trade unions and 
professional associations affiliated with one of the major political parties, or through mobilising 
support and creating a constituency at the grassroots level. Another route through which people enter 
politics in Bangladesh is as members of political families or dynastic politics. 
At the national level, except for the female leaders that emerged through participating in student 
politics, trade unions and professional associational politics in the 1960s and 1970s, most of the female 
leaders entered into politics through their families. They were either born or they married into political 
families. In a political culture where dynastic politics seems to be the norm and kinship ties are a key 
source of political capital for advancement, this is hardly surprising. However, the role of the family in 
creating access to the formal political arena for women has a particular gender dimension when it 
comes to electoral democracy.
In the literature on women in politics in Bangladesh the gender division of labour and resistance from 
the family (particularly husbands and in-laws) are identified as key factors that limit women's political 
participation (Chowdhury 1994, Frankl 2004, Panday 2008). However, families can also support female 
candidacy for various reasons. An analysis of women who ran in the general seats since 1991, show that 
apart from those who were already established as national figures and were active in the Bengali 
nationalist movement in the 1960s, most of the women belong to political families. In the 
parliamentary elections of 2008 and 2014, there was a significant rise in numbers of women contesting 
and winning general seats compared to other elections.  Most of these women were seen as proxy 
candidates by the general public (Khondker et al. 2013) given that they contested in family seats either 
in place of their husbands, fathers or other family members. Another study (Nazneen et al. 2014) that 
collected life histories of female councilors in three major cities, also reveals that a large number of the 
councilors interviewed were from political families. The perception that most candidates are proxy 
candidates for the male members of their families limits women's political effectiveness in the 
parliament and at the local level (Chowdhury et al. 1994, Nazneen and Mahmud 2012). 
The support from the family for female candidacy in formal politics is influenced by various factors. 
These include: keeping the seat within the political dynasty when the male members are unable to 
contest, accessing political power and patronage networks through the elected offices, enhancing 
family's standing within the community and continuing the family legacy, and at times having a genuine 
interest to see the female members of the family flourish as politicians. Studies also show that for the 
local female politicians, the constituents were willing to vote for females as they saw their vote as an 
endorsement of powerful political families and a way for securing patronage (Nazneen et al. 2014, 
Hassan and Nazneen 2013). 
These findings indicate the women's leadership and participation in formal democratic politics face the 
following risks. Firstly, women representatives and politicians face difficulty in establishing their own 
identities as social and political actors. Secondly, as the male family members in many cases use the 
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women to gain seats and enter political office, elected women officials may not acquire the required 
skills, nor represent the interests of the constituency. Thirdly, although dynastic politics may benefit 
some women, the absence of a track record of being active in formal party politics is a major barrier for 
women politicians in advancing in local and national politics. For women, lack of political 
apprenticeship in the traditional arenas leads to a failure in creating networks and relationships with 
senior political leaders and mentors within the party. In Bangladesh where political party structures are 
'informal and centralised', (Goetz and Hassim 2003), the failure to create these relationships with 
senior leaders translates into an absence of opportunities for climbing up the political ladder, taking 
part in important decision-making processes, or ensuring a share of the development budget for one's 
electoral constituency (Nazneen et al. 2014, Hassan and Nazneen 2013). All of these reduce women's 
effective representation and inclusiveness in Bangladeshi democracy. 
It should be noted that dynastic politics do benefit some women. Family is an important arena where 
women representatives learn political negotiation skills, and develop informal networks and 
relationships that they are able to use once in political office (Nazneen et al. 2014, CGST 2014). Given 
the violent nature of student, trade union and grassroots level politics, those who are able to rise 
through the party ranks need to have ' the three 'Ms'--money, muscle power and men' (Tarana Halim, 
MP, Speech at the roundtable on Women in Politics, March 2014). Most women face a particular 
disadvantage as they lack financial and other social resources, informal networks and access to political 
enforcers (thugs), unless their families are able to provide these. Hence families emerge as key routes 
for women in accessing political power (Interview, Rounaq Jahan, February 2014). Moreover political 
mentors play a key role in informal-centralized party structures for accessing central leadership, and for 
opportunities to exercise political agency. In the Bangladesh context, most senior political party leaders 
are male. Cultural practices and norms that regulate the interactions between men and women in 
public spaces are restrictive. Political apprenticeship requires being able to accompany the political 
mentors to different policymaking arenas, party offices and other spaces and at times outside of 
regular office hours. Mentoring an unrelated young female party member means that both mentor and 
mentee run the risk of being accused of alleged 'sexual misconduct.' Being mentored by a male 
member of the family reduces this risk. This is also one of the reasons why family acts as a key entry 
point for women in politics (Interview, Rounaq Jahan, February 2014). 
The discussion above highlights the following about the nature of politics and the opportunities for 
women's political apprenticeship. Firstly, opportunities for political apprenticeship is limited for 
women because of cultural norms, lack of financial resources, access to informal networks and the 
ability to use violent means against opponents. Lack of opportunities for political apprenticeship 
translates into an absence of female leadership in party committees and power structures, as we have 
seen in Table 6.1. Secondly, measures such as quotas and reservations for women to increase women's 
participation in formal decision-making bodies inside the parties may have limited impact. They may 
mostly be filled by proxy candidates, women without a proven track record at the grassroots, or 
independent links to centralized party leadership (other than their family connections).  
Candidacy: Gendered barriers to participation in democratic politics
Historically, the number of women contesting in general seats in parliamentary and local level elections 
is low, although a large number of women have contested at the union level after direct elections to 
reserved seats were introduced in 1997. The number of independent women candidates is also very 
small in the national elections and none of them have won seats (see Table 4-2 of Annex 4). For example 
thin 2008, only seven out of fifty-nine women candidates in the 9  parliamentary election contested as an 
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thindependent candidate and none of them won (9  Parliamentary election report, 2012). As women 
have fewer material resources, networks and political connections, running a campaign as an 
independent candidate is difficult. This implies that securing political party nominations is the first step 
for women to contest in general seats for parliamentary elections. In Bangladesh, single member 
constituencies and a 'first past the post system' lead to fewer women being nominated as candidates in 
the general seats, as political parties are unwilling to risk losing these seats. An analysis of data from the 
elections of 2008 show that out of 1567 candidates nominated by different political parties, there were 
only 64 women constituting about 4.08 percent of the total candidates (Akter 2014a).The following 
table shows the number of women who contested as candidates, nominated by the five major political 
parties in different elections.
Table 6.2: Number of women candidates in different parliamentary elections
Figure 6.1: Proportion of women candidates in general elections
Name of 1991 1996 2001 2008
the party
Total Women Total Women Total Women Total Women  
women women women candidate women
BNP 300 4 1 300 3 2 252 4 3 260 13 3
AL 264 8 3 300 4 2 300 9 2 264 17 15
JP   (Ershad) 272 5 - 293 3 1 49 2 1
JI 222 - - 300 - - 31 - - 39 - -
JSD 161 - - 67 1 - 76 - - 45 1 -
Elected Elected Elected Elected
11
th th th thSource: Bangladesh Election Commission, 5 , 7 , 8  and 9  Parliamentary Election Report. Available at: 
http://www.ecs.gov.bd/English/MenuTemplate2.php?Parameter_MenuID=39&ByDate=0&Year [Accessed 6 June 2014].
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1991 1996 2001 2008
th th th thSource: Bangladesh Election Commission, 5 , 7 , 8  and 9  Parliamentary Election Report. Available at: 
http://www.ecs.gov.bd/English/MenuTemplate2.php?Parameter_MenuID=39&ByDate=0&Year [Accessed on 6 June 2014]
11. Member of the JP (Ershad) contended under lslami Jatiyo Oikyo Front in 2001.
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Given the centralised-informal structure of political parties, the security of nominations depends on 
the decisions made by the party leader. This informalised structure of political parties may have an 
adverse impact on women's candidacy for reserved seats, and also participation within the party 
structure. Securing a nomination in a general or reserved seat is possible only if the party leader and 
the central committee are in favor of a particular women candidate. Although the RPO specifically 
mentions that grassroots members are required to have a say in nominating candidates, the final 
decisions on selection are taken by the central committee, which exercises direct control over the party 
(Interview, Ayesha Khanam, 2014). 
A woman MP who served in the last parliament stated that for securing nomination for either a general 
or reserved seat, a woman candidate has to have strong party affiliations, be an active member of the 
party and have sufficient financial means (Interview, Rashed Begum Hira, June 2013). As most women 
lack experience of political apprenticeship and informal networks with political party leadership, most 
of them rely on family connections to secure nominations. Most women also lack financial resources, 
which intensifies their reliance on family. The structural and cultural difficulties in securing 
nominations to general seats also encourage women to secure nominations to reserved seats instead 
of building an electoral constituency.
How reservations may limit women's effective representation
The existence of reserved seats at the national and local level ensures women's numerical presence in 
these formal political spaces. Women's numerical presence through reserved seats has a 
'demonstration effect' (Mansbridge 1999), showing women are able to occupy seats of power. 
However, in most cases at the union and national levels, serving as a member in the reserved seats 
rarely allows women to develop their own constituency. The reserved seats cover larger geographic 
areas, which make it difficult for women to serve their constituents. Women representatives need to 
share their constituency with another directly elected representative, which fosters the impression 
among the people that women representatives are superfluous in that particular constituency. This 
perception is also present among state officials. In a recent study, for example, women municipal 
councilors recounted that local bureaucracy refused to accept documents and certificates signed by 
the councilors elected to reserve seats (Nazneen et al. 2014). These findings show women's ability to 
represent interests of the constituents in a representative democracy is constrained by the way quotas 
and reservations have been designed and implemented by the state. 
What do political parties think about women's representation and political participation?
The party constitutions and other formal documents embody the vision of change these parties aspire 
to. They reflect their normative values, and identify priority areas for action to be undertaken by the 
party.  An analysis of the constitutions of the five major political parties reveals that women's political 
empowerment or gender equity receives little attention in these documents. The Constitution of the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) does not specifically mention women's political empowerment or 
advancement, and only mentions women when it comes to effective use of labor power 
(http://www.bnpbd.org, accessed on June 2014). Awami League's Constitution places emphasis on the 
importance of women's empowerment and states that the party will act to eradicate all forms of 
violence against women and ensure women's participation in all spheres of public life, including the 
political sphere (http://www.albd.org, accessed on June 2014). The Constitution of the Jatiya Party (JP) 
only mentions women participation in poverty alleviation activities, and Jamat-E-Islam professes to 
ensure women's rights based on the Sharia Law and promote Islamic values (Jamaat-E-Islami 2007). 
6.5  Political party position on women's political empowerment
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The election manifestoes drafted by these political parties are documents that explain the 
development, political agenda and the future action plan of these parties. A quick analysis of the 2008 
parliamentary election manifesto of the five major political parties show that all of them have a 
separate section on women that explains their positions on women's rights and gender equity 
concerns. Four major parties (AL, BNP, JP, JI) place women's development concerns along with child 
rights issues under the section-heading 'Women's and Children's Rights'. Although other centrist 
parties use terms such as women's empowerment, JI uses the term women's rights (narir odhikar). In 
fact, JI never refers to women's empowerment in their election manifesto or any other policy 
document. Omitting the term women's empowerment may be a strategic decision by JI, as this allows 
for framing its agenda on women's rights issues within the Sharia based rights discourse, and to 
separate their agenda from the mainstream development discourse. The other three centrist parties 
take an instrumental view for focusing on women's empowerment (i.e., using women's labour power 
for reaching development goals and alleviating poverty). They lack any reference to collective 
empowerment or changing social [read patriarchal] structures. This instrumentalist framing reflects 
the political realities in Bangladesh, where women's rights have little relevance in mainstream electoral 
politics, and where women are a weak political constituency.
Only the National Socialist Party (JSD) has a clear policy approach to increase women's political 
participation. The party promises to ensure 33 per cent women's representation at the Parliament and 
local levels, and also 33 per cent of women representation within the political party and in trade 
unions. AL highlights its role in increasing women's reservations in the parliament in 2008 and promises 
to reach the 33 per cent reserved quota for women within the party structure by 2021. However, AL 
does not provide any details of how this would be done, and does not mention direct elections for 
women in reserved seats in the parliament. None of the political parties other than JSD discuss the 
issue of direct elections. In fact BNP, Jaamat-E-Islam and Jatiya Party are vague and speak about 
'ensuring suitable conditions' for women's participation in politics. None of these parties discuss 
identifying sources of election funding for women, capacity building of women politicians within these 
parties or creating mechanisms that promote female leadership development (Akter 2014a).
Is there space and scope for promoting women's representation in politics and within political 
parties in Bangladesh?
The analysis above of party documents and election manifestoes reveal that all major parties except for 
JSD do not have a clear vision on promoting women's participation and inclusion in democratic politics. 
Given this scenario, are there spaces and scope for gender inclusivity inside political parties and for 
engendering democracy? Will pressure from the Election Commission and other state agencies create 
an enabling environment for women?
In 2008, when the Election Commission was under the Caretaker regime, it had proposed direct 
elections in reserved seats for women in parliament and a reservation of 33 per cent of seats in 
parliament and a 33 per cent representation within the political parties. All four of these major political 
parties had objected to these conditions on the ground that there are very few effective women 
leaders within their parties and that the parties would require time to develop capacities of their 
female members. The political parties pressured the Election Commission to extend the time limit for 
meeting the target of 33% of women's representation within parties (Sumi and Rekha 2009). The 
Election Commission does not mention any sanctions for political parties failing to increase the number 
of women in the party hierarchy till 2020. In fact, party registration of Jamaat-E-Islami, which has no 
women in their executive bodies, was not challenged on this ground in 2008 by the Election 
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Commission. Moreover, women's presence in the party executive and advisory councils has decreased 
after this provision was introduced (Akter 2014b). This perhaps indicates that the agenda for women's 
representation within political party structures does not carry weight with neither the political parties, 
nor the concerned state agencies. It also reveals a relatively weak position of the women's movement 
when it comes to influencing women's political inclusion, since direct elections and women's 
representation within the party structure have been demanded by women's rights activists since the 
late 1970s (Nazneen and Sultan 2014).   
Though direct elections to reserved seats were introduced at the local level, it seems a slim possibility 
at the national level, despite strong demands from the MPs holding the reserved seats, and also from 
the women's rights groups. In fact, none of the major political parties since 1991 have taken any 
measures to introduce the issue of direct elections in the parliament for debate, although all parties 
agreed to increase the provision of reserved seats when it ended in 2001, and also to increase the 
number of reserved seats. This perhaps indicates an informal consensus among the major parties to 
keep the practice of indirect nominations to the reserved seats. In fact, the interviewees of Bangladesh 
Mohila Parishad, one of the civil society organizations advocating for women's political participation 
since the 1970s, revealed that the women politicians had asked them to raise the issue of direct 
elections and create pressure from outside as they were experience strong resistance from within the 
parties (Nazneen and Sultan 2010). The space and scope for advocating the issue of direct elections or 
women's representation within the party structure is limited.
At the local level, after the introduction of direct elections to the reserved seats in Union Parishad, a 
large number of women contested in these seats. Various policy directives on women's inclusion in 
committees have led to space being created for women to be part of these formal spaces (Frankl 
2004, Khan and Ara 2006). However, a recent study on Union Parishad shows numbers of women re-
contesting in reserved seats is falling (Khondker et al. 2014). However, what this fall in number means is 
unclear.
Women representatives at the UP level are perceived as legitimate political actors in many unions 
when it comes to social issues, particularly if the issues are related to marital disputes, divorce, child 
custody (Khan and Mohsin 2008, Nazneen and Tasneem 2010). However, their effectiveness in 
securing development funds for their constituencies is limited, as this places them in direct conflicts 
with their male colleagues over patronage distribution (Nazneen and Tasneem 2010, Hassan and 
Nazneen 2013). A recent study found that at the municipal level, women councillors are the first port of 
call in matters related to violence against women and women's welfare issues (IMED 2014, Nazneen et 
al. 2014). Their ability to secure larger development programs or address matters related to service 
provision can be limited, as they lack knowledge about the informal networks within the 
administration and the government, and are politically less influential. The fact that these women are 
seen as representatives advocating women's needs and interests may create space for raising gender 
equity concerns, and also to consolidate their legitimacy as social and political actors. However, this 
idea that women representatives should primarily address women's needs may also marginalize their 
position as representatives for their constituencies as they may be perceived as 'women's 
representative' only. In terms of creating scope for advocating for women's political participation, the 
opportunity to serve in these local spaces may lead to the development of political skills and the ability 
to climb up the political ladder from the grassroots. On the other hand, development of political skills 
and opportunities may be limited because of structural constraints and cultural and attitudinal biases. 
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6.6  Concluding observations 
What has been the effect of democratization on women's representation and participation in politics 
post 1991? Undeniably, women's representation and visibility in formal political spaces has increased. 
This is because of the reservations and quotas in the parliament and also in local government 
institutions. Direct elections in reserved seats at the Union Parishad level and in municipalities have 
also led to a larger number of female candidates competing for these seats. More than 24,000 women 
contested in the local level elections, unprecedented in the previous elections. These measures have 
created opportunities for women to occupy formal spaces and elected office. Women are able to 
participate in these spaces, albeit in a constrained manner, empowered by the positions that they hold. 
The RPO, amended in 2008, contains provisions that may create possibilities for women's effective 
presence within the political parties, such as ensuring 33 percent representation within the party 
structure, placing caps on election spending etc. In fact, the reforms provisions of election finance, if 
enforced, may create a level playing field for women candidates at the local level, who tend to lack 
financial resources (see Box 4-1 of Annex 4).
However, these above mentioned provisions in the RPO have had limited impact on creating women's 
effective representation in democratic politics. This is because the Election Commission lacks the 
power to take action against the major political parties or powerful candidates for noncompliance. This 
inability of the Commission results from the partisan use of the Election Commission as an agency by 
the ruling coalition. This limits enforcement of sanctions against ruling parties and candidates 
associated with the ruling coalition. If the EC takes steps to sanction opposition political parties and 
candidates, it is perceived as harassment. This perception is not completely without grounds as the 
Commission has been used politically at various times to harass the opposition. This does not imply 
that the personnel working at the Election Commission lack capacity. In fact, given the opportunity and 
impersonal political space, they can function effectively [including for securing women's interests], as 
seen during 2008 when the RPO was amended. This was the first time that the Election Commission 
pressured the political parties for mandatory inclusion of women within the party structure. This was 
the result of consultations with women's rights organizations, even though the latter are rarely given a 
seat at the table during democratic regimes (interview, Ayesha Khanam, Bangladesh Mohila Parishad, 
March 2009).  
The above indicates that contextual factors play a key role in creating a space for women's inclusion. 
Importantly, the political gain and loss encountered by the major political parties in promoting 
women's representation and participation influence how political parties decide to act where inclusive 
democracy is concerned. 
An analysis taking political realities into account shows why some measures such as direct elections to 
reserved seats, were easier to introduce at the local level than at the national level, and why they may 
limit possibilities for women's effective presence. It seems unlikely that direct elections to reserved 
seats will be introduced soon. All political parties wanted an extension to implementation of the quota 
on women's representation inside the political party structure, which indicates a resistance to a gender 
equity agenda. The Election Commission also did not sanction any party for not taking any effective 
measures since 2008 to meet this target, which indicates that the agenda for increasing women's 
representation within the political parties has lost importance. Interventions regarding this matter by 
the Election Commission, which plays an important role in setting the rules and overseeing elections in 
a democracy, appear slim.
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Besides stipulations on the incorporation of women within the party structure, women's inclusion to 
build a robust democracy is mediated by other factors. Opportunities for political apprenticeship are 
limited, and for most women their pathways into politics is still their family. That family emerging as an 
arena where the political apprenticeship of women takes place is not surprising, given the violent 
nature of politics, and the requirement to distribute patronage limit a woman's ability to participate in 
student or trade union, or grassroots level politics. The 'family' emerging as the key pathway has several 
implications on the quality of women's inclusion within the party structure and electoral politics. There 
is a complex set of reasons behind the family's support including material gain, increased prestige, and 
the desire to help the women succeed. Given the dynastic, patronage-based politics and the informal-
centralized party structures in Bangladesh, having family's support, particularly when the family has 
social and political capital, is crucial for women to contest and win elections. Given the informal-
centralized structure of the political parties, the ability of women who are included into various party 
structures to promote women's rights, may be constrained if promotion of women's rights goes against 
the interests of the party's central leadership (Nazneen et al. 2014).
What are, therefore, the possibilities for promotion of women's leadership and inclusion in formal 
politics, especially within the party? Firstly, the devolution of power between the Members of 
Parliament and the elected chairpersons and members (including female) of the Upazila and Union 
Parishad may create a scope for elected women leaders to take part in collective action by local 
representatives. Women representatives could establish strategic links with the male members for 
collective bargaining with the political parties. Secondly, the intensive electoral competition in recent 
elections for Upazila Vice-chairman women-reserved posts has created an interest inside the political 
parties to focus on developing women's leadership at the local level to avail these seats. Thirdly, the 
creation of participatory spaces for influencing local government activities has created 
opportunities for rural women to participate in local decision-making processes. This participation is 
linked to the practice of democracy at a broader level. Inclusion of women in these spaces creates 
possibilities for development of women's leadership (Hassan and Nazneen 2013). Admittedly, there 
are structural constraints that may limit women's participation, but the possibility for change 
remains if they are to be addressed. In conclusion, this analysis shows that for democratic politics to 
be truly gender inclusive, entry of women in formal politics is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. 
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7.1  Introduction
Political parties require a substantial amount of money to carry out their day-to-day activities, finance 
their campaigns and mobilise party activists. The sources of political party funding need to be 
transparent and should be disclosed to the public for the sake of democracy and good governance (Jain 
2002). In western democracies, political parties and candidates raise a substantial part of their election 
expenses from various sources, which include personal contributions and mass donations, and are 
generally well accounted for (Scarrow 2005). Nevertheless, studies show that political party financing 
can distort the electoral process, and is a major motive for corruption in both developed and 
developing countries (DFID 2001). In the case of Bangladesh, the political parties collect local and 
overseas donations from their supporters, as well as business and industrial financiers (Bryan and Baer 
2005). However, irrespective of the size and ideology of the political party, accounts of their funding 
sources and expenditures are rarely maintained (TIB 2009). As electoral financing is not well 
documented, very little is known about how much money is raised and what amount of money is spent 
during parliamentary elections. Reporting on finance within the party or to the Election Commission 
(EC) is also inadequate and reports which are submitted to the EC are not comprehensive (Austin and 
Tjernström 2003). It is widely perceived that candidates do not follow the Representation of the 
People's Order (RPO). The existing regulatory system is apparently inadequate to hold the political 
parties accountable for their financial operations, although the EC requires that political parties have to 
1be registered with the EC and have to submit their audit reports annually.  Reporting on electoral 
financing is a recent phenomenon in Bangladesh and the political parties often deviate from the rules 
and regulations of the EC. However, the funding mechanisms of political parties in Bangladesh have 
largely been unexplored. The few studies available on party financing in Bangladesh are largely based 
on secondary literature. In fact, there is very little information in the public domain on sources of 
political parties' income, expenditure patterns and the accountability procedures of party resources.  
Political Party Finances:
'Norms and Practices'
1. See Political Party Registration Act, 2008 for details
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In this backdrop, we look to study empirically the financial practices and accountability mechanisms of 
the political parties of Bangladesh. Since there is little available documentation, it was important to go 
to the people who are integrally involved with the process to get the best possible picture of political 
party financing. Individuals who were identified for interview about party financing matters include 
political party leaders (in particular district level leaders), businessmen, Election Commission officials, 
and members of civil society groups, particularly academics and journalists. The chapter also looks into 
the major areas of political parties' expenditure. The focus of this study is on tracking the financing 
mechanisms of the two major political parties, Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP). 
The research questions for this study are as follows:
a) What are the sources of funds for political parties and electoral candidates?
b) What are the major areas of political parties' expenditure?
c) To what extent are the political parties transparent and accountable concerning party finance?
d) Is there any significant change taking place in the composition of party committees at the 
district level as a result of donations to the party funds?
Figure 7.1: Conceptual framework
7.2  Study design and methodology
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The study applied a multi-method data collection approach that includes both primary and secondary 
data, including a review of secondary literature. Due to time and resource constraints, only the major 
two political parties i.e., the ruling Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP) were looked at in detail. 80 Structured interviews comprising specific questions were conducted 
among the Presidents/General Secretaries/Treasurers of 40 district committees of AL and BNP 
assuming that respondents with such portfolios would be able to shed light on the actual practices of 
the financing mechanisms of the two parties. Moreover, a total of 16 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) 
were conducted among politicians, businessmen, academics, journalists, civil society members and 
former Election Commissioners. For this, an open-ended interview guide was developed. Both sitting 
and former parliamentarians and bureaucrats were included in the interview pool; the assumption 
being that serving politicians and officials would have more up-to-date information, but individuals 
who are no longer actively involved in politics or in the bureaucracy may be more likely to be honest 
about the internal workings of political party financing. The findings from KIIs were then critically 
juxtaposed with the survey data to unveil a clearer picture. Data collected from BIGD perception survey 
which was conducted in the same 40 administrative districts among 2400 households were also used. 
The information collected from various sources was triangulated to understand the funding practices 
of political parties in Bangladesh. Party constitutions and relevant government laws were also 
scrutinised wherever accessible. 
A survey was conducted in 40 administrative districts among the political leaders of both AL and BNP. 
Twenty questions were asked about sources of income, areas of expenditures, transparency and 
accountability mechanisms of financial transactions of their respective party. KIIs were conducted 
among relevant experts. A perception survey was also conducted in the same 40 administrative 
districts. The findings of various methods are discussed below in detail.    
7.3.1 Sources of party income 
The parties appear to rely on numerous sources for funding, which include membership fees, 
donations from businessmen or wealthy individuals, sale of party publications, contributions from 
expatriate Bangladeshis or their associations and so on. According to constitutions of both the parties, 
the membership fee is supposed to be the major source of income. Every primary member of AL is 
required to pay a fee of Taka 10 triennially. In case of BNP, this amount is Taka 5 every year.
The survey reveals that about two thirds of the political party leaders identified membership fees as the 
largest source of parties' income. Out of the two parties, 70 percent AL leaders and 50 percent of BNP 
leaders recognised membership fees as the major source of earnings of the district unit (Figure 7.2). 
Nevertheless, this contradicts the opinions expressed by experts as none of the two parties keep 
proper records regarding the number of party members and the amount of money collected from 
them. Moreover, the central leaders admitted the fact that income from membership fees is very 
negligible and hardly any money flows from the district committee to the central party funds.
7.3  Findings and analysis
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Figure 7.2: Major sources of district unit's fund 
While both political parties claim to generate most of their funding from stipulated membership fees, 
almost one third of the respondents admitted that they do not collect any membership fees at all. AL 
fared way better than BNP in this category as 22.5 percent respondents claimed that general 
membership fees are collected on a regular basis while only 5 percent of BNP respondents claimed to 
do so. At the same time, as many as 30 percent of AL respondents and 45 percent of BNP respondents 
reported that they collect membership fees irregularly (Figure 7.3).
Figure 7.3: Frequency of membership fee collection
There seems to be a greater reliance on business donations next to membership fees, as one fifth of the 
AL respondents identified funding from business donations or from wealthy individuals as the major 
source of their district unit's income. On the other hand, almost a third of BNP respondents mentioned 
0 20 40 60 80
Membership fee
Donation by businesses/individuals
Contribution from party center
Income from party run businesses
Other
BNP
AL
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
AL
BNP
Regularly Somewhat 
regularly
Irregularly Very 
irregularly
Not at all 
The State of Governance Bangladesh 2013
97
this to be their party unit's major earning source (Figure 7.2). This implies that BNP has more 
associations with businessmen compared to AL as far as their sources of income are concerned. From 
expert interviews it seems that political parties are relying more and more on big business donations 
for their funding. Businessmen usually give money to both the political parties. At times, they 
contribute big amounts directly to the funds set up by the chiefs of the parties for running election 
campaigns. Moreover, there are some businessmen who are also affiliated with a particular political 
party who often contribute to the respective party fund. The income and expenditure statement 
submitted by AL to the EC also recognised that donations constituted the largest share of its income (65 
percent) in 2012 (Table 7.1). While not specifically stated, BNP also mentioned that donations were one 
of the major sources of its income during the same period.
Table 7.1: Income and expenditure statements of AL and BNP submitted to the EC for the year 
2012 (in taka crore)
Apart from membership fees and donations, there are provisions in the constitutions of both the 
political parties to raise funds through sale of the party's publications, cultural and social programmes, 
exhibitions, and so on. But in practice, as observed in our survey, an insignificant amount of money is 
raised through these avenues. Half of the respondents of both AL and BNP stated that they do not 
collect funds from the above mentioned sources. Only 15 percent interviewees of AL mentioned that 
they collect some money from the sale of party's publications. BNP leaders did not mention this as a 
source of earning. On the other hand, only 5 percent of BNP respondents said they accumulate some 
revenue from cultural or social programmes while no AL interviewees reported to collect funds 
through cultural or social events. 
Political parties claim to rely on quite a few sources to accumulate the major share of their funding.  
Although the majority of the respondents at the district level reported to generate the greater share of 
the parties' income from membership fees, they contradicted their statement when they stated that 
the rate of membership fee collection is very low and in most cases membership dues are not at all 
Earnings
Expenditure
Sources of income
Areas of expenditure
Public disclosure of earnings 
and expenditure 
AL
10.06
9.19
Donations (Taka 6 crore), membership 
and other committee-member fees, sale 
of coupons, sale of various publications 
and booklets, district fee, interest from 
bank deposit, other savings etc. 
Running the organisation and 
humanitarian assistance 
No
BNP
1.79
2.26
Interest from bank deposit, 
general membership fee, fees 
from various committee-
members, donation etc. 
Running the organisation and 
observing various events 
Yes
Source: Compiled from various sources.2
2. Daily Sun 2013, bdnews24.com 2013, Daily Jugantor 2013a and  Daily Jugantor 2013b.
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collected. A substantial number of respondents admitted that parties' principal source of income is the 
donations from businessmen and wealthy individuals. Contributions from other sources is negligible.
7.3.2 Areas of political parties' expenditures
There are many areas where political parties spend a lot of money, such as organising public meetings, 
processions, demonstrations, election campaigning, per diem for party activists, transportation, rents 
for party offices, among others. However, there is negligible systematic documentation on the nature 
of expenses of political parties in Bangladesh. Organisation of public meetings and processions seem to 
be a sizeable expenditure for both AL and BNP, with over two thirds of the respondents reporting this to 
be their major expenditure. Election campaigning was reported as the second major source of 
expenditure by both the political parties; the corresponding figures for AL and BNP are 20 percent and 
15 percent respectively (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4: Major areas of expenditure 
All the major political parties have thousands of party offices throughout the country. The type of 
ownership of these party offices is unknown. Since rents for party offices are a legitimate area of 
expenditure, the survey included a question on the type of ownership of party offices. Half of the AL 
respondents said that their party unit offices are rented, while 55 percent of BNP offices were said to be 
rented. The ownership pattern of party offices is similar for both parties, with just over one-fourth 
respondents of AL and one fourth BNP respondents stating that their party offices are owned by the 
party (Figure 7.5). Central political leaders also mentioned that in a few cases, the party-units take lease 
of government-owned khash lands. 
7.3.3 Electoral funding
Electoral funding of political parties is an understudied area of political party governance. Very little is 
known about how much money is raised and what amount of money is spent during parliamentary 
elections. We tried to see whether there is any significant variation in party funding phenomenon 
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between election year and non-
election year. To understand this 
better, the respondents were 
asked what amount of money is 
needed in a non-election year. 
About a fifth of AL respondents 
said that they require two to four 
lacs (One lac equal to 100 
thousand) taka, while almost a 
third BNP respondents said they 
need similar amounts of taka to 
run the district unit expenditures 
(Figure 7.6). One fifth of both AL 
and BNP respondents stated that 
they spend five to seven lacs taka 
in a non-election year. On the 
other hand, 22.5 percent AL respondents reported that they spend eight to ten lacs taka in a non-
election year while 17.5 percent BNP respondents mentioned to spend the same. Political parties, in 
reality, maintain little accounts of their expenses, as 32.5 percent of AL and 22.5 percent of BNP 
respondents reported that they are not aware of what amount of money is spent in a non-election year. 
Figure 7.6: Non-election year spending by major political parties
Political Party Finances: 'Norms and Practices'
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Do not know
> 11 lacs
8 - 10 lacs
5 - lacs
2 - 4 lacs
< 2 lacs
BNP
AL
Figure 7.5: Ownership of party offices 
Rented Owned Other
AL
BNP
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
100
The amount of money spent in an election year is several times more than a non-election year. Only 
10 percent AL respondents said they spend five to ten lacs taka while 20 percent BNP respondents 
claimed to spend similar amount of money in an election year. 5 percent AL respondents reported 
that they require 16 to 20 lacs taka while 7.5 percent BNP respondents reported to spend 21 to 40 
lacs taka in an election year. It is worth mentioning that 7.5 percent BNP respondents reported to 
have spent over 10 million (100 lacs) taka in an election year. The significant finding about electoral 
spending is that electoral candidates themselves bear the costs of political activities in an election 
year, where the district committees have little role. This is supported by the fact that 70 percent of 
AL respondents presume that candidates bear the electoral costs. Similarly, two thirds of BNP 
respondents reported that their electoral candidates take care of the party expenses and the district 
units do not keep track of the expenditures (Figure 7.7).  
Figure 7.7: Election year spending by major political parties
Expert opinions are also in line with the survey results; the majority mentioning that electoral 
expenses are borne mostly by the candidates themselves. In a few cases, parties provide financial 
assistance to the candidates. As far as electoral expenses of the political parties are concerned, AL in 
its expenditure statements submitted to the EC reported that it had spent a total of approximately 
Taka 3.6 crore during the 2009 parliamentary elections, and BNP stated that it spent approximately 
Taka 4.5 crore (EC 2009). However, the EC did not verify the electoral expenditure statements 
3submitted by the political parties.
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7.3.4 Transparency and accountability mechanisms
The political parties in Bangladesh are not transparent in terms of their financial transactions. This has also 
been reflected by statements of top party leaders at the district level. A majority of respondents of both AL 
and BNP said that there is little transparency and accountability as far as party funds are concerned.
Figure 7.8: Audit of accounts by independent auditing firms 
Audit of accounts is an important aspect of transparency of party funds. Respondents at the district 
level reported that they rarely audit their party accounts by independent professional auditing firms. 
The majority of respondents of both parties admitted that they do not conduct any audit of accounts. 
Only 10 percent AL respondents claimed to audit their party accounts regularly but no BNP respondent 
claimed to do so (Figure 7.8).
Figure 7.9: Provision of receipts/vouchers while receiving fund by BNP and AL
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In order to ensure transparency and accountability, it is essential to issue receipts while receiving any 
funds or donations, which is also mentioned in the party constitutions. But in reality, parties do not 
provide receipts to contributors as reflected in the survey results from 40 districts. Less than one-sixth 
of the respondents of both the parties claim to provide receipts regularly against funds received. Two-
third of respondents from both political parties admitted that they do not issue any receipts while 
accepting party funds (Figure 7.9). The central leaders also admitted that they do not always provide 
vouchers to party funders. 
The major two political parties do not seem to be concerned about the district level funding 
mechanism, although there is a provision in AL's constitution to review and approve district level party 
funds. Less than 10 percent respondents of both parties claimed that their district unit funds are 
reviewed and approved by the central committee/working council of the respective parties (Figure 
7.10). Two-thirds of the AL respondents mentioned that the district unit funds are never scrutinised by 
the central committee, and 70 percent BNP respondents stated that their accounts are not examined 
by the party centre.
Figure 7.10: Accounts reviewed by party center
Article 44CC clause (4) of RPO states that no political party shall receive any donation amounting to more 
than taka 20 thousand, unless it is made by payee cheque. Political parties do not appear to abide by these 
rules and regulations of EC. In most cases, political parties do not keep any formal record of financial 
transactions, despite there being a straightforward EC directive. The majority of respondents admitted 
that they do not use formal channels while accepting donations or spending money, preferring informal 
channels instead (Figure 7.11). Only 23 percent AL respondents claimed to make use of formal banking 
channels for financial transactions compared to 13 percent of BNP respondents. This practice is contrary 
to the party constitutions, which stipulate that party-units have to open bank accounts, and require 
financial transactions to be conducted through bank accounts. It seems that most monetary transactions 
occur through informal, unregulated channels. This finding from district survey was matched with the 
information from the experts, who reiterated that informality in financial matters dominates all levels. 
During national elections, however, the parties open a separate bank account for election purposes, and 
the transaction statement of that account is submitted to the EC.   
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Figure 7.11: Channels used for financial transactions
The political parties seem to internally discuss matters like spending a large sum, say Tk.10,000 or 
more, in the party forum. The party constitutions also stipulate such collective decision-making. 
Two-fifth of the respondents from both parties claimed to take such decisions through general 
meeting of the district committee. One-third of the respondents stated that decision about 
spending a large sum is taken by consultation between any two of the following persons of the 
district committee  President/General Secretary/Treasurer. Only a fifth of the respondents 
confirmed that such a decision is taken solely by anyone among the district unit President, General 
Secretary or Treasurer (Figure 7.12).
Figure 7.12: Decision making process to spend BDT. 10, 000 or more 
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7.3.5 Business-politics nexus
There is a growing concern that the representation of businessmen is increasing in politics.  Since 1991, 
the percentage of businessmen in parliament has increased more than any other professionals (see 
chapter 5 for details). A majority of the current MPs (193 out of 300) have categorised themselves as 
thbusinessmen in their affidavits submitted to the EC before the 10  Parliamentary election. To 
corroborate with this trend in parliament, the study intended to verify whether the same is happening 
at the district committee level. Almost half of respondents reported that businessmen or contractors 
are mostly represented in the district unit committees of both AL and BNP; 38 percent AL respondents 
and 33 percent BNP respondents mentioned lawyers, teachers and journalists as being the mostly 
represented professionals in the district committees. The representation of full time party activists 
seem to be declining in the district units, as only 15 percent AL respondents and 23 percent BNP 
respondents stated as such. Only three percent AL respondents claimed that farmers and land owners 
are represented in the district unit committee, while no BNP respondent mentioned this (Figure 7.13). 
The result of the survey shows that representation of wealthy businessmen is increasing in the district 
unit committees. One reason could be that earnings one can accumulate from a political career are 
outweighing that of the private sector. A similar view was expressed by experts, on the growing 
involvement of businessmen in politics.
Figure 7.13: Dominance of professionals in district committees 
As the representation of businessmen in politics is increasing, it is likely that their contributions to party 
funds are rising simultaneously. To observe this trend at the district level, the survey included a 
question whether the district units receive any one-time donation from local businessmen or 
contractors. A significant number of interviewees of both the parties admitted to receive such 
donations from businessmen, as 35 percent respondents of AL reported to receive money regularly, or 
on some occasions (Figure 7.14). In fact, half of the BNP respondents stated that they accept donations 
from businessmen or contractors either occasionally or on a regular basis. Two-third of AL respondents 
and half of the BNP respondents denied receiving donations from businessmen.
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Figure 7.14: One-time donation from local businessmen or contractors 
Politics has been considered as a business venture, as the return from investing in politics outweighs 
other forms of investment. Many experts ascertain that growing trend of businessmen turned 
politicians is a testimony of this conviction. The study intended to corroborate this expert opinion with 
people's perception, so a question was included in the BIGD Household Survey (2014) as to why 
businessmen are entering in politics at an increasing rate. Almost 90 percent respondents think that 
businessmen are joining politics for personal gains rather than the well being of the public (Figure 
7.15). Experts say that the phenomena is not only confined to businessmen entering politics, as 
politicians are also turning into businessmen.
Figure 7.15: Do businessmen join politics for personal gains?
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7.4  Concluding observations
The chapter looked into three core issues  sources of income, expenditure patterns and accountability 
mechanisms of political parties in Bangladesh, primarily focusing on AL and BNP. The focus of the 
chapter has been to examine the actual practices of party financing of the major two political parties; 
more specifically to what extent the parties are transparent in terms of their income and expenditures, 
as well as the documentation of transactions.  In addition, an attempt was made to capture the growing 
nexus between business and politics.
Regarding sources of political parties' income, there is a visible deviation between norms and actual 
practices. As per constitutions of both BNP and AL, membership fees are supposed to be one of the 
main sources of income. While the district survey among BNP and AL leaders recognised this, the 
central leaders admitted that neither of the two parties maintains proper documentation of money 
collected from party members. Almost one-third of the respondents admitted that they do not collect 
any membership fees at all, and the fees that are collected are irregular, at best. Moreover, hardly any 
money flows from the district committee to the central party funds. A substantial number of survey 
respondents and the central leaders of both the parties admitted that the major share of their funding 
derives from donations of businessmen and wealthy individuals. The political parties are witnessing a 
shift in their funding over the years, as the parties are more and more reliant on big business donations 
for their financial support, while previously they used to depend more on small contributions from the 
party supporters. 
When it comes to expenditure patterns, similarities between the two political parties have been 
noticed. Public meetings and processions are a large portion of their budget. Expenditure during 
election years multiplies than a non-election year. However, the district units have little knowledge 
about the actual electoral expenses of the parties, as it seems that the election is almost entirely 
funded by the candidates themselves during the election period. It is widely perceived that the real 
electoral expenses are far higher than what the candidates or parties report to the election 
commission. BIGD  household survey (2014) also found that two-third of respondents consider the 
electoral expenditure statements that are submitted to the EC by the candidates not to be trustworthy.
The institutional apparatus of the political parties seem to be very weak at dealing with issues of 
accountability. Neither of the parties audit their accounts properly by independent auditing firms at 
the district level. They do not keep record of their incomes and expenditures; parties do net even 
provide receipts/vouchers to contributors. The financial transactions of the political parties are 
dubious, as both the parties prefer informal channel to conduct financial transactions, ignoring the 
rules and regulations of EC. To address accountability and transparency issues of party financing, 
regular audit of accounts might play a positive role. Moreover, the EC neither scrutinises the yearly 
income and expenditure statements submitted to them by the political parties, nor discloses it for 
public scrutiny.  
The findings of the study show that the political parties do not maintain any transparency as far as their 
funding is concerned. Non-transparency in financial affairs of the political parties might have 
counterproductive implications for democracy and good governance. As observed in other countries, 
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non-transparent political party financing can distort the electoral process (DFID 2001). In the case of 
Bangladesh, lack of adequate information and transparency in electoral financing could influence the 
electoral outcome. 
If parties are not regulated properly for their financial affairs, and financial matters are controlled by a 
few, there is a likelihood that political parties will engage in corrupt practices, thus weakening intra-
party governance. In addition, business donations have not only become a major source of income of 
political parties, but also businessmen themselves are represented overwhelmingly in the district unit 
committees of both AL and BNP, at the expense of grassroots leaders. If business donations become the 
major source of party financing, this could encourage people with money to take the centre stage in 
politics, which could have negative implications for the country's democracy and good governance.
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The State of Governance in Bangladesh Report 2013 sought to understand the underlying dynamics of 
the 'democratic deficit' in the country particularly focusing on the contribution of political parties and 
politicians. Using a coherent research methodology applied to both primary and secondary data, the 
report suggests that the argument that slow political development exists because of the weak 
commitment exercised by the political parties when it comes to democratic norms and practices, 
essentially by exerting their influence over the state institutions and the rule of law, and undermining 
the principles of inclusion at both the local and national levels. More detailed empirical findings and 
analytical observations or insights are highlighted in the remainder of the chapter below.  
Evolving partyarchy constrains political development. A discouraging finding of the report is the 
evolution of multi-party democracy towards partyarchy. The poor status of state building, democratic 
accountability, and rule of law—the three tenets of political development—indicates the existence of 
partyarchy, i.e, a tendency of political parties to exert overwhelming influence over state and non-state 
institutions in Bangladesh. The dominant political parties have successfully managed to 'capture' state 
and non-state institutions and through them, are able to forcefully exert power to influence political 
outcomes at all tiers and many key institutions in their favor. The civil society institution, BSCBA, the 
police force; and at the district level the local governance bodies, i.e., Union Parishads, are cases in 
point. 
The politicization of civil society, law enforcement agencies and weakening of representation at the 
local level has stymied pluralism and advanced authoritarian tendencies in party behavior. This reality 
appears to be invariant to the changes in political regimes in Bangladesh. Both the dominant parties 
contribute to these outcomes, undermining the progress of political development and modern 
democratic institutions. One important implication of such findings, keeping partyarchy in mind, is that 
the once vibrant civil society of Bangladesh has diminished over time. While civil society in Bangladesh 
has been able to play an impressive role in expanding public and economic services across the country 
to help reduce poverty, it has not been able, especially in recent years, to play the 'original' role 
envisaged by Hobbes—holding successive governments to account for their perceived anti democratic 
practices; nor galvanizing support for institutionalizing the rule of law and human rights, on a large 
scale. Some civil society institutions, such as Transparency International, Ain-o-ShalishKendro and the 
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Human Rights Watch have of course played a seminally important role in these areas, which are vital to 
establishing liberal democracy in Bangladesh. This points to the need for the political parties to play a 
greater role in fostering a more vibrant civil society in Bangladesh in the interest of political 
development of the country. 
There is a divergence between democratic norms and practices within political parties. The findings 
suggest an often stark divergence between democratic scruples and practices, which reflects weak 
commitment to a democratic culture in both parties. In terms of the scruples, the constitution does not 
make any specific mention of the need for transparency and accountability on the part of the parties. In 
terms of the practices, there is reasonable evidence to suggest that the party center affects 
competition negatively at the local level. 
The divergence noted above point to a pressing need to promote an 'inclusive and decentralized' 
representation. Without this, the democratic governance of a country risks descending into 
'authoritarianism.' Even though such findings are based on a minimalist research framework, we 
believe that they are adequately robust. It is thus necessary to heed its significant implications in terms 
of policy making, as it not only reflects the inherent undemocratic practices of individual party 
members in both parties, but also points to some problems in the foundation of the country's 
governance, i.e., its constitution and the legislative acts governing the parties. Indeed, for democratic 
norms and values to be enforced, it is important to make constitutional amendments to ensure greater 
transparency and accountability and the unbridled pursuit of pluralism within the political parties.
Party induced political violence has increased. The investigation of 'political violence' or 'party 
induced violence' indicates that such violence has increased at a constant rate of four percent during 
the period 2008-2013. The districts of Naryanganj, Rajshahi, Dhaka, and Gazipur counted among the 
top ten of the most violent districts, adjusted for population and incidence of reported violence. In 
addition, our findings unveil an interesting fact: that ruling party, regardless of which of the two 
dominant parties it is, always outstrips the opposition in terms perpetrating violence, and that intra-
party violence accounts for a large share of overall political violence which is also attributed in most 
cases to the ruling parties.  
The implication of increased political violence is related to an overarching lack of ideological harmony 
not only between the parties, but also between the individual members and factions within each party.  
It is important to take this implication into account because it shows the negative impact of the lack of 
unity around party ideology on the governance of the political parties, as shown by the proclivity for 
violence to resolve differences; and perhaps, more disconcertingly an emphasis on personal or 
factional loyalties to powerful leaders in the parties. The predicament shows that there is a dire need 
for the political leaders to rally the party rank and file around their respective ideologies using more 
profound political mobilization methods, i.e., methods that promote liberal thinking, open debate and 
an uncompromising commitment to pluralism and peaceful tactics to achieve political ends. Party 
members in breach of these fundamental democratic principles, must be held accountable and 
obligated to face justice. Both parties need to play a more inspiring role, one which can 'win the hearts 
and minds of the nation' and abjure acrimony and violence for the greater interest of the country.     
The profile of politicians matters. Our findings also indicate a greater bias towards the induction of 
businessmen and dynastic aspirants into parliamentary politics. The personal characteristics of 
politicians significantly affect their political work and responsibilities at both the national and local 
levels. The synthesized empirical findings based on detailed evaluation of member characteristics, 
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attendance in parliament, participation in budget speech, and attendance in standing committee 
meetings, also point out the individual traits of politicians that are not conducive to overall political 
development. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that political parties influence the extent to which 
members perform effectively in parliament. The findings also suggest that those businessmen and 
members who face corruption charges have lower attendance levels, on average, in parliament.
Overall, the findings suggest that political parties recruit members based on their political expediency 
and not through competition at local levels. More importantly, the findings highlight the need to 
explore the profile of politicians in greater details to develop an understanding of 'who leaders are' and 
'how they behave'. Only then can they assess the links between the party members and their 
characteristics, i.e., the workings behind participation, funding, and legislator performance can be 
unfolded in greater details. 
Gender exclusion is severe in political structures of the parties: It has been observed that even though 
the subjects of quotas as a pathway for women's inclusion in politics and gender equity have 
dominated the debate on women's political empowerment in Bangladesh, women's participation in 
formal political structures is abysmally low in the major political parties. More specifically, it has been 
observed that women are used primarily for community mobilization purposes at the grass roots level, 
while the higher levels in party hierarchies and policymaking is relegated to their male counterparts. In 
retrospect, such trends are related to the general gender bias in the country that exists not only 
because of culture norms, but also because of the preference given to male politicians by political 
parties as they are perceived as being more likely to act as a source of funding.
Furthermore, it has been observed that the number of women who contested as independent 
candidates in the national elections is surprisingly low; and from the few who contested, none have 
won in their seats. However, it is important to unfold issues such as the role of family behind women 
contestants as well as the role women themselves play when it comes to promoting gender equality in 
politics, and the emerging spaces and gaps that possibly could promote democratic practices that 
nurture women's inclusion.
Nevertheless, the discussions in this report carry great significance in terms of understanding the need 
to change the patriarchal structure that continues to grasp parliamentary politics in Bangladesh.  More 
importantly, it signifies the paradox that is unique to Bangladesh, as the country's political scenario is 
one where the very top levels of major political parties continues to be occupied by female political 
leaders, while little measures are being undertaken to promote women MPs from the lower levels in 
the political hierarchy. Indeed, we hope that our findings paint a broader picture that suggests the need 
for the inclusion of women at all levels of political hierarchy, as it is a crucial step towards achieving 
pluralistic democratic participation in the country.
Norms and practices of party financing need to be transparent. Surveys of the literature on party 
financing in developing countries shows that available data are limited.  This report also experienced a 
similar constraint. The final chapter's empirical investigation into funding practices in the political 
parties indicates that the major parties have increasingly recruited businessmen based on the 
expectation that they will expand their financial resources. In addition, although both the major 
political parties state membership fees to be the major source of funds of the district units, the analysis 
also suggests that political parties rely largely on donations from the private sector for funding their 
expenses. The findings also suggest that there is significant divergence between what the parties claim 
as their source of finance and their actual sources, with hardly any funds flow from the district 
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committees to central party funds. The findings also suggest divergence between the declaration of 
financial information to the EC and actual expenditures in election years in particular. The findings 
strongly suggest a need to improve transparency to promote democracy and good governance in the 
country. 
There is a 'crying' need for an enlightened national dialogue on the future political direction of the 
country. All stakeholders involved need to address the challenges faced by democracy in Bangladesh, 
to avoid reversals in the gains achieved so far. The antagonism between the two main political parties is 
sometimes reminiscent of the 'state of nature' described by Locke and Peardon (1952) and Hobbes 
(1952). In Hobbes' description man is by nature bad and vicious. This cannot be good for the morale of a 
people who should be looking toward a radiant future for the country in this early stage of the new 
Century. 
Its discontents notwithstanding, the ideals of modern democracy remain as powerful as ever and are 
likely to remain the preferred mode of political organisation of society for a long time to come, not 
because there is 'no worse system' but on account of the inspiring the ideas on which it is founded. 
However, political institutions which comprise the 'soul' of a modern, liberal democracy cannot be 
taken for granted. They must be painstakingly built over long periods as the history of democracy and 
modern civilization shows (Fukuyama 2011). The present 'impasse' presents the political parties with a 
rare opportunity to consolidate democracy in Bangladesh, and move the country towards a strong two 
party system much like most industrialized countries, which is at the same time stable. 
The adversities faced by democracy in Bangladesh reflect a failure to transform its institutions and to 
create new ones in step with the rapid economic, social and technological changes that have been 
taking place in the country since its birth. This requires an 'enlightened' national compact to reconcile 
competing visions of national identity as well as to restructure and build new, stronger democratic 
institutions. It is for the parties and the politicians to decide whether they wish to put the country's 
interests ahead of their own.  
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Box 1-1: Brief methodology for Chapter 3
This is an account for the methodology pursued in Chapter 3 in the effort to unearth previously 
unknown facts surrounding the activities of political parties in Bangladesh. It considers 
methodology rather broadly, to include 1) conceptual development in relation to existing literature 
2) multiple levels of conceptual translation from basic concepts to specific indicators and 3) the 
eventual operationalisation of these concepts as indicators that were surveyed against responses 
from a) District committee party secretaries b) journalists and 3) a representative citizens of 
Bangladesh. 
We establish a basic idea for participation, representation and voice with foundation in both 
classical and contemporary literature that can be said to be embedded in the twin imperatives of a) 
inclusion and b) decentralization. These two central themes of democratic process were then 
elaborated as five central indicators: participation, representation, competition, responsiveness 
and transparency.
We operationalise the five indicators across five central investigative tools:
1) A review of BNP and AL constitutions
2) Questionnaire survey of AL and BNP Party district secretaries in 40 districts
3) Questionnaire survey of Journalists in the same 40 districts
4) Questionnaire survey of a representative sample of Citizens in Bangladesh
5) In-depth qualitative interviews with experts, thinkers and advocates that study and are 
involved in the field of politics in Bangladesh. 
The selection of the 40 districts surveyed in our report reflects the availability of time and resources 
and also considerations of the districts that typically feature dominance by either BNP or AL, and 
those that feature the dominance of neither of the two main parties. Specifically, 15 AL 
strongholds, 15 BNP strongholds as well as 10 districts understood as historically dominated by 
neither of the two parties. The concept of party stronghold was based on a historical analysis of 
party dominance with regards to electoral seats as seen across the districts over the past 15 years.
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Table 1-1: Constitutional review
The State of Governance Bangladesh 2013
General members' rights
AL BNP
Are the principles of intra-party democracy explicitly mentioned in the statute? -1 -1
Are party members' rights explicitly mentioned in the statute? -1 -1
According to the statute, do party members explicitly have the following rights: –
To be informed about party activities? -1 -1
To express a divergent opinion within the party and/or in public? -1 -1
To participate in party decision-making? 0 0
To form factions within the party? -1 -1
TOTAL -5 -5
Average -0.83 -0.83
Minority rights
AL BNP
Is there an explicit reference to minorities in the statute? 1 1
Are there any quotas explicitly mentioned in the statute with respect to minorities? 1 1
Is it explicitly mentioned, that the quotas are binding? 1 1
Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in party organs? 1 1
Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in the party lists for public office? -1   -1
Do certain members (i.e. representatives) of the minority groups automatically
become members of the party executive? 1 1
TOTAL 4 4
Average 0.67 0.67
The national executive 
AL BNP
Does the statute mention the responsibilities and accountabilities of the national executive? -1 -1
Does the statute mention that the national executive is accountable to the party
members or to the party congress? -1 -1
Is there any party body/mechanism explicitly mentioned, which is specifically
entitled to control the national executive? -1 -1
Total -3 -3
Average -1 -1
The executive committee
AL BNP
Does the statute mention the responsibilities and accountabilities of the
executive committee? 1 -1
Does the statute mention that the executive committee is accountable to the
party members or to the party congress? -1 -1
Is there any party body/mechanism explicitly mentioned, which is specifically
entitled to control the executive committee? -1 -1
TOTAL -1 -3
Average -0.33 -1
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Party president
AL BNP
Does the statute mention that the party president can be challenged in his position? -1 1
Does the statute mention the following rights (obligations) of the party president:   
To block the execution of decisions and other acts of the executive? 0 -1
To exclude a party member? 0 -1
To dismiss a member of the party executive? 0 -1
To act against the general provisions of the statute in certain cases? 0 -1
To form or to close sub-national party units? 1 -1
TOTAL 0 -4
Average 0 -0.67
Relationship between the national level and sub-national levels
AL BNP
Does the statute mention sub-national party units? 1 1
Does the statute mention any rights of sub-national party units? 1 -1
Does the statute mention that sub-national units influence entities at higher levels? 0 -1
Is it explicitly mentioned that sub-national units have autonomy? -1 -1
TOTAL 1 -2
Average 0.25 -0.5
Public office-national: candidate nomination
AL BNP
Does the statute mention the rights to suggest/nominate candidates for public office? 1 1
Do nominations for candidates come from the executive committee or a nomination
committee chosen by the executive committee? 1 0
Do nominations for candidates come from the national executive or a nomination
committee chosen by the national executive? 0 -1
Do nominations for candidates come from the party congress (or individual members)? 0 -1
Do nominations for candidates come from sub-national units? 1 1
May each candidate suggest him- or herself for at least some public offices? -1 -1
TOTAL 2 -1
Average 0.33 -0.17
Candidate selection—parliament
AL BNP
Does the statute mention who has the right to select candidates for parliament? 1 1
Do registered party members select candidates by election (“closed primary”)? -1 -1
Do delegates select candidates by election? 1 -1
Does the national executive or a committee chosen by it select candidates? 1 1
Does the executive committee, president or a committee designed by them
select candidates? 0 -1
TOTAL 2 -1
Average 0.4 -0.2
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Relationship between the national level and sub-national levels (national public)
AL BNP
Do national party units completely control the selection of candidates? 1 1
Do sub-national party units propose candidates, but the national party organs
make the final decision? 1 1
Do national party units provide a list of names from which the sub-national
party organs can select the final list? 1 1
Do subnational party units have suspensive veto rights regarding candidate
selection for public office? -1 -1
Do subnational party units completely control the process and make the final
decision about public office candidates? -1 -1
TOTAL 1 1
Average 0.2 0.2
Intra-party office—National level: election of the national executive
AL BNP
Are there any rules regarding the election of the national executive explicitly
mentioned in the statute? 1 1
Are individual party members directly involved in electing the national executive? -1 -1
Are delegates in the party congress or a central committee directly elected by the
congress directly involved in electing the national executive? 1 -1
Is the executive committee directly involved in the election of the national executive? 1 1
Is the party president directly involved in electing the party executive? -1 -1
TOTAL 1 1
Average 0.2 -0.2
Election of the executive committee
AL BNP
Are there any rules regarding the election of the executive committee explicitly
mentioned in the statute? 1 1
Are individual party members directly involved in electing the executive committee? -1 -1
Are delegates in the party congress or a central committee directly elected by the
congress involved in electing the executive committee? 1 -1
Is the national executive directly involved in the election of the executive committee? 1 1
Is the party president directly involved in electing the executive committee?– – -1 -1
TOTAL  1 -1
Average o.2 -0.2
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Election of the party president
AL BNP
Are there any rules to the election of the party president mentioned in the statute? 0 0
Are all party members directly involved in electing the party president? -1 -1
Are delegates of the party congress directly involved in electing the party president? 1 1
Is the national executive directly involved in electing the party president? -1 1
Is the executive committee directly involved in electing the party president? 0 0
TOTAL -1 1
Average -o.2 0.2
Procedure: Voting procedure
AL BNP
Do the statutes contain any information about the manner of voting for
intra-party or public positions? 1 0
Is a secret method used when electing candidates for either intra-party or public positions? -1 -1
Is a secret method always used when electing candidates for both intra-party
and public office? -1 -1
Is it explicitly mentioned that the voting results are presented to all party
members within the party to justify and legitimize the candidacy? -1 -1
TOTAL -2 -3
Average -0.5 -o.75
Relationship between national and sub-national units—sub-national public office
AL BNP
Is it specified how sub-national units elect their public office candidates? 1 1
Do sub-national units enjoy regional autonomy when electing their public office candidates? 1 1
Is it explicitly mentioned that the sub-national units cooperate with
national branches when electing their public office candidates? 1 1
Do the national units completely control the election of the sub-national
public office candidates? 1 1
TOTAL 4 4
Average 1 1
Relationship between national and sub-national units—sub-national intra-party office
AL BNP
Is it explicitly specified how sub-national units elect their leadership? 1 1
Do sub-national units enjoy regional autonomy when electing their leadership? 1 1
Do sub-national units cooperate with national branches when electing their leadership? 1 1
Do the national units completely control the election of the sub-national party leadership? 1 1
TOTAL 4 4
Average 1 1
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Box 1-2: Relevant formulae for Chapter 3
Programmatic issue
AL BNP
Does the statute explicitly specify who is in charge of the manifesto? 1 -1
- May individual party members vote upon the manifesto? -1 -1
- May the party congress vote upon the manifesto? 1 -1
- May the party executive vote upon the manifesto? 1 -1
- May the party president vote upon the manifesto? 1 -1
- May sub-national party units have a separate vote on a manifesto? -1  -1
TOTAL 2 -6
Average 0.33 -1
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Box 1-3: Districts in which no meetings are held
BNP districts with no General Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=8 or 20%): 
• Gopalganj, Joypurhat, Madaripur, Manikganj, Munshiganj, Noakhali, Panchagarh, 
Shariatpur
BNP districts with no Executive Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=10 or 25%):
• Joypurhat, Manikganj, Munshiganj, Panchagarh, Shariatpur, Nilphamari, Magura, 
Chittagong, Jhenaidah
AL districts with no General Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=4 or 10%):
• Bagerhat, Munshiganj, Noakhali, Panchagarh
AL districts with no Executive Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=4 or 10%):
• Bagerhat, Noakhali, Panchagarh, Narail
Districts in which no Executive or General Meetings were held in any (2012 or 2013) year
• BNP: Joypurhat, Manikganj, Munshiganj, Panchagarh
• AL: Bagerhat, Noakhali
Transparency Index
Correlation (between AL & BNP) (BNP)
Transparency
Index Score (AL) Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .003
N 40
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Transparency Index Score
Pearson .452**
Table 1-2: Correlation between AL and BNP Transparency Indices (party office)
Table 1-3: Correlation between AL and BNP Transparency Indices (journalists)
Transparency Index 
Correlation (between AL & BNP) Score 
Transparency
Index journalists Score ( ) Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 40
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
journalists Transparency Index journalists
(BNP)
Pearson .873**
AL
Annex 1
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Map 1-1: PDI Mapping of AL districts
Note: districts that are not coloured denote districts that have not been surveyed.
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Map 1-2: PDI Mapping of BNP Districts
Note: districts that are not coloured denote districts that have not been surveyed.
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Table 1-4:  Party democracy indices for AL by district
District Name Representation Competition Participation Responsiveness Transparency PDI, AL
Rangpur 0.71 0.76 0.62 1.00 0.83 0.79
Kurigram 0.45 0.65 0.46 1.00 0.67 0.65
Habiganj 0.23 0.65 0.52 1.00 0.83 0.65
Satkhira 0.10 1.00 0.40 0.57 1.00 0.61
Noakhali 0.35 0.65 0.60 0.57 0.83 0.60
Nilphamari 1.00 0.53 0.15 0.57 0.67 0.58
Feni 0.23 0.76 0.36 1.00 0.50 0.57
Sylhet         0.03 0.59 0.66 0.57 1.00 0.57
Gopalganj 0.39 0.41 0.33 0.86 0.83 0.56
Shariatpur 0.16 0.76 0.43 0.57 0.83 0.55
Patuakhali 0.24 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.83 0.54
Chandpur        0.00 1.00 0.79 0.57 0.33 0.54
Sherpur 0.19 0.29 0.63 0.57 1.00 0.54
Manikganj 0.29 0.65 0.16 0.57 0.83 0.50
Pirojpur 0.52 0.24 0.32 0.57 0.83 0.49
Jessore 0.13 0.53 0.23 0.57 1.00 0.49
Madaripur 0.10 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.50 0.49
Munshiganj 0.16 0.29 0.72 0.57 0.67 0.48
Brahmanbaria 0.65 0.76 0.39 0.57 0.00 0.48
Bagerhat 0.32 0.41 1.00 0.57 0.00 0.46
Magura 0.10 0.65 0.44 0.57 0.50 0.45
Jhenaidah 0.26 0.88 0.09 0.86 0.17 0.45
Lalmonirhat 0.45 0.29 0.57 0.43 0.50 0.45
Joypurhat 0.19 0.76 0.03 0.57 0.67 0.44
Gaibandha 0.03 0.76 0.88 0.00 0.50 0.43
Kushtia 0.10 0.63 0.36 0.57 0.50 0.43
Comilla 0.06 0.06 0.75 0.86 0.33 0.41
Gazipur 0.13 0.53 0.32 0.57 0.33 0.38
Rajshahi 0.24 0.41 0.07 0.29 0.83 0.37
Dinajpur 0.26 0.29 0.18 0.43 0.67 0.37
Thakurgaon 0.42 0.12 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.36
Bogra 0.21 0.41 0.49 0.57 0.00 0.34
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District Name Representation Competition Participation Responsiveness Transparency PDI, AL
Nawabganj 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.57 0.33 0.33
Barguna 0.45 0.29 0.30 0.57 0.00 0.32
Cox's Bazaar    0.13 0.76 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.31
Jamalpur 0.10 0.06 0.47 0.57 0.33 0.31
Laksmipur 0.03 0.00 0.34 0.57 0.50 0.29
Chittagong     0.00 0.12 0.52 0.57 0.17 0.27
Panchagarh 0.11 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.27
Narail 0.19 0.63 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.20
Average 0.25 0.51 0.42 0.56 0.56 0.46
Table 1-5: Party democracy indices for BNP by district
District Name Representation Competition Participation Responsiveness Transparency PDI, BNP
Madaripur 0.17 0.90 0.36 1.00 0.83 0.65
Laksmipur 0.04 0.60 1.00 0.75 0.83 0.64
Nilphamari 0.00 0.80 0.58 0.75 0.83 0.59
Thakurgaon 0.18 0.60 0.40 0.75 1.00 0.59
Kushtia 0.11 1.00 0.11 1.00 0.67 0.58
Magura 0.13 0.80 0.36 0.75 0.83 0.57
Noakhali 1.00 0.70 0.20 0.25 0.67 0.56
Panchagarh 0.88 0.13 0.19 0.75 0.83 0.56
Kurigram 0.19 0.80 0.22 1.00 0.50 0.54
Sherpur 0.31 0.70 0.11 0.75 0.83 0.54
Munshiganj 0.00 0.60 0.23 1.00 0.83 0.53
Patuakhali 0.11 0.57 0.38 0.75 0.83 0.53
Sylhet         0.16 0.50 0.15 1.00 0.83 0.53
Brahmanbaria 0.10 0.80 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.51
Jamalpur 0.08 0.40 0.40 1.00 0.67 0.51
Gopalganj 0.43 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.00 0.50
Dinajpur 0.19 0.90 0.25 1.00 0.17 0.50
Rajshahi 0.34 0.70 0.37 0.25 0.83 0.50
Cox's Bazaar    0.12 0.80 0.12 0.75 0.67 0.49
Lalmonirhat 0.26 0.40 0.31 0.75 0.67 0.48
Jhenaidah 0.00 0.60 0.13 0.75 0.83 0.46
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District Name Representation Competition Participation Responsiveness Transparency PDI, BNP
Barguna 0.20 0.90 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.46
Comilla 0.32 0.70 0.12 0.75 0.33 0.45
Pirojpur 0.10 0.70 0.33 0.25 0.83 0.44
Jessore 0.16 0.70 0.31 1.00 0.00 0.43
Chandpur        0.16 0.80 0.19 1.00 0.00 0.43
Feni 0.32 0.60 0.11 0.75 0.33 0.42
Satkhira 0.11 0.00 0.35 0.75 0.83 0.41
Nawabganj 0.10 0.60 0.41 0.75 0.17 0.40
Gaibandha 0.07 0.70 0.06 0.75 0.33 0.38
Bogra 0.04 0.70 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.38
Gazipur 0.06 0.47 0.08 0.75 0.50 0.37
Bagerhat 0.15 0.60 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.36
Joypurhat 0.00 0.10 0.15 1.00 0.50 0.35
Habiganj 0.27 0.70 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.31
Shariatpur 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.28
Narail 0.06 0.80 0.21 0.00 0.33 0.28
Rangpur        0.12 0.00 0.18 0.25 0.83 0.28
Manikganj 0.09 0.30 0.11 0.25 0.50 0.25
Chittagong     0.00 0.00 0.14 0.75 0.33 0.24
Average 0.18 0.59 0.24 0.74 0.54 0.46
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Table 2-1: Top ranked violent districts
Top Violent District Top Violent District Top Violent District Top Violent District 
(2008-12) in number (2008-12) in per 10,000 (2013) in number (2013) in per 10,000
Dhaka Dhaka Dhaka Rajshahi
Narayanganj Narayanganj Chittagong Satkhira
Chittagong Meherpur Rajshahi Narayanganj
Rajshahi Rajshahi Gazipur Gazipur
Sylhet Rangamati Narayanganj Joypurhat
Noakhali Munshiganj Bogra Feni
Barisal Barisal Sirajganj Nawabganj
Gazipur Manikganj Satkhira Lakshmipur
Khulna Khulna Sylhet Bogra
Bogra Kushtia Noakhali Sirajganj
Table 2-2: List of variables used in the regression analysis
Political violence per 10,000  people 
Cumulative strong holds of parties in districts 
th th th thconsidering the 9 , 8 , 7  and 5  Parliament.   
Percentage of ministers and Parliamentary 
committee chairpersons in a district as a 
thpercentage of elected representatives in 9  
Parliament
% of people under the upper  poverty line 
Location of public universities 
Six divisional headquarters as well two 
districts, industrial zone
Political violence
Party strong holds
Power concentration
Poverty 
Public university 
location
Divisional 
headquarters and 
industrial zone
BIGD data based on newspaper 
scan
Compilation from election 
statistics 
Compilation from Parliament 
statistics (SOG 2012)
BBS 2005
BBS 2011
Survey data 
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Map 2-1: Political violence in Bangladesh 2008-12
Political Violence in Bangladesh
2008-12
Violence per ten thousand population
data source: Prothom Alo, 2008-12
cartography: Arafat
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Map 2-2: Political violence in Bangladesh 2013
Political Violence in Bangladesh
2013
Violence per ten thousands Population
50 25 0
Miles
data source: Prothom Alo, 2013
cartography: Arafat
Low
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Legend
135
Annex 2

thTable 3-1: Political parties in the 9  national parliament and the family connection of their 
chairpersons
Leader: Sheikh Hasina Wajed is the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, and 
the daughter of the country's founding father Bangabandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman. Sheikh Mujib was the first President of Bangladesh 
and the third chairman of Awami League. 
Leader: Begum Khaleda Zia is the widow of General Ziaur Rahman who 
thfounded BNP and was also the 7  President of Bangladesh. 
Leader: General HM Ershad founded Jatiya Party, and he has no major 
previous family connection. Ershad was also the President of 
Bangladesh from 1983-1991. 
Leader: Barrister Andaleeve Rahman Partho- Andaleeve is the son 
rdNaziur Rahman Manjur who founded BJP. Naziur was also the 3  Mayor 
of Dhaka and a Minister during 1987-1991. Andaleeve, was a Member of 
Parliament. 
Leader: Maulana Nizami. He was a Minister during 2001-2006, and he 
has no major family connection.
Leader: Col. Oli Ahmad. Mr Oli founded LDP. He is an MP and he has no 
major family connection.
Leader: Hasanul Haq Inu. He is a Member of Parliament with no major 
family connection.
Leader: Rashed Khan Menon. He is a Member of Parliament. His sister is 
an influential leader in BNP. His father was a Speaker of the National 
Parliament.
Bangladesh Awami League (AL)
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
Jatiya Party (JP)
            Bangladesh Jatiya Party (BJP)
Bangladesh Jamaat-E-Islami
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Jatiya Samajtantric Dal (JSD)
Workers Party of Bangladesh (WP)
Source: Rahman 2013a
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Table 3-2: Description of families producing three generations of leaders
Kafiluddin Chowdhury was a political leader in Awami League and Minister in 
the provincial government of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). His son Dr 
thA.Q.M Badruddoza Chowdhury was the 15  President of Bangladesh. His 
grandson Mahi B Chowdhury is a former MP.
Monsur Ali was a Minister from 1972-1975. His two sons - Mohammed Nasim 
and Mohammed Selim - were also MPs. At present his grandson Mohammed 
Tanvir Shakil Joy is an MP.
Yusuf Uddin Mollah was a Member of the Legislative Assembly before 
independence. His son Ahsanul Huq Mollah was also a MP. His grandson Reza 
thAhmed Bachu Mollah was an MP in the 8  National Parliament. 
Khan Shaheb Osman Ali was a Member of the Legislative assembly before 
independence. His son AKM Shamsur Rahman was also an MP. His grandson 
Nasim Osman is currently an MP from Awami League.
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the First President of Banladesh. 
His daughter Sheikh Hasina is the current Prime Minister. His nephew Sheikh 
Selim and Sheikh Helal are MPs. His grandnephew Sheikh Fazle Noor Taposh is 
also an MP.
Chowdhurys
Mohammed Monsur Alis
Mollahs
Osmans
Sheikhs
Source: Rahman 2013a
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Annex 4
Table 4-1: Women in politics at the local level at a glance
Union Parishad- (2003 elections)
22 women chairpersons elected out of 232 total contestants
79 women (out of 617 women candidates) won in general seats. 
Total 39,419 women candidates contested for 12,684 reserved seats
Upazila Parishad- (January2009 elections),
480 women elected for reserved seats of vice-chairperson
City Corporation- (2008 elections)
194 (2.4 percent) women contested for 39 reserved councilor's seats
120 (0.47 percent) women contested in nine Pourashavas
Source: Akter 2014a
Table 4-2: Women as independent candidates
Year Number of independent
candidate contested election
2008 8 0
2001 9 0
1996 6 0
Number of elected
th th thSource: Election Commission report on 7 , 8  and 9  Parliamentary Election. Available at: 
http://www.ecs.gov.bd/English/index.php.
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Box 4-1 : Requirements for nomination specified in the RPO
The RPO includes conditions for a candidate's nomination and the main purpose of these is the 
disclosure of personal and financial information to the public (Akter 2014a). Any nominated 
candidate is required to submit a certificate from their respective party in support of their 
candidature. The nomination process seeks to ensure that political parties practice internal 
democracy (Article 90B, Clause 1b (iv)).
The RPO 2008 also stipulates the broad provisions on financial accounting required of all political 
parties. Each candidate is required to submit to the Returning Officer along with the nomination 
papers, information in the prescribed format of the source of his election funding (Article 44AA). 
Private and corporate donations to any political party and to individual candidates are allowed 
under the law but there is a ceiling on the amount. This ceiling is a maximum Tk 2.5 million for an 
electoral constituency. The upper limit of the electoral expenditure by any candidates depends on 
the number of voters (Tk 5 per voter) (Article 44B.3). In case of parties, the highest permissible amount 
spent by a party depends on the number of candidates from the respective party. In 2013, this was 
increased to 50 lacs.
Both the candidates and parties are required to submit electoral expenditure reports to the Election 
Commission within a stipulated time period. Noncompliance with this requirement will result in a 
jail sentence with a fine or cancellation of registration (Article 44CCC). Two to seven years of 
rigorous imprisonment with fine will be imposed if the candidates contravene the provisions of 44B 
(obligation of documentation of expenses, limit of expenses and the mode of spending (Article 73). 
Bills and receipt vouchers of every payment of more than Tk. 100 has to be maintained by the 
election agent (Article 44 B.5)
Article 44B (3a) states that the election expenses cannot be used for printing a poster with more 
than one color or bigger than the size prescribed by the EC. It is also illegal to use money for the 
entertainment of the electorate in any manner. Setting up more than one election camp in any 
union, ward, putting up posters on walls or using any other structures for installing election posters, 
and using motorised vehicles of state agencies for campaigns, etc  are not allowed (Article 44B (3a).
Furthermore, the EC imposes reporting obligations on the political parties for account and 
expenditure details. Article 44C (1), stipulates that all contesting parties will maintain proper 
accounts of all income and expenditure for the period from the date of publication of notification till 
the completion of elections. Every party for any donation above Tk 5,000, should provide names 
and addresses of the donor, and specify the nature of donation. 
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The BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) (formed through a merger of 
the Institute of Governance Studies and BRAC Development Institute), BRAC University 
is a centre of research and academic excellence. It is a specialised institute of BRAC 
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The relationship between economic growth and political development has emerged in recent years as a 
front-ranking research issue in the field of development economics. Institutions of market economy can 
develop even in the backdrop of political decay, but the gains from such growth remain susceptible to elite 
capture based on non-economic considerations. Where the economic and political moments of 
development acutely mismatch, distributive conflicts often take the form of political conflicts over 
distribution of economic rents based on party-political affiliations. The distributive economic and political 
conflicts get aggravated under the “winner takes it all” model of democratic contestation. The State of 
Governance Bangladesh 2013 focuses on some of the major issues of political development such as 
politicization of state agencies, weak inner-party democracy, growing political violence and questionable 
practices of party finance to explore the nature of elite control through extraction of party-political 
allegiance. Each of the selected themes has bearing on the quality of economic governance. While the 
treatment of these issues is by no means exhaustive and demands more careful empirical scrutiny the 
report brings a fresh perspective by highlighting the centrality of the concept of “partyarchy” as an 
indicator of democratic backtracking. One area of future research in this connection would be to explore 
the question of why things tend to remain as they are (why things do not fall apart), i.e. to examine the 
question of “endogeneity of partyarchy”, having momentous consequences for long-term economic 
development.
Binayak Sen
Research Director
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS)
BRAC Institute of Governance and Development
BRAC University 
A spectre is haunting Bangladesh, the spectre of 'liberal fascism'. H.G. Wells incidentally coined this term, 
telling the Young Liberals at Oxford in a speech in July 1932 that they must become 'liberal fascists'! Others 
have referred to this as 'electoral authoritarianism.' In Bangladesh two things remain very specific when it 
comes to reproducing 'liberal fascism' or 'electoral authoritarianism'. Firstly, political parties are infected 
with polarized politics, often violent in nature, and misgovernance. This is mainly because 'polarized 
politics' and 'misgovernance' are profitable for the political-business-bureaucratic nexus, not only 
politically but also financially, while 'good governance' could erode the power for using and misusing it for 
reproducing the nexus. Secondly, familiocracy and lack of democracy within major political parties have 
become the norm in recent times, forgetting, however, that none of the great politicians of Bangladesh, 
starting from AK Fazlul Huq (1873-1962), Maulana Bhashani (1880-1976), HS Suhrawardy (1892-1963), 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920-1975), even Ziaur Rahman (1936-1981), came from political families, that 
is, none of their parents were actively involved in politics. Nothing less than serious pondering and critical 
research would help in transforming the current dismal state of affairs and making Bangladesh 
economically prosperous and politically stable. The State of Governance Bangladesh 2013: Democracy, 
Party, Politics, published by BRAC Institute of Governance and Development, BRAC University, would 
certainly remain a valuable contribution in this endeavour.
Imtiaz Ahmed
Professor of International Relations
University of Dhaka
